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Abstract 
 
 
The rapid emergence of Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) over the past decades 
together with a lack of research into new drugs presents health care systems with 
serious challenges and threatens their ability to effectively treat serious bacterial 
infections. As a result, it is realistic to expect that effective treatment options for 
some infections will run out in the future. The thesis begins by outlining the 
mechanisms and consequences of AMR and argues that AMR differs from other 
distributive problems, due to the specific characteristics of antibiotics. It is suggested 
that for considerations of distributive justice, antibiotic effectiveness should be 
treated as a resource, which can be depleted and which must be fairly distributed 
between people and generations.  
The thesis then goes on to examine the distinctive moral challenge posed by AMR. It 
begins by considering a consequentialist account, which suggests that AMR is a 
moral problem due to the bad health outcomes it entails. However, this approach is 
subsequently dismissed because it struggles to account for some of the particular 
features of AMR. An alternative is to consider AMR as a morally wrongful harm to 
individuals, which requires not only that AMR has adverse effects, but also violates 
the victim’s rights. It is shown that the harm caused by AMR is morally wrongful 
and that people have a right to be protected from adverse health outcomes, which 
AMR violates. However, it is difficult to specify correlative duties that result from 
such a rights claim. 
As an alternative, the thesis suggests and defends a form of Scanlonian 
contractualism, which offers the best model to represent and address issues of 
distributive justice in the case of AMR.  It is shown that a principle of antibiotic use, 
which rules out the use of antibiotics for infections that do not pose a serious risk of 
irreversible harm, offers a convincing contractualist argument. The thesis examines 
the concerns for intergenerational justice that arise as a consequence of AMR and 
shows that contractualism is capable of addressing them. The thesis concludes by 
suggesting a new way of framing AMR as a specific type of policy challenge, which 
better captures its complexity and advocates a reduction of future dependency on 
antibiotics. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and overview of the thesis 
 
1.1  Introduction 
On April 7th 2011, the World Health Day, the WHO announced that urgent actions 
were necessary if the effectiveness of antibiotics was to be ensured in the future. 
Failure to confront the rising problem of antimicrobial resistance (AMR)
1
 would 
result in the loss of the 'miracle cures' offered by antibiotics, the WHO's Director-
General Margaret Chan announced.
2
 These worries have been reiterated by Sally 
Davies, the Chief Medical Officer for England, who described AMR as an 
"apocalyptical threat" in a speech to MPs.
3
 In a recent publication, she and her 
colleagues warned of the possibility that health care system might no longer be able 
to treat bacterial diseases effectively in as little as twenty years.
4
 The World 
Economic Forum has voiced similar concerns and in 2013 declared that AMR 
constitutes one of the main risks to human health.
5
  
 
A mere 68 years earlier, in his introductory remarks to the laureate, Professor 
Theorell, the director of the Department of Biochemistry at the Nobel Institute, had 
compared the invention of antibiotics to a Grimm fairy tale. The laureate he 
addressed that night was Alexander Fleming, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for 
the discovery of Penicillin. Theorell told Fleming that his invention "cannot kill a 
mouse, though it can heal a man".
6
 Today we know that while penicillin has cured 
many, its use was not quite as unproblematic as Theorell had thought. In fact, 
Fleming himself was already a vocal advocate of the careful use of antibiotics at the 
time - during the Nobel lecture he gave he warned: "[T]here may be a danger [...] in 
underdosage [of penicillin]. It is not difficult to make microbes resistant to penicillin 
                                                          
1
  The terms 'antibiotic resistance' and 'antimicrobial resistance' are often used interchangeably 
and I shall adopt this practice throughout the thesis. While antimicrobial resistance can also refer to 
resistance against other substances such as antivirals and antifungals, the focus will here solely be 
placed on resistance against antibiotics.  
2
  http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2011/whd_20110406/en/index.html 
3
  Sample, I. (2013). Antibiotic-resistant diseases pose 'apocalyptic' threat, top expert says. The 
Guardian. London. 
4
  Davies, S. C. (2013). The Drugs Don't Work: a global threat. London, Penguin. 
5
  World Economic Forum (2013). Global Risks 2013 - Insight Report Eighth Edition. 
Geneva.p. 28 
6
  http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1945/fleming-speech.html 
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in the laboratory by exposing them to concentrations not sufficient to kill them, and 
the same thing has occasionally happened in the body."
7
  
 
As it turned out, this property was not unique to penicillin but applies equally to all 
known antibiotics. In fact, recent research has shown, that bacteria became resistant 
to organisms with antibiotic properties, such as fungi, long before antibiotic drugs 
were even discovered and used.
8
 The past years have seen an increased interest in the 
emergence of AMR and the associated risks, yet as much as the topic appears to be 
timely it is by no means a new problem. Before discussing the causes and ethical 
implications of AMR, it will be helpful to introduce a working definition of the term. 
There are numerous similar explanations of the phenomenon, however a particularly 
well-phrased and non-technical definition has been provided by Mossialos et al. It 
defines AMR as:  
 
'[t]he ability of a bacterium to survive and even replicate during a course of 
antibiotic treatment with a specific antibiotic. Failure to resolve an infection with the 
first course of antibiotic treatment may mean that the infection may spread, may 
become more severe and may be more difficult to treat with the next antibiotic that is 
tried.'
9
 
 
Since their invention, and despite Fleming's early warning, the use of antibiotics has 
steadily increased. As a result, AMR quickly emerged, although initially its effects 
were largely offset by a constant stream of new and more potent antibiotics that 
entered the market, routinely replacing antibiotics against which bacteria had already 
become resistant.
10
 While not a solution to the problem, this stream of new 
antibiotics was sufficient to stave off the consequences of AMR. If one drug failed, 
others took its place.
11
 However, the replacement of ineffective drugs with new ones 
has not been sustainable. Since the 1980s, a growing number of multi-drug resistant 
                                                          
7
  Fleming, A. (1945). Penicillin. Nobel Lecture. Stockholm. 
8
  Martinez, J. L. (2008). "Antibiotics and Antibiotic Resistance Genes in Natural 
Environments." Science 321: 365-367. ; D'Costa, V. M., C. E. King, et al. (2011). "Antibiotic 
resistance is ancient." Nature 477: 457-461. 
9
  Mossialos, E., C. Morel, et al. (2008). Policies and incentives for promoting innovation in 
antibiotic research. London, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. p. xiii 
10
   Moellering, R. C. (2012). "MRSA: The first half century." Journal of Antimicrobial 
Chemotherapy 67(1): 4-11. 
11
  Bud, R. (2008). Penicillin: Triumph and Tragedy. Oxford, OUP. Chapter 6 
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and increasingly difficult to treat bacterial strains have emerged.
12
 Available 
therapeutic options against these infections are often less effective, more expensive 
and carry a greater risk of side effects.
13
 Especially the case of extensively and 
completely drug resistant (or "pan-resistant") strains of bacteria has prompted fears 
that the world is entering what some commentators refer to as a 'post-antibiotic 
age'.
14
 Today, AMR already has grave implications for health care and causes 
significant morbidity and mortality. According to estimates from the European 
Centre of Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), 25,000 deaths per year are 
caused by multi-drug resistant bacteria in the EU alone.
15
 Drug resistance also puts 
enormous costs on health care systems.
16
 While the total cost is difficult to assess and 
calculations vary according to the number of cost factors they take into account, the 
available data shows that AMR puts severe strains on health care financing. In the 
US for example, estimates for the total annual costs of treating drug-resistant strains 
of bacteria range between $21 billion - $34 billion.
17
 To put this into perspective, 
annual funding for the American National Institutes of Health, the largest state-
owned research network in the US, currently stands at $32 billion.
18
 
 
The financial and human cost of AMR has sparked research efforts in a number of 
academic disciplines such as economics, politics and history and AMR is no longer 
considered to be a mere medical issue.
19
  However, despite this growing concern 
over AMR, very little attention has so far been paid to the ethical issues, which arise 
                                                          
12
  Witte, W. and M. Mielke (2003). "ß-Laktamasen mit breitem Wirkungsspektrum." 
Bundesgesundheitsblatt - Gesundheitsforschung - Gesundheitsschutz 46(10): 881-890. 
13
  European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. (2010). "Antimicrobial Resistance - 
Factsheet for Experts."   Retrieved 21.04., 2011, from 
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/antimicrobial_resistance/basic_facts/Pages/factsheet_experts.asp
x. 
14
  Brown, N. (1994). "Dawn of the post-antibiotic age?" BMJ 309(6954): 615. Alanis, A. J. 
(2005). "Resistance to Antibiotics: Are We in the Post-Antibiotic Era?" Archives of Medical Research 
36: 687-705. 
15
  European Medicines Agency & European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (2009) 
Joint technical report: the bacterial challenge—time to react, available at: 
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/0909_TER_The_Bacterial_Challenge_Time_to_Re
act.pdf. 
16
  Kaufmann, S. (2007). The New Plagues: Pandemics and Poverty in a Globalized World. 
Frankfurt a.M., Haus Publishing.: 165 
17
  Morel, C. and E. Mossialos (2010). "Stoking the antibiotic pipeline." BMJ 340(c:2115).: 
1115 Smith, R. and J. Coast (2013). "The true cost of antimicrobial resistance." BMJ 346. 
18
  Figures available from the NIH budget office, see 
http://officeofbudget.od.nih.gov/pdfs/FY12/Volume%201%20-%20Overview.pdf   
19
  Bud, R. (2008). Penicillin: Triumph and Tragedy. Oxford, OUP. Roberts, J. A., Ed. (2006). 
The Economics of Infectious Disease. Oxford, OUP. Battin, M. P., L. P. Francis, et al. (2009). The 
Patient as Victim and Vector: Ethics and Infectious Disease. New York, Oxford University Press. 
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as a consequence of antimicrobial resistance.
20
 This thesis will examine some of 
these problems in greater detail. In particular, the thesis will consider questions of 
distributive justice, which arise as a consequence of AMR. 
 
1.2  Aims of the thesis and the question it tries to answer 
This thesis has two primary aims. First, it will examine how and why AMR raises 
questions of distributive justice. Second, it develops a framework within which these 
questions of distributive justice can be structured and - hopefully - answered. A 
rough outline of the arguments in each chapter is presented below. 
 
1. AMR is largely the result of excessive use of antibiotics. It is already a major 
health problem but due to current patterns of antibiotic use, the problem will 
likely become worse in the future. The emergence of AMR and the lack of 
research into new drugs is leading to a lack of effective antibiotics. Due to the 
diminishing effectiveness of antibiotics, we will be unable to treat many 
bacterial infections in the future. This effect cannot be overcome by merely 
eliminating the wasteful use of antibiotics. (Chapter 2) 
2. We can therefore think of antibiotic effectiveness as a resource which we are 
currently depleting and which – due to the time it takes to develop new 
antibiotics – is non-renewable in the medium run. This resource depletion is 
similar to some other kinds of collective action problems but, due to the 
characteristics of AMR, creates a set of specific problems. (Chapter 3) 
3. For our discussion, it is necessary to examine the ways that AMR is not just a 
distinctive distributive problem, but also presents a distinctive moral 
challenge. The thesis will examine different ways of framing and analysing 
the moral challenge that AMR poses.  
4. A first potential answer to the question what makes AMR a moral problem is 
provided by consequentialism. Since AMR exacerbates the harm caused by 
bacterial infections and results in high additional health care costs (which in 
                                                          
20
  Notable exceptions include Millar, M. (2011). "Can antibiotic use be both just and 
sustainable... or only more or less so?" Journal of medical ethics 37(3): 153-157. ; Battin, M. P., L. P. 
Francis, et al. (2009). The Patient as Victim and Vector: Ethics and Infectious Disease. New York, 
Oxford University Press.  
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turn create opportunity costs), consequentialism can explain the moral 
relevance of AMR in terms of its bad consequences.   
5. However, upon closer inspection, it is unclear what results from this 
assessment, since consequentialism’s approach of maximising expected 
benefits across persons struggles to accommodate for some of the factors of 
AMR. In particular, it struggles to assess the morally right course of action, 
because it cannot account for the uncertainty of future effects of AMR. 
(Chapter 4) 
6. An alternative is to consider AMR as a morally wrongful harm to individuals, 
which requires not only that AMR has adverse effects, but also violates the 
victim’s rights. We can show that AMR adversely affects people, although 
the cause of the harm may be diffuse and the size of harm to the individual 
quite small. However, it will be argued that even very small harms can be 
morally wrongful. The account of AMR as a morally wrongful harm also 
considers the possibility of framing the excess risk that drug resistance 
creates as harm, but it will be suggested that such an account is unconvincing, 
because it presupposes awareness of the risk factor. (Chapter 5) 
7. To substantiate the claim that AMR constitutes a morally wrongful harm, it 
will be considered if AMR constitutes a rights violation. Building on Raz’s 
interest theory of rights, it will be argued that people can be said to have a 
right to be protected from adverse health outcomes if an effective treatment 
could be administered. This supports the view that AMR is a morally 
wrongful harm but it is difficult to specify correlative duties that result from 
such a rights claim. Moreover, the rights account of AMR struggles to 
incorporate the fact that with increasing rates of AMR, the content of the 
right becomes gradually harder to provide to all rights holders. This 
diminishes the rights practical relevance over time. It will be outlined that a 
better way to deal with this conflict is to consider a contractualist approach. 
(Chapter 6) 
8. The thesis suggests that a form of Scanlonian contractualism offers the best 
model to represent and address the moral issues of AMR and in particular the 
concerns of distributive justice, which arise in this context. Scanlon proposes 
15 
 
that to assess the justifiability of principles that determine the moral 
permissibility of an action, we must measure the strength of what he calls 
objections to permission and objections to prohibition respectively. Building 
on the work of Michael Millar, the thesis will explore in detail how such a 
principle can be applied to the case of AMR. The thesis shows that Millar’s 
principle of antibiotic use, which rules out the use of antibiotics for infections 
that do not pose a serious risk of permanent irreversible harm, offers a 
convincing contractualist argument. It will be argued that contractualism 
could in principle justify more demanding principles to restrict the use of 
antibiotics for the preservation of antibiotic effectiveness. However, it will 
also be suggested that the positive externalities of antibiotics somewhat limit 
the scope for restricting antibiotic use and that existing principles also face a 
number of problems, including the inability to decide clearly, what risk we 
can legitimately expose people to. (Chapter 7) 
9. Since AMR will also affect the lives of future generations, we will have to 
consider what our obligations to future people are. The consideration of 
future generations is complicated, by a number of factors including the time 
frame under consideration, the uncertainty about outcomes in the future and 
the overlap of generations, which makes it difficult to treat them as separate 
entities. The greatest challenge of an intergenerational account of justice, 
however, is Parfit’s non-identity problem, which suggests that our actions 
cannot harm future persons, if their existence is contingent upon our previous 
actions. It will be shown that a contractualist account can sidestep this 
problem and assign equal moral value to the interest of future persons. 
(Chapter 8) 
10. To better capture the complexities of AMR, the thesis will conclude by 
developing an account of AMR as a specific kind of policy challenge, a so-
called super-wicked problem. On this account, AMR is a problem we cannot 
solve with technological means. Consequently, it will be suggested that 
obligations for future persons may therefore not only entail the preservation 
of antibiotic effectiveness, but also a duty to reduce the current dependence 
on antibiotics in health care. (Chapter 9) 
 
16 
 
1.3  The scope of discussion and the questions I do not try to answer  
While the main focus of research into AMR continues to lie in the biomedical 
disciplines, the emergence of wide-spread resistance has sparked a significant 
number of research projects in other disciplines not traditionally concerned with 
AMR.
21
 The challenge in addressing a question pertaining to AMR is thus twofold. 
On the one hand, the high degree of complexity and interconnectedness of the 
problem makes it difficult to delineate its boundaries. On the other hand, the 
increasing number of academic disciplines concerned with AMR, all with their own 
methodologies and theories, has led to a large number of possible approaches to the 
problem. Not all of them can and will be considered in this dissertation. 
 
In focussing the question and thereby reducing its scope to one that allows for a 
comprehensive analysis and critical evaluation, some of the ethical concerns 
surrounding AMR will therefore have to be left out. In the case of this thesis, the 
most obvious topic to be excluded is a discussion of the use of antimicrobial drugs in 
farming. Given that a large proportion of the overall production of antibiotics is 
designated for the use in animals, this may seem like a rather glaring omission, 
especially since many commentators consider this use of antibiotics to be one of the 
major driving forces in the emergence of AMR. However, the focus of this thesis is 
on distributive justice and as such will be concerned with parties that can be seen to 
have moral claims to the use of scarce resources. I do not wish to claim that animals 
may not have rights, nor do I wish to suggest that such rights claims do not matter in 
the case of distributing antibiotics. However, a full discussion of these aspects would 
simply go beyond the scope of this thesis. On occasion, the aspect of using 
antibiotics in animal farming will be mentioned but this will primarily be for the sake 
of completeness, rather than as a substantial part of the overall argument.  
 
Furthermore, the focus of this thesis is on the macro-level distribution of antibiotics. 
While the second chapter will consider prescription practices in different health care 
settings, the ethical analysis will mostly focus on fair resource distribution. AMR 
creates a host of additional problems in addition to those discussed in this thesis. 
                                                          
21
  Laximinarayan, R. (2006). Economic Issues related to antimicrobial resistance. The 
Economics of Infectious Disease. J. A. Roberts. Oxford, OUP. Laxminarayan, R. and D. L. Heymann 
(2012). "Challenges of drug resistance in the developing world." BMJ 344. Bud, R. (2008). Penicillin: 
Triumph and Tragedy. Oxford, OUP. 
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Many of these pertain to the treatment of patients with extensively resistant bacterial 
infections, the management and containment of infection and the enforced social 
distancing of contagious patients.
22
 In particular, the emergence of multi- and 
extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB and XDR-TB respectively) has 
exacerbated the need to formulate ethical guidelines for the treatment of patients with 
dangerous infectious diseases in resource-poor settings.
23
 The decision to forego a 
systematic analysis of these problems in the thesis stems from the fact that many of 
these ethical problems do not pertain to AMR specifically, but are a "by-product" of 
infectious disease control more generally. To be sure, as the example of MDR- and 
XDR-tuberculosis has shown all too clearly, the difficulties in treating drug-resistant 
infections greatly amplify the problem and create additional urgency. However, in 
this thesis, the focus will be placed on moral challenges that are not applicable to 
infectious diseases in general but apply specifically to the case of AMR.  
 
Finally, the thesis does not claim to offer a comprehensive refutation of normative 
theories and their relevance to AMR. Since there is little previous research on issues 
of distributive justice in the context of AMR, much of the following discussion 
breaks new ground. As a result, the primary aim is to establish which theory of 
distributive justice offers the most coherent account of the challenges posed by 
AMR. However, the thesis does not amount to a conclusive rejection of the 
alternatives it considers.  
 
1.4  Why the questions addressed in this thesis are important  
AMR has been described as one of the major challenges to health care in the 21st 
century and presents policy-makers with a scenario of potentially "apocalyptic 
dimensions.”24 It should therefore come as no surprise that it is an area of concern for 
health policy makers. However, to date very little has been written about the specific 
ethical questions that AMR raises. As chapters 3 and 9 will explore in greater detail, 
there is no straightforward solution to the problem of AMR and many of the current 
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initiatives, such as the conservation of antibiotic effectiveness by promoting the 
'prudent use' of antibiotics inevitably raise ethical questions that have so far not been 
addressed in detail.  These questions seem to apply particularly to macro-level 
decision-making. Adjusting current use of antibiotics to socially optimal or cost-
effective levels will require a conception of what such an optimal distribution could 
look like and - most importantly - whose interests we must take into consideration. 
This requires, for instance, that we make a decision whether or not we respect future 
people’s claims to effective antibiotics and at what level of tolerable cost to currently 
living  persons. An answer to these questions will help us to determine the criteria we 
should use to assess the fairness of the policy options we adopt. Moreover, it will 
also outline more clearly, what interests and moral claims are at stake as a result of 
the rapid progression of AMR. 
 
1.5  Research approach and interdisciplinary work  
A project on ethical aspects of infectious disease control and ethics will necessarily 
have to take an interdisciplinary research approach - without some biomedical 
background information, the ethical analysis has no subject matter to explore. At the 
same, time, medical expertise and knowledge of infectious diseases alone will be 
insufficient to establish normative claims about the fair use of effective antibiotics. 
The thesis seeks to bridge this gap by not only drawing on medical and public health 
literature, but also by making extensive use of the existing literature and discourses 
in bioethics and public health ethics. 
 
Ethics is certainly not an academic discipline that is commonly associated with the 
study of AMR and it may therefore be necessary to locate more clearly the role that 
ethical analysis can play in this field. To be sure, AMR itself is a biomedical problem  
but, as will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters, its origins lie at 
least partially in human behaviour. As a result, medical researchers are increasingly 
becoming aware of the need to address AMR in cooperation with different academic 
disciplines and non-academic organisations and interest groups.
25
 Such cooperations 
include public engagement and information campaigns, the study of financial 
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incentives to reduce rates of infection in hospital wards, or qualitative studies of 
prescription behaviour among general practitioners.
26
 But, as Larson et al have 
pointed out, the current state of interdisciplinary research in the field of AMR suffers 
from a problem, namely the question, how one can even know which research areas 
may be beneficial, as long as the problem itself is only loosely defined.
27
  
The thesis will not be able to provide a general answer to this problem but it will 
show that ethical analysis of AMR is an important aspect that has so far not received 
sufficient attention. Researching the thesis revealed that this view is not universally 
shared. I encountered a number of practitioners and policy makers who were kind 
enough to share their expertise with me. However, some of them were rather 
sceptical of the role that ethics could potentially play in informing health policy. This 
scepticism appeared to be founded in a common misunderstanding of the function of 
ethical discourse, which Jonathan Glover has identified precisely: 
 
Many people think that [...] arguing about the merits of general moral principles is 
either superfluous of impossible. This is often because they make one of two false 
assumptions. One of these assumptions is that there is one set of 'true' moral beliefs, 
which no humane, rational and informed person could reject once he understood 
them. This makes moral argument redundant. The other assumption is that moral 
beliefs are so subjective that no useful discussion can take place between those who 
differ [...]. This makes moral argument impossible.
28
  
 
Particularly the second concern mentioned by Glover is fairly pervasive. A worry 
that was expressed repeatedly in conversations with health care professionals was 
that an ethical analysis of AMR  would merely amount to the expression of one 
person's opinion. While it will hardly come as a surprise that the thesis in its present 
form reflects the author's views, this fact need not pose any real limitation to the 
soundness of the argument. Ethical discourse, while often pluralistic, has at its 
disposal a number of methods which allow for an appraisal of competing normative 
arguments that venture beyond the 'mere expression of  opinion'.  
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These methods include for example: 
 
 scrutinising arguments for inconsistencies or 'blurred concepts' 
 exposing logical inadequacies, e.g. by showing that certain premises that are 
assumed to be generally applicable do in fact not hold 
 pointing out undesired consequences that a moral theory might inevitably 
entail.
29
 
 
As the thesis will hopefully show, the current discussion surrounding AMR can 
greatly benefit from more normative analysis, particularly with regard to the fair 
distribution of scarce resources.  
 
1.6 Research methods 
Given the complexity of the subject matter and the number of disciplines on which 
the thesis draws, the research process involved the consultation of a wide range of 
sources. The main components are summarised below. 
 
Literature Review 
As an indication for the availability of literature on the subject matter, a simple 
literature review on the medical research database PubMed received 95 hits for the 
subjects of "antibiotic resistance" and "ethics".
30
 Many of the results are relevant to 
the project and - where publicly available - have been consulted throughout the 
research process. However, given the interdisciplinary nature of the problem which 
this thesis seeks to explore, it was important to sample a broad range of literature. To 
obtain it, the following methods were employed: 
 
Library catalogues  
University library catalogues at UCL, as well as at the universities of Berlin, Zurich, 
Hamburg and Copenhagen were consulted. Furthermore, the subject-specific library 
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at the Wellcome Trust in London was used extensively, as well as the British 
Library, and other collegiate libraries within the University of London. 
 
Snowballing  
In many instances, further literature was found via references in the works that were 
initially consulted. This proved particularly useful for less widely known government 
studies that were not generally listed in library catalogues, but also became relevant 
for the inclusion of literature that discussed related problems, such as the ethical 
dilemmas created by climate change and global warming or the use of management 
theory in chapter 9. 
 
Consultation of Guidelines  
Many national and international health institutions have published guidelines, policy 
briefings or workshop summaries on the issue of AMR, often including national or 
international statistics of prevalence and incidence of infections that were caused by 
bacterial strains resistant to antibiotics. These institutions include the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC), the UK's Department of Health as well as Public Health England (PHE), 
the German and South African Ministry of Health, the South African National 
Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD), the Robert-Koch-Institute (RKI), and 
others.    
 
Expert Opinion 
Due to the collaboration between UCL and PHE, the writing of the thesis and the 
identification of key problems benefitted enormously from discussions with PHE 
staff, as well as policy makers in the Department of Health. These discussions ranged 
from basic questions about biochemical mechanisms of AMR to the participation in 
PHE specialist board meetings and the presentation of specific ideas to policy 
makers. PHE staff also made available statistics and surveillance data, and explained 
the mechanisms of risk assessment and calculation of economic forecasts for 
modelling the costs of AMR. 
 
Furthermore, academic experts in the fields of public health, bioethics, infectious 
disease control and medicine contributed to this thesis, either through informal 
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conversations or by providing feedback on drafts or particular ideas.  Lastly, many of 
the international institutions mentioned in the previous paragraph were contacted 
directly and in some instances allowed me to visit them for more in-depth 
conversations. The National Institute for Communicable Diseases in Johannesburg 
welcomed me for a three-day visit in December 2011, where I had the chance to 
meet with a number of tuberculosis experts, and I was able to attend a number of 
meetings and workshops at the WHO in Copenhagen, which helped to better 
understand the perspective of international organisations.  
 
1.7  Main conclusions of the thesis and its contribution to the field  
The main conclusion of this thesis is that moral duties to preserve antibiotic 
effectiveness will require that current consumption is reduced, even if this means that 
people will have to forego some health benefits. The thesis develops an account of 
contractualist ethics, on which the restriction of antibiotics is permissible wherever 
those who are adversely affected by such restrictions could not reasonably reject 
such restrictions. It is shown that the extent of such restrictions is partly dictated by 
contractualism but will equally depend on the consideration of medical and 
epidemiological facts, since the use of antibiotics also generates positive externalities 
for infection control, which reduces the future burden of contagious diseases.  
 
The argument developed in this thesis is shown to be consistent with considerations 
of distributive justice within and between generations. Its conclusions build on and 
expand existing research and the thesis offers one of the first detailed examinations 
of distributive justice in the case of AMR. The thesis challenges the frequently made 
assumption that AMR represents a problem, which can be treated as analogous to 
other policy challenges and outlines the characteristics that separate AMR from 
comparable cases. Moreover, it outlines the normative importance of AMR and 
develops a novel account of framing AMR as a special policy challenge, a so-called 
super-wicked problem.  
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Chapter 2: Antibiotics, their use, and the emergence of drug 
resistance 
 
Chapter 1 gave an overview of the research questions and the methodological 
approach of the thesis. The second chapter pursues three goals. First, it will outline 
the basic functioning of antibiotics and the reasons for the emergence of bacterial 
resistance to these drugs. Second, it will examine more closely, how and why the 
present use of antibiotics is unsustainable and what policy efforts have so far been 
undertaken to curb the spread of AMR. Third, the factors that motivate overuse of 
antibiotics in different settings and by different groups of stakeholders will be 
discussed. We shall begin, however, with a brief overview and taxonomy of bacteria. 
 
2.1  Bacteria - a brief microbiological overview and taxonomy 
Since antibiotics are drugs which are only effective against bacteria, it is useful to 
start with a brief discussion of their targets. Bacteria are simple but highly adaptive 
and resilient organisms. Unlike human tissue cells which are eukaryotic, bacteria are 
prokaryotes, meaning that they do not have a nucleus.
31
 In bacteria, the DNA thus 
lies in the cytoplasm, usually in circular form.
32
 Circular DNA is more prone to be 
replicated imprecisely, increasing the chance of random mutation. Many of these 
mutations will not be able to survive but some, by sheer chance, can display new 
biological features, which may for example render them immune to a certain type of 
antibiotic. We will return to these properties later on in this chapter. Generally 
speaking, bacteria have three defining structural features
33
: 
 
(1) A cell membrane (and often a cell wall) 
(2) Internal cytoplasm, which contains the DNA and ribosomes (the site for 
protein synthesis in both, prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells) 
(3) External structures, which will vary according to the type of bacteria, 
including flagella and pilli on the bacterium's surface. 
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Bacteria exist in a multitude of shapes, such as spheres, spirals or curves. The name 
of a bacterium will usually include a reference to its shape.  Staphylococci for 
example have a spherical structure, which is referred to as coccus.
34
 In the case of 
Staphylococci, the first part of the name refers to the arrangement in which they can 
be found ('staphylo' denotes the grape-like clusters of bacteria). 
 
Bacteria are classed in many different ways - one standard text book on microbiology 
lists a total of 25 common classification criteria.
35
 These criteria range from simple 
morphology to the reaction to specific chemical tests that will lead to the partial 
breakdown of parts of the cell and/or staining to distinguish between different types 
of bacteria. The most widely used method (which will also be relevant to the 
following discussion) is the Gram stain test, named after the microbiologist Hans-
Christian Gram.
36
 Gram discovered that in a three-step staining process, where 
crystal violet and iodine are added to the cell, before decolourization with ethanol is 
performed, some bacterial cells retain the stain while others don't.
37
 Based on this 
test, the most common taxonomy for bacteria distinguishes between Gram-positive 
cells (which will retain crystal violet even after decolourization), and Gram-negative 
cells (which will not retain the stain). A smaller group of bacteria is not reactive to 
the Gram-Stain test at all. Since Gram-positive and Gram-negative cells display very 
different properties and react differently to antibiotics, the distinction will be relevant 
throughout the following chapters.  
 
While ten years ago, Gram-positive bacteria such as S. aureus were the primary 
concern of infectious disease specialists, their attention has recently shifted to newly 
emerging threats posed by multidrug-resistant Gram-negative bacteria such as K. 
pneumoniae. These bacteria develop resistance more readily and often exchange 
mobile genes via plasmids that are transferred between cells.
38
 Of particular concern 
are those bacteria which have developed resistance to carbapenems, one of the most 
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effective classes of intravenous antibiotics against Gram-negative bacteria that 
clinicians currently have at their disposal.
39
 While still rare, the number of 
carbapenem-resistant bacterial infections registered in UK hospitals has increased 
significantly over the past decade - in 2004, there were a mere five registered cases, 
while seven years later, this figure had already risen to more than 300.
40
 This 
development is all the more worrying because, as will be discussed in greater detail 
below, there is a significant lack of research into drugs that specifically target Gram-
negative bacteria.
41
 
 
2.2  Antibiotics 
Antibiotics are a special group of chemotherapeutic agents. Even though in everyday 
language 'chemotherapy' is commonly used as synonymous with cancer treatment, 
the term actually describes all forms of therapy in which a chemical rids the body of 
malignant cells.
42
 The literal translation of antibiosis is 'against life' and antibiotic 
drugs are chemical substances, which specifically attack and kill pathogenic bacteria. 
What makes antibiotics so special is their property of selective toxicity. This means 
that they are toxic enough to destroy the pathogenic prokaryotic cells but not so toxic 
as to attack the eukaryotic tissue cells of the patient. Unlike synthetic antibacterial 
agents, such as sulphonamides, antibiotics are mostly biosynthesized and are usually 
the metabolic product of particular types of fungi or other bacteria.
43
 Different 
antibiotics have different mechanisms of action but crucially, antibiotics either 
interfere with bacterial growth processes (bacteriostatic antibiotics), or kill off 
bacteria (bactericidal antibiotics).
44
 They commonly achieve their purpose by 
employing one of three mechanisms to attack their target:  
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1) Inhibition of cell wall synthesis - particular antibiotics, such as β-lactams 
weaken the bacterial cell wall, which results in the breakdown of the cell (also 
known as lysis) 
2) Inhibition of protein synthesis - by attacking prokaryotic ribosomes, certain 
antibiotics render bacterial cells incapable of synthesizing proteins that are 
needed for the cell's survival. 
3) Disruption of the bacterial cell wall - some bactericidal antibiotics specifically 
target molecules in bacterial cell walls and destroy these, which causes lysis.
45
 
 
Antibiotics are often classified in terms of the order in which they should be used for 
specific infections. First-line drugs are those, which initially proved to be effective, 
while second and third-line drugs are subsequent generations of antibiotics that are 
effective against resistant or multi-resistant strains of bacteria. What will be classed 
as a first-, second-, and third-line drug will depend on the respective pathogen.  
 
2.3  Discovery and initial use of antibiotics 
The first antibiotic was discovered in the 1920s by Alexander Fleming, who named 
his invention penicillin. Due to its success story it remains the best-known antibiotic 
to date.
46
 However, it was not until the 1940s that antibiotics were used more widely 
as a standard therapeutic measure against infections, and dramatically changed the 
role and perception of infections as a disease burden in modern society. Initially 
reserved for use in the armed forces during WWII, penicillin was made available to 
the wider public after the end of the war and became widely used. This was due to at 
least two reasons. Not only could penicillin cure a wide range of infections and 
diseases that were previously untreatable, it also did so at breathtaking speed, with 
significant improvements in patients' health being observable in the space of hours. 
In one of the first cases in the United States, where penicillin was used to treat 
septicaemia (blood poisoning), doctors were astonished that the patient not only 
survived but also fully recovered from a critical condition in less than 24 hours.
47
 It 
is therefore not surprising that in the decades following their discovery, antibiotics 
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were hailed as 'miracle drugs'.
48
 To some extent, this belief in a medical 'miracle' 
went far beyond curing bacterial infections. It has been suggested that penicillin 
transformed the way in which we view medication and changed the expectations 
patients and relatives place in drugs.
49
 After all, if a single pill can cure deadly 
infections, then why not other conditions such as cancer, coronary heart disease or 
stroke? As is all too clear today, modern medicine has not been able to deliver on 
such a promise. Miracle cures are rare and AMR shows that even where we believe 
that we may have found them, the medical triumph is often temporary. Nevertheless, 
in the early days of antibiotic use, confidence in their continued effectiveness was 
such that in 1967 the US surgeon general was credited with claiming that that '[t]he 
time has come to close the book on infectious diseases. We have basically wiped out 
infection in the United States'.
50
 
 
In the decades following their initial discovery, a broad range of antibiotics were 
identified and put into production. By 1960, more than a dozen different classes of 
antimicrobial drugs had been commercialised.
51
 Some of them were very similar to 
already existing drugs, yet a few of them addressed one of the shortcomings of 
penicillin. Despite its immense curative power, penicillin is only effective against a 
comparatively small number of bacteria and crucially does not work on most Gram-
negative bacteria. The answer to this limitation came in the form of broad-spectrum 
antibiotics, which - unlike narrow-spectrum drugs like penicillin - attack a much 
wider range of bacteria, including both Gram-positive and Gram-negative pathogens. 
One enormous advantage of these drugs is that in cases where immediate treatment is 
needed or lab cultures cannot be taken and analysed, broad-spectrum antibiotics 
massively improve the chance that the patient receives effective treatment in time. 
However, this increased effectiveness comes at a price. For example, the higher 
toxicity of broad-spectrum antibiotics increases the risk of superinfections, due to a 
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reduction in microbial antagonisms.
52
 Such a reduction occurs when antibiotics 
diminish the overall load of microbes, but leave certain types unaffected. Because 
microbes are usually in competition for nutrients, their co-existence limits the extent 
to which they can spread. If an antibiotic drastically reduces the numbers of multiple 
types of microbes, the remaining ones can multiply more quickly, which can result in 
secondary infections.
53
 
 
2.4  Emergence and mechanisms of AMR 
Despite the fairly recent public interest in AMR, the phenomenon itself is not new.
54
 
In many ways, it is therefore surprising that it was only in 2011 that the WHO made 
AMR one of its major policy issues.
55
 However, it would be untrue to claim that 
there was no awareness of the problem before. The U.S. Office of Technology 
Assessment, for example, published a report in 1995 entitled Impacts of Antibiotic-
Resistant Bacteria, in which it discussed not only difficulties in treating infections 
caused by bacteria that were resistant against first-line antibiotics but also raised the 
problem of completely drug-resistant strains of bacteria.
56
 While the report stated 
that untreatable infections were rare at the time of writing, it warned that the number 
of such infections was rapidly increasing and that there were a significant number of 
bacterial strains, which displayed resistances against all but one antibiotic. The report 
concluded that it was therefore likely that total drug-resistance for these types of 
bacteria was merely a matter of time.
57
 
 
AMR can occur in different ways, but the most important distinction is between 
intrinsic and acquired resistance.
58
 The former refers to natural defence mechanisms 
a bacterial cell may have. Gram-positive bacteria for example have a thicker cell 
wall, which makes it harder for certain antibiotics to penetrate the cell. Intrinsic 
                                                          
52
  Bauman, R. W. (2004). Microbiology: International Edition. San Francisco, Pearson 
Benjamin Cummings. p. 297 
53
  ibid. 
54
  Martinez, J. L. (2008). "Antibiotics and Antibiotic Resistance Genes in Natural 
Environments." Science 321: 365-367. 
55
  The WHO did publish extensive guidelines for health care professionals before, but did not 
place a particular emphasis on engaging and informing the public about the risks of AMR  
56
  Office of Technology Assessment (1995). Impacts of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria. 
Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office. 
57
  ibid. p. 1 
58
  Mossialos, E., C. Morel, et al. (2008). Policies and incentives for promoting innovation in 
antibiotic research. London, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.  
29 
 
resistance is usually limited to a few antibiotics and often only to a single type of 
action mechanism. Acquired resistance is the result of genetic mutation. As outlined 
before, due to their simple cell structure, their high rate of cell division and the lack 
of a nucleus, prokaryotic cells are more frequently subjected to naturally occurring 
mutation. Consequently, resistance against a particular antibiotic may simply be a 
matter of chance. The development of AMR as a result of mutation or gene 
acquisition is unavoidable.
59
 However, the speed with which this will occur is greatly 
influenced by man-made factors, such as the overall use of antibiotics, adherence to 
therapy protocols and the circumstances in which antibiotics are prescribed. Low 
dosages of an otherwise effective antibiotic or incomplete treatment cycles for 
example may render bacteria resistant against the same drug in the future. In a recent 
joint statement, the U.S. Centres of Disease Prevention and Control (CDC) together 
with a number of national health organisations succinctly highlighted the dilemma 
that is inherent in any antimicrobial usage policy:  
 
"The more we use antibiotics, the more we contribute to the pool of antibiotic-
resistant microbes. The development of resistance is an inevitable by-product of 
exposure to antibiotics. All antibiotic use, whether warranted or not, places selection 
pressure on bacteria, and some organisms that possess genetic mutations will 
survive antibiotic treatment."
60
 
 
Fundamentally, there are five common mechanisms of AMR, which prokaryotic cells 
can develop.
61
 These are: 
 
(1) Production of enzymes that destroy antibiotics. The most common 
enzymes are ß-lactamases, which destroy a molecular structure of ß-lactam 
antibiotics such as penicillin, thereby rendering the antibiotic inactive.  
(2) Slowing down or preventing the antibiotic from entering the cell. This is 
usually the result of changes in electrical charges on the cell surface and 
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confers resistance against broad-spectrum antibiotics such as tetracycline, and 
narrow-spectrum antibiotics such as penicillin 
(3) Altering the receptor to which the antibiotic binds. This mechanism 
occurs mainly in pathogens that become resistant to antibiotics that interfere 
with protein translation in prokaryotic cells. 
(4) Changing the cell metabolism, for example by stopping to produce certain 
enzymes which an antibiotic would normally attack. 
(5) Developing transport mechanisms that pump antibiotics out of the 
prokaryotic cell before they can act on their target site.
62
 
 
While AMR is a long-standing phenomenon, increased use of antimicrobials in 
health care settings has exacerbated the problem dramatically.
63
 A good example is 
the progressive resistance of staphylococci infections. In the case of staphylococcus 
aureus, resistance to the antibiotic methicillin was first discovered in the 1960s.
64
 
However, since then, the prevalence of methicillin resistance amongst S. aureus 
strains has increased dramatically. One study found that between 1975 and 1991 the 
prevalence of MRSA among nosocomial staphylococcus infections in the US 
increased from 2.1% to 35%.
65
 Today, S. aureus is the most common cause of 
bloodstream infections in the United States, Canada and Latin America, with a 
significant proportion of the infections displaying drug-resistance.
66
 In Europe 
MRSA is also one of the most prevalent drug-resistant pathogen that causes blood 
stream infections.
67
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2.5  Causes of AMR 
AMR has been described as a prime example of Darwin's theory of evolution.
68
 
While antibiotics have greatly helped in reducing morbidity and mortality from 
bacterial infections in the last 60 years, their use has inadvertently led to the natural 
selection of resistant strains, which are stronger, more virulent, and in some cases 
almost untreatable. In addition to random genetic mutation, most studies of AMR 
identify at least three reasons why drug-resistance has become more pronounced as a 
problem in recent years. These are overprescription, a lack of research into new 
drugs, and the widespread use of antibiotics in agriculture and cattle farming.
69
  
 
2.5.1 Overprescription 
Overprescription and 'empirical therapy' (also known as 'calculated therapy') have 
been identified as one of the key problems in the rise of AMR. 'Empirical therapy' 
refers to the practice of prescribing antibiotics without obtaining a sample for 
laboratory testing and precise identification of the bacterial strain that caused the 
infection.
70
 This is not merely a matter of cost-saving or ignorance. Sometimes, there 
may not be enough time for such testing, or the wait for confirmation of lab results 
would be painful for the patient and place him at unnecessary risk. The result of 
empirical therapy, however, is that antibiotics will sometimes be used on patients for 
whom they are ineffective or provide only very limited benefits. In the case of otitis 
media (middle ear infection) it is estimated that only thirty to fifty percent of patients 
will benefit from antibiotic therapy.
71
 However, since most patients are children, 
doctors will usually refrain from puncturing the eardrum to obtain a sample of pus, 
which can be analysed. The immediate prescription of broad-spectrum antibiotics 
thus continues to be the most common therapy for middle ear infections.
72
 Yet, it 
remains unclear, in which cases empirical therapy is in the interest of the patient. In 
the case of S. aureus bacteraemia for example, recent findings suggest that calculated 
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therapy is not in fact associated with lower mortality.
73
 Judging whether or not non-
laboratory-confirmed antibiotic therapy is in the interest of the patient is thus a 
difficult question to assess. While empirical therapy carries the risk of administering 
an ineffective antibiotic treatment, thereby also increasing the chances of creating 
AMR, it may also aid in alleviating painful symptoms quicker than would be 
possible if microbiological tests were carried out in advance. Furthermore, empirical 
therapy may decrease the chance of serious complications, as the therapy is provided 
more quickly. Physicians may thus be faced with a trade-off between short term and 
long-term costs and benefits of prescribing antibiotics. In this trade-off lie many of 
the ethical dilemmas that the following chapters will examine in detail. 
 
To some extent, antibiotic overprescribing is measurable. Institutions such as ESAC, 
the European Surveillance of Antimicrobial Consumption, record the number of 
prescribed daily doses across 27 European countries.
74
 These display stark 
differences across European countries - with regard to both volume of consumption 
and the types of antibiotics that are being prescribed. In light of the fact that health 
outcomes will often not be better in countries that prescribe particularly large 
amounts of antibiotics, it has been suggested that the difference in consumption can 
be explained by excess prescriptions. However, this is difficult to prove conclusively, 
as higher levels of antibiotic prescribing may also simply indicate a higher burden of 
infectious diseases in a country.
75
 It must also be noted that the degree to which 
people adhere to treatment protocols may vary between countries, and that a 
comparison of national statistics on antibiotic prescription is thus not an accurate 
estimate of actual rates of antibiotic consumption. Grigoryan et al found for example 
that in a cross-European study on attitudes and beliefs about antibiotics, some 
countries (among them the UK) displayed lower levels of knowledge about 
antibiotics and their mechanism of action than others such as Sweden, Belgium or 
the Netherlands.
76
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At the other end of the spectrum, lack of access to antibiotics is a serious problem in 
many developing countries.
77
 Where treatment is not affordable or access to health 
care resources is restricted, people are more likely to self-medicate, buy counterfeit 
drugs through unofficial channels or fail to complete treatment cycles.
 78  
In all these 
cases, bacteria are subjected to an insufficient dose of antibiotics, thereby increasing 
the chance of AMR among the surviving pathogens. In many cases, failure to 
conform with treatment instructions is thus not due to the patient, but results from 
systemic failure in the health care sector. This problem will be discussed in greater 
detail in chapter 9 of the thesis.
 
 
2.5.2 Lack of research into new drugs  
For a period of around four decades, following the discovery of penicillin, 
pharmaceutical companies produced a steady flow of new antibiotics.
79
 New 
developments did not only include drugs that were similar to already existing ones, 
but also products that used novel mechanisms to attack bacteria. This helped to 
circumvent some of the pharmacological problems that had arisen as a consequence 
of emerging AMR. However, since the 1970s, development of new antibiotics has 
slowed down considerably and the available stocks of effective antibiotics are 
currently being depleted, while little research effort is geared towards the 
development of new antibiotics.
80
 Despite the significant levels of mortality and 
morbidity associated with AMR, in 2004 a mere 1.6% of the research budget of the 
world's 15 largest pharmaceuticals was spent on the development of new 
antibiotics.
81
 In particular, there is a lack of research into new antibiotics specifically 
targeted at Gram-negative bacteria. A survey of the pharmaceutical industry from 
2013 reported that presently no drugs with a novel action mechanism against Gram-
negative bacteria are in advanced stages of clinical development.
82
 This is 
particularly problematic, as Gram-negative bacteria account for a majority of 
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infections, and some strains such as Klebsiellae have already become a cause of 
concern for physicians due to their extensive drug-resistance.
83
  
 
There are a number of causes for the decrease in research activity for the 
development of new antimicrobial drugs, but they mostly appear to concern the 
expected rate of return on investment.
84
  
The initially very rapid development of new antimicrobials over the past decade was 
partly explicable by the relatively low level of basic research that was needed to get a 
new antimicrobial drug into the market.
85
 However, antimicrobial drugs have been 
developed in what Christopher Walsh described as "a target-poor environment".
86
 
Many classes of drugs work on similar action mechanisms and with increasing levels 
of AMR, the discovery of completely new target sites is becoming more and more 
important. This, however, requires extensive research and investment, long before it 
is clear if the development costs can be recovered. It is estimated that for the 
development of a new compound that can act as an antibacterial agent, only one out 
of twenty candidates will lead to a new drug.
87
 Once a new antibiotic has been 
developed, its profitability is limited by the short length of prescription and the 
relatively low volume of sales, which is further reduced, if there is pressure to 
preserve the drug's effectiveness.
88
 Such a pressure will primarily exist for new 
second- and third-line drugs, which are often therapies of last resort and are 
consequently prescribed sparingly.  Given the high cost and long time span it takes to 
develop a new antimicrobial drug, pharmaceutical manufacturers that seek to 
maximise profits currently have few incentives to conduct research into new 
antibiotics.
89
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2.5.3 Antibiotic use in agriculture 
Early antibiotics like penicillin were intended to be used on humans only.
90
 
However, over the last five decades antibiotics have also increasingly been used on 
animals and even plants in order to combat bacterial infections.
91
 Until a ban to use 
antibiotics without veterinary indication in cattle farming was passed in the European 
Union in 2006, around 50 percent of the annual production of antimicrobials in the 
EU was designated for animal use.
92
 The use of antibiotics on farm animals is not 
primarily aimed at treating acute infections. Instead, antibiotics are used as growth 
enhancers, and for infection prophylaxis.
93
 The widespread use of antibiotics in 
animals may have consequences for bacterial infections in humans. For example, 
there is an observable correlation between the prevalence of vancomycin-resistance 
in humans and the use of avoparcin as a growth promoter in farming animals. 
Countries in which avoparcin was routinely given to livestock also displayed 
significantly higher rates of resistance to vancomycin, which like avoparcin is a 
glycopeptide antibiotic and thus very similar in structure.
94
 It is thus widely accepted 
that the emergence of vancomycin-resistance is at least partially attributable to the 
widespread use of avoparcin in farm animals.
95
 Animal farming is, however, not the 
only area of food production that utilises antibiotics on a large scale. In the early 
1990s, an estimated ten percent of the US annual production of antimicrobials were 
used on neither persons nor farm animals, but designated for use on organisms such 
as honeybees and fruit trees.
96
  
 
The use of antibiotics in animals and on plants is problematic, as low dosages of an 
antibiotic consumed over prolonged periods of time facilitate an optimal selection for 
drug-resistant strains.
97
 There are a number of reasons why this ought to be of 
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concern to us. First, there is a risk that antibiotic-resistant bacteria can be transferred 
between animals and humans, either by direct contact or through contaminated 
products such as eggs.
98
 Second, there is evidence to suggest that even very low 
doses of antibiotics that remain in animal products can contribute to the selection of 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria.
99
 Third, the fact that plants and animals become hosts to 
(multi-)drug resistant bacteria is an ecological problem, as greater density of resistant 
organisms will reduce the number of drug-susceptible microbes in the environment 
even further by natural selection.
100
 The phenomenon is well established in hospital 
settings.
101
 However, by increasing the use of antimicrobials outside health care 
settings, the spread of drug-resistant bacteria in other settings has also increased. 
 
2.5.4 Other factors 
There are a number of additional factors, which have facilitated the emergence of 
antimicrobial resistance over the past decades. Some of them are difficult to address 
with specific policies, because they concern societal change over time. A good 
example is the demographic change that is observable in many developed countries. 
Increased life expectancy, paired with improved medical technology and better 
treatment options for chronic conditions have led to an increase of the proportion of 
people who are particularly susceptible to bacterial infections.
102
 Similarly, the 
increase of international travel, greater cross-border mobility, and large-scale 
immigration have had an impact on the global distribution of bacterial infections, and 
consequently on the spread of antimicrobial resistance. A recent example of the 
speed with which new infections can spread was the emergence of patients with 
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carbapenem-resistant enterobacteriaceae in Pakistan in India.
103
 Within a short 
period, similar cases were reported all around the world, for example in the UK and 
Germany.
104
  
 
Beyond the epidemiological factors, individual patients’ medical histories and 
characteristics can also play a role in the spread of AMR. Poor absorption of oral 
antibiotics or bad circulation, which impedes the transport of antibiotics to the target 
site can increase the chances that some bacteria survive antibiotic therapy and 
become resistant.
105
 This is a particular problem for bone infections where only few 
blood vessels are within proximity of the infection site.
106
  
 
While it has been stressed so far that antibiotics should be used sparingly wherever 
possible to avoid an increased risk of the development of AMR, it must also be noted 
that the prophylactic use of antibiotics may sometimes be unavoidable. This applies 
in particular to patients with a weakened immune system, e.g. as a result of 
rheumatic fever or for patients with HIV. Antibiotics are also commonly used as 
prophylaxis for very invasive types of surgery, such as hip replace ments, where the 
chances of post-surgical site infection can be significantly reduced with a dose of 
broad-spectrum antibiotics before the first incision.
107
 
 
2.6 Current responses to AMR 
The current policy responses to address AMR vary greatly between countries, both in 
their extent and success. However, there are some observable trends in the kinds of 
policies that are being adopted. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
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Control (ECDC) has suggested that policies to curb the spread of AMR must address 
three areas.
108
 These are  
i) the prudent use of available antibiotics,  
ii) the undertaking of all hygienic precautions to control cross-transmission and  
iii) the research and development of antibiotics with a novel mechanism of 
action.  
Other policy guidelines make similar recommendations, and we shall therefore 
briefly examine these responses and their current effectiveness.
109
  
 
2.6.1 The prudent use of antibiotics 
There is widespread consensus that antibiotic prescribing should be limited to cases 
where their application is 'prudent'. Policy initiatives such as the Alliance for the 
Prudent Use of Antibiotics (APUA) or the EU Commissions' 'Prudent Use of 
Antibiotics' campaign reflect a concern for improved stewardship of antimicrobial 
resources.
110
  
However, definitions of prudent use tend to be rather general and often merely focus 
on the elimination of wasteful prescribing of antibiotics. It is worth illustrating this 
point by giving two examples of commonly used definitions of prudent use. The first, 
provided by the z The second definition, from the Alliance for the Prudent Use of 
Antibiotics (APUA), adds to this that prudent use is essentially "the right drug for the 
right condition for the right amount of time."
111
 
Thus, one way of understanding prudent use is that the concept merely promotes a 
maximally efficient use of antibiotics (i.e. that the marginal benefit of their use ought 
to be greater or equal to the marginal cost).
112
 Yet, unless it is specified how 
marginal costs and benefits are to be calculated in these cases, current definitions of 
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prudent use are largely descriptive and amount to little more, than a declaration of 
intent to reduce the waste of antibiotics. Moreover, the focus on cost-effectiveness 
may distort the concept of prudent use, since - due to the low cost of many antibiotics 
- even limited effectiveness will often be cost-effective.
113
 
 
Alternatively, prudent use can include the possibility of restricting the use of 
antibiotics such that only those treatments for which the effectiveness (and the 
associated magnitude of risk that the patient avoids by being treated) is above some 
threshold value, which must be defined. There are, some practical examples of 
policies, which define an acceptable 'cost level' in order to preserve antibiotic 
effectiveness. In these instances, antibiotic prescribing was restricted, and second-
line drugs could only be administered, after a local threshold value for AMR to first-
line treatments had been reached. Daneman et al report a case in which such a 
restrictive use of antibiotics led to an additional risk of death of one percent.
114
 What 
is noticeable in these instances is a general absence of discussion of normative 
standards that govern the definition of such thresholds for prudent use. We will 
consider this question in more detail in the second half of this thesis.  
 
Another point worth noting about definitions of prudent use is that they generally 
suffer from a lack of precision, a characteristic they share with many other concepts 
of 'sustainable consumption'.
115
 Effectively this greatly limits their usefulness for 
setting targets for the quantity of antibiotics that should be used in a given society or 
health care system.
116
  Such target setting is further complicated by the fact that fixed 
targets are unlikely to be of much practical use in the first place. Setting fixed targets 
for prudent consumption of antibiotics would overlook the permanently changing 
social and demographic conditions as well as progress in health care, all of which 
may require adjustments to predefined consumption levels. It is therefore crucial to 
realise that when 'prudent consumption' is being promoted, this does not refer to 
clearly denoted target levels or permissible overall amounts of drugs that can be 
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consumed. Rather, given the wide range of factors that contribute to AMR, the 
prudent use of an antibiotic will often have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
As a result, the concept of 'prudent use' appears to be more relevant at the micro-
level, where it affects the doctor-patient relationship, than as a concept for public 
health policy, which so far lacks a coherent account of establishing quotas for usage 
of antibiotics.
117
 
 
2.6.2 Infection control to reduce transmission 
The basic principles of modern infection control through hand hygiene were 
pioneered by Ignaz Semmelweis in 1847. Semmelweis worked as a doctor in the 
maternity ward of the Vienna hospital, where the mortality due to childbed fever was 
extraordinarily high.
118
 Semmelweis introduced systematic hand disinfection in his 
ward, which resulted in a significant decrease in mortality. Even though he was 
unaware of the germ theory of disease and therefore could not explain this 
observation properly, his research findings addressed one of the significant problems 
of hospital care: the exposure of patients to pathogens, which are present in the 
hospital environment or on other patients. These infections are commonly referred to 
as Health Care Associated Infections (HCAI), or nosocomial infections, and 
according to international studies, they affect between 4-9 percent of patients in 
European hospitals.
119
 Their detection and prevention has become a high priority in 
primary care settings. Yet, given the fact that in the US and UK between 40 and 60% 
of S. aureus strains commonly found in hospitals display some form of drug 
resistance, this interest should hardly come as a surprise.
120
  
 
Hospitals constitute ideal breeding grounds not only for infections but also for AMR. 
They host a large number of people receiving antibiotic treatment (either therapeutic 
or, in the case of many surgeries, prophylactic) with weakened immune systems in 
the same enclosed space, looked after by health care workers who will have to attend 
to a large number of people in a single shift.  Especially in patients who take a single 
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type of antibiotic over prolonged periods of time, emerging resistance to not only the 
prescribed antibiotic but to other drugs can often be observed after around ten 
days.
121
 And since the responsible genes are commonly transmitted between bacteria 
of different taxonomy via plasmids, an environment with numerous long-term users 
of antibiotics will commonly create instances of AMR.
122
 This process is not entirely 
avoidable  but a lack of appropriate hygiene standards will facilitate the spread of 
microbes between patients and wards. Hospital hygiene is thus commonly cited as 
one of the areas of paramount importance in developing a strategy to combat 
AMR.
123
 Its effectiveness is widely accepted, as aggressive management 
programmes for resistant strains of MRSA in hospitals in the Netherlands and across 
Scandinavia have achieved prevalence of less than 1 percent, whereas many South 
European countries still report MRSA rates in excess of 40 percent.
124
 To further 
promote these efforts, the WHO launched the World Alliance for Patient Safety in 
2004 and two years later, the Council of Europe adopted a recommendation on 
management of patient safety and prevention of adverse events in healthcare.
125
 
However, what is also recognised in these guidelines is that reducing incidence and 
prevalence of HCAIs does not merely require behavioural changes of staff or greater 
insistence on hand hygiene. Conditions under which such policies can be properly 
implemented also require a work environment and a sufficiently high staff-to-patient 
ratio to be realistically implementable. 
2.6.3 Research and development of new antibiotics 
In light of the dearth of new antimicrobial drugs under development, the substantial 
lack of new antibiotics has so far not been addressed sufficiently. There is currently a 
move towards the establishment of incentive programmes to encourage research. The 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration's recent Safety and Innovation Act (also known 
as the "Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now", or GAIN act), for example, identified 
a list of pathogens for which the development of new drugs will be incentivised by 
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granting five years of patent extension.
126
 In Europe, the establishment of public-
private partnerships such as the Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI) have been 
launched.
127
 In 2012, the EU-financed IMI invested around €220 million into a 
programme called 'newdrugs4badbugs', which aimed to develop new antibiotics, in 
partnership with pharmaceutical companies GlaxoSmithKline and AstraZeneca.
128
 
However, it is too early to predict whether or not these incentive schemes will 
generate the desired research output over the next years. Currently, a major research 
breakthrough is unlikely, due to the continued lack of basic research into new target 
sites for antibiotics and the fact that only a few pharmaceutical companies invest into 
antibiotic research.
129
 Moreover, the provision of financial incentives alone is 
unlikely to generate sufficient research activity to protect antibiotic effectiveness in 
the future. This is due to a number of reasons.  
 
To begin with, the existing incentive schemes, such as the GAIN act, work primarily 
through the extension of patents. Yet, such an extension does not remove the initial 
risk of investing into basic R&D with highly uncertain returns, but - if anything - 
promotes the development of drugs that have a high chance of passing market 
approval and are thus structurally similar to existing drugs. Existing incentive 
schemes are thus largely pull-mechanisms that reward marketable products, rather 
than push-mechanisms that support early-stage research. The advantage of pull 
mechanisms is that they award only successful research (push-mechanisms may end 
up supporting unsuccessful research projects). However, the complexity of AMR and 
the need for basic research suggest that a combined approach of incentives will be 
needed to generate a higher level of antibiotic R&D.
130
  
 
So far, the measurable success of incentive schemes appears to be limited. In a recent 
assessment of the US 10x20 initiative, which seeks to bring ten new antimicrobial 
drugs to the market by 2020, Boucher et al found that ongoing R&D into new drugs 
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was limited and mostly conducted by smaller enterprises. Moreover, few of the 
ongoing research projects could report significant progress and the compounds under 
development did not systematically address the areas of greatest clinical need, 
notably the creation of new antibiotics against Gram-negative infections.
131
 While 
the progress of research remains elusive, there is certainly increasing awareness that 
the development of new antibiotics must be appropriately incentivised. For instance, 
the UK's current AMR strategy acknowledges a need "to do more to address the 
commercial viability and market failure issues that are hampering investment in 
antibiotic development."
132
 Yet, it remains unclear, which strategy should be adopted 
to appropriately incentivise research. Moreover, there is so far only limited 
discussion about the appropriate size of any financial incentive.
133
 In light of the 
enormous human and financial costs of AMR, which were presented earlier, the 
current incentive system does not seem to reflect the urgency, with which new drugs 
are required. 
 
2.7  Antibiotic Prescribing and consumption 
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, some level of AMR is inevitable, as it 
occurs as part of a natural selection process, even under exact observation of 
treatment protocols. However, it is also known that a significant proportion of the 
current problem is due to human behaviour and thus, at least in principle, 
avoidable.
134
 Greater emphasis on hygiene, observance of guidelines and avoiding 
overprescription can all help to substantially slow down the emergence of AMR.
135
 
To this end, it is important to review in greater detail what different groups or 
organisations can contribute in order to slow down the further spread of drug 
resistance. Here, the discussion shall be limited to those groups that are primarily 
involved in 'using' antibiotics, either by prescribing or by taking them.
136
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Unlike in some South American and Asian countries, across Europe antibiotics are 
only available on prescription. Physicians thus act as gatekeepers to access, which 
might also explain why much of the literature on antibiotic use focuses on 
prescription practices rather than consumption (and thus the role of the patient). Yet, 
the role of physicians in promoting and ensuring the prudent use of antibiotics is 
complex and requires differentiation between levels of health care provision. What 
constitutes prudent use will vary considerably with the severity of an infection, the 
overall condition of the patient and the urgency with which treatment is required. 
Similarly, demands placed on health care providers by patients will be context-
dependent. The next two sections will distinguish between the use of antibiotics in 
primary and in secondary care, and it will be discussed how antibiotic prescribing 
varies in both settings.  
 
2.7.1  Antibiotic prescribing in primary care and general practice 
People often associate AMR with hospital settings and public knowledge and opinion 
on this matter has been heavily influenced by media stories about drug-resistant 
MRSA 'super-bugs'.
137
 Nonetheless, while the most visible cases of AMR usually 
occur in hospital settings, most antibiotic consumption does not take place there. In 
the UK, it is estimated that almost 80 percent of prescriptions for antibiotics are 
written in primary care settings.
138
 If we are interested in adjusting prescription 
practices and reducing overall consumption, general practice may thus be a good 
place to start looking.
139
  
Despite a growing awareness for the threats of AMR among both, the public and 
health care professionals, statistics of the use of antibiotics in primary care show that 
since 2001 the number of antibiotic prescriptions by GPs has steadily increased.
140
 It 
should be noted that this effect may not be entirely due to changing prescription 
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practices, but could also simply reflect higher incidence of bacterial infections. 
However, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that the rise in antibiotic 
prescribing can entirely be explained by such a change in morbidity. There are, 
however, a number of reasons that surveys and studies of prescription practices have 
identified as contributing factors to the rise in antibiotic prescribing.  
 
Many practitioners cite a need to maintain good relations with their patients - a task 
that is easier to achieve if patients feel that their doctor complies with their expressed 
needs and meets their expectations with regard to prescriptions.
141
 There is an added 
financial incentive to prescribe antibiotics in health care systems where practices are 
not awarded a global budget but receive remuneration based on patient contacts. 
Since only satisfied patients are likely to return (or to recommend their physician to 
others), GPs have an incentive to meet patients' expectations. However, there is 
evidence to suggest that in at least some instances, doctors anticipate patient 
expectations and act upon these anticipations, even when the patient does not 
actually hold them.
142
 Empirical studies suggest that patients rarely demand 
antibiotic treatment explicitly, and are often more interested in reassurance and 
provision of information than in a particular type of treatment.
143
  Assessing how 
relevant the pressure exerted on physicians by patients is to the issue of 
overprescription of antibiotics thus requires further quantitative and qualitative 
research. 
 
Another issue for antibiotic prescribing in primary care is the difficulty of testing 
more broadly for bacterial strains before commencing treatment. Testing for most 
bacterial strains requires laboratory facilities and takes between 24-48 hours. 
However, for most infections that are treated in community settings (i.e. by GPs), no 
bacterial cultures are taken, and consequently, antimicrobial therapy is based on the 
clinical assessment of symptoms. This increases the chance of choosing the wrong 
treatment, or to use antibiotics for viral infections, against which they are ineffective. 
It also encourages the use of broad-spectrum antibiotics as these promise a greater 
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chance of therapeutic success if the pathogen is unknown - albeit at the cost of using 
a stronger antibiotic than may often be necessary. These decisions are not really 
down to the physician's individual choice, however. Currently, there is a lack of rapid 
tests for many bacterial strains, which is primarily caused by the lack of research into 
new types of tests: it is estimated that the total sum spent on medical diagnostics for 
bacterial infections is equivalent to only one to two percent of the money that is spent 
on antibiotics annually.
144
  
 
Prescription of antibiotics can often reduce the severity of symptoms and shorten the 
course of the infection, even if antimicrobial therapy was not crucial to the patients' 
recovery and merely accelerated it somewhat.
145
 In qualitative studies, doctors have 
cited the obligation to do everything they can for the patient's wellbeing as one of the 
strongest motivators for prescription of antibiotics.
146
 From a societal perspective, 
this may appear to be undesirable, but this in turn raises the difficult question of how 
much added discomfort is acceptable, if this marginally reduces the chances of 
further AMR in the future. We will return to this point in chapters 4 and 7. 
  
An additional factor to influence prescribing in general practice is that antimicrobial 
therapy often reduces the chance of complications arising later on.
147
 This has two 
implications. First, physicians reduce the risk of overlooking a symptom or 
misdiagnosing a serious condition. This may be of particular relevance for younger 
doctors who lack clinical experience and prefer to err on the side of caution.
148
 
Secondly, abstaining from the use of antibiotic therapy requires follow-up visits of 
the patient. These may not always be possible or physicians may have cause to 
believe that the patient will not show up again. In such cases, the prescription of 
antibiotics may not be strictly necessary, but represents an option that rules out risks 
for both the patient (in terms of health effects) and the physician (in terms of 
professional codes of conduct or risking malpractice lawsuits). 
The immediate personal benefits of antimicrobial treatment compared to the potential 
negative impact on public health due to resulting drug resistance are likely to also 
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affect physicians' decisions. Many GPs will only encounter the results of AMR  
infrequently, while they have to deal with patients whose condition could be treated 
with antibiotics on a daily basis.
149
 They are therefore likely to place greater value on 
the potential health benefits to the individual, rather than the risk of future resistance 
in the community.
150
 An American survey that looked at the prescription of 
antibiotics for community-acquired pneumonia confirms this view. The study found 
that while most doctors were aware of and concerned about the public health 
implications of AMR, societal concerns ranked low in deciding whether to 
administer a course of antibiotic treatment to a patient.
151
 
 
AMR is a highly complex field of research and some qualitative studies have found 
that GPs would welcome better information on such aspects as local resistance 
patterns, as well as a greater emphasis on the problems of drug resistance in medical 
training.
152
 It is noteworthy that this does not seem to be a problem of a lack of 
available guidelines or recommendations. Rather there appears to be an oversupply 
of information. Different issuing bodies at regional, national and international levels 
use different evidence bases and place differing emphases and consequently arrive at 
varying recommendations.
153
 
The complexity of the causes of AMR paired with limited public awareness has 
practical implications for many GPs. Explaining to the patient the reasons for not 
prescribing antibiotics is time-consuming and if physicians work under a very tight 
schedule, it may simply be quicker to prescribe them, than to convince a patient that 
the treatment is not necessary.
154
 
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this brief overview of factors, which influence 
antibiotic prescribing in primary care: first, it is evident that antibiotic prescribing is 
driven by a wide range of factors, not all of which are remediable by introducing 
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stricter guidelines. Second, and following on from the previous point, reducing 
antibiotic consumption is not merely a matter for health care professionals. It will 
also require input from a wide array of other disciplines, as diverse as health 
economics, psychology and communication theory.  
 
2.7.2  Antibiotic Prescribing in secondary care settings 
The prescribing of antibiotics in secondary care reflects many of the challenges that 
primary care physicians face. However, it also differs from the primary care sector in 
a number of ways. For one, patients in hospital often require immediate care and 
there may be even less time to reach decisions about which treatment offers the 
greatest benefit at the lowest risk of AMR. Secondly, many infections in hospital 
settings are much more severe than those which primary care staff deal with (and 
consequently carry greater risks for adverse health outcomes). Thirdly, the antibiotics 
that are used in secondary care may vary significantly from those that are routinely 
prescribed in primary care settings, both with regard to their strength and their 
potential side effects. Second-line and third-line drugs will also often require that the 
patient remain in hospital for at least the first part of the treatment. Finally, the 
containment of AMR along with the control of infections is particularly challenging 
in hospital settings, because many people with weakened or compromised immune 
systems stay in very close proximity to each other for prolonged periods of time - a 
circumstance that clearly separates them from primary care facilities. Antibiotic 
prescribing in secondary care thus faces the difficult task of having to find a balance 
between the quick and aggressive use of antibiotics to fight infections (and thereby 
improve patient outcomes and avoid the spread of infection within the hospital) and 
the prevention of AMR.
155
 In practice, this means that physician will often have to 
make complex decisions about the type of antibiotic and the duration of therapy. This 
may for example involve a decision about whether to use a broad- or a narrow-
spectrum antibiotic. While the use of the former may be unnecessary and risk the 
emergence of resistance against newer and versatile antimicrobial drugs, an 
inappropriate use of narrow-spectrum antibiotics severely reduces the patient's 
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chance of a quick recovery.
156
 In most European countries, hospitals often prefer to 
err on the side of caution. A recent Cochrane review of interventions to improve 
antibiotic prescribing for hospital patients reports that over the last two decades, 
antibiotic prescribing in many European countries has increased by between ten and 
twenty percent, and that there is evidence to suggest that "over a third of 
prescriptions are not compliant with evidence-based guidelines."
157
  
 
In order to address this problem, hospitals have developed detailed guidelines to 
reduce unnecessary or excessive prescribing of antibiotics and promote antimicrobial 
stewardship.
158
 Yet, their practical implementation is often greatly complicated by 
the sheer complexity of the task and by having to account not only for medical, but 
also for organisational, social and behavioural factors.
159
 These include for example 
health care professional's attitudes towards disease, willingness to accept risk to the 
patient, or the way in which guidelines are communicated to employees.
160
 
Interestingly, there also seems to be a correlation between prescribing of antibiotics 
in hospitals and hierarchical power structures within a health care system.  In a 
European study, Deschepper et al found that in more hierarchical societies, levels of 
antibiotic prescribing were also higher.
161
 These factors do not constitute a 
comprehensive list, but they illustrate some of the reasons behind the discrepancies 
in antibiotic prescribing and consumption across countries. However, even within the 
same country or cultural environment, differences in the types of antibiotics used 
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(albeit not in the total amount prescribed) are observable. These appear to be more 
closely linked to size and location of the hospital.
162
 
 
2.7.3  Antibiotic Consumption - the role of the patient 
Since guidelines for antimicrobial stewardship and prudent use of antibiotics are 
normally written for health care professionals, the role of the patient in reducing the 
use of antibiotics has perhaps received less attention than it should. This tendency is 
likely to have been strengthened by the fact that in the public perception of AMR, 
patients are the reported victims of drug resistance. While this is undoubtedly an 
accurate view in most individual cases, aggregate patient behaviour is nonetheless a 
significant contributing factor to the emergence of AMR.
163
 Patients, through non-
adherence to treatment protocols or consumption of antibiotics for non-bacterial 
infections, carry part of the responsibility for the emergence of AMR. 
 
Before outlining the role of patients further, it may be useful here to quickly note that 
there is an ongoing discussion as to whether the non-observance of doctor's advice 
should be referred to as non-adherence or non-compliance. Non-adherence is often 
preferred, as the concept of compliance implies a strict power-relation between the 
doctor and the patient, in which the patients' interests are of secondary importance.
164
 
I believe that while this concern is legitimate, the choice of terminology is wholly 
context-dependant - and that especially in cases of severe and contagious infections, 
compliance may be a more accurate description. However, throughout this chapter, I 
shall refer to any acts of non-observance of doctor's advice as non-adherence. This 
discussion is not merely a case of semantics. What it underlines is a deep-rooted 
concern about patient autonomy, which could potentially be undermined by strict 
enforcement of 'prudent' prescription policies for antibiotics. This fear has been 
expressed by Leibovici et al, who argue that by not giving patients with medium to 
severe infections access to the full range of available antibiotics, in order to prevent 
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AMR, we do in fact infringe on  to the patient's right to autonomy.
165
 There are good 
reasons to disagree with this view - for example the fact that under such conditions, 
any restriction of access in the health care sector (such as the insistence on cost-
effectiveness for new interventions provided by the NHS) would constitute an 
ethically worrying infringement of patient autonomy. However, a more moderately 
phrased version of the  same concern, namely that it is ethically troubling if we do 
not fully inform patients of the reasons for restricting access is likely to meet with 
much wider consent. Yet, what constitutes appropriate levels of information, 
especially in an area as complex as antibiotic therapy is difficult to answer, and 
whether or not patients or their relatives can always be fully informed is 
questionable.  
 
A lack of information regarding the causes and risks of AMR on the patients' side 
has also often been quoted as one of the main reasons behind non-adherence to 
treatment.
166
 As outlined in the previous sections, many general practitioners report 
pressure from patients to prescribe antibiotics even for non-bacterial infections as 
one of the reasons for high numbers of prescription. This view is supported by a 
survey conducted by the Alliance for the Prudent Use of Antibiotics (APUA), which 
surveyed the view of more than 900 US-American adults on the effectiveness of 
antibiotics. The survey concluded that around 45 percent of participants believed 
antibiotics to be effective against viruses while almost ten percent would 
immediately use an antibiotic against a common cold.
167
 What this shows is that 
there seems to be a continued lack of awareness of the underlying mechanisms and 
causes of AMR - a fact that is even more worrying in countries where antibiotics are 
available without a prescription. However, it is not only the initiation of treatment 
that is potentially problematic - incomplete treatment poses at least as great a risk to 
the development of AMR.
168
 Reasons for the failure to complete treatment may vary 
and are at least partly specific to the disease and drugs in questions. While an 
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incomplete treatment for a fairly mild urinary tract infection may be due to the fact 
that the patient quickly felt better and thus discontinued the course of treatment, 
failure to complete treatment for more severe infections (such as MDR-TB) may be 
motivated by the severe side-effects of second- and third-line antibiotics. As a result, 
there is no straightforward answer to the question why people fail to adhere to 
treatments. And consequently there is no straightforward solution either. However, in 
most cases appropriate information about risks and consequences of incomplete 
treatment is likely to increase adherence. At the same time, this may also require 
greater awareness on the health care worker's side for the patient’s lack of knowledge 
about AMR. 
 
2.8 Summary  
In this chapter, it has been argued that AMR is an inevitable by-product of antibiotic 
use, but that the speed at which it progresses depends greatly on the extent and 
conditions under which we use antibiotics. It has been suggested that there are a 
number of key driving factors in the development and spread of AMR, notably the 
over- and misuse of antibiotics, the lack of research into new drugs and the 
widespread use of antibiotics in cattle farming and agriculture. However, by looking 
in detail at the role of different groups of stakeholders, notably doctors and patients, 
it also became evident that a focus on prescribing fails to appropriately reflect the 
responsibility of patients in using antibiotics correctly. This discussion concluded 
that in the near future, current policies are insufficient to halt or reverse the progress 
of AMR. In the following chapter, it will be examined, how current solutions are 
shaped by the way we have conceptualised AMR in the policy discourse and we will 
consider if lessons from other policy fields can be adopted to develop new solutions 
to the problem we face. 
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Chapter 3:  Antimicrobial resistance and analogical 
reasoning 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Given that potentially life-saving treatments will become a scarce resource in the 
near future, we face the difficult question of how to best use the remaining stock of 
antibiotics, not just within a given society, but also between generations. These 
questions will be discussed throughout the remainder of the thesis. At this point, 
however, it will be useful to begin our analysis with a review of similar policy 
problems and the way they have been used to conceptualise AMR. In discussing the 
mechanisms of AMR, and exploring possible policy responses to the threat, many 
commentators have pointed out that the problem of AMR is analogous to other cases 
of collective action problems, where scare resources need to be distributed fairly. 
These supposedly analogous cases include the tragedy of the commons, incidences of 
overfishing and the use of fossil fuels. This chapter examines the usefulness of such 
analogies. It will suggest that while analogical reasoning is an important tool in 
policy-making, many of the cases, which are frequently compared to AMR differ in 
relevant aspects. As a result, solutions to the problem of distributing antibiotics 
cannot be derived from analogous scenarios, but need to be developed to match the 
specific characteristics that antibiotics display as a commodity. It will therefore be 
argued that the distribution of antibiotics raises ethical problems that are sui generis. 
More specifically, it will be shown that those analogies, which are commonly used to 
analyse AMR are inadequate because they each fail to  reflect salient features of 
antibiotics.  
 
3.2  AMR and the distribution of which commodity? 
This chapter will compare distributive challenges that arise in the case of AMR with 
a number of related cases, in which other commodities are distributed. Before 
considering these other cases, a little bit more needs to be said about which 
commodity is to be distributed in the case of AMR. Fundamentally, we could 
consider (and therefore have to distinguish between) the following:  
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a) the distribution of the antimicrobial drugs themselves,  
b) the ownership of the respective intellectual property to the manufacturing of 
antibiotics, and 
c) the distribution of antibiotic effectiveness.169  
 
All three of these options are relevant to the case of AMR. However, the following 
discussion will primarily focus on c) and consider, how antibiotic effectiveness can 
be distributed. For the purposes of the following analysis, 'antibiotic effectiveness' 
will therefore be treated as a measurable commodity that represents the stock of 
remaining doses of antibiotics that can be used to effectively target bacterial 
infections. This focus on antibiotic effectiveness merits some clarification and 
explanation.   
 
The distribution of antibiotic drugs, and the distribution of antibiotic effectiveness 
are closely related, yet not identical and they will ultimately concern different aspects 
of distributive justice. To make the distinction more obvious, consider the following 
example. A manufacturer can produce a certain amount of antibiotic drugs every day 
and if antibiotics are scarce, who gets access to the drugs will be of tremendous 
importance. Dealing with these concerns will for example involve questions 
regarding production capacity, as well as fair price levels and coverage of health care 
costs for those who fall ill. However, in most countries it is not the physical access to 
antibiotics that constitutes the main challenge. Rather, it is the question, whether all 
the drugs produced remain effective, and if so for how long. In principle, a 
manufacturer can continue to produce and sell antibiotics even if prevailing levels of 
drug resistance have rendered them ineffective. Consequently, what is arguably of 
the greatest relevance in more developed countries is the preservation of the 
effectiveness of the drugs that are manufactured and used. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, this can be achieved either by developing new drugs or by restricting the use 
of antibiotics to reduce the emergence of AMR.  
The remainder of the chapter will focus on the distribution and preservation of 
antibiotic effectiveness and examine if and how suggested policy solutions to 
distributive dilemmas that affect other resources can be applied to the case of AMR. 
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Before considering these dilemmas, however, it will be useful to say more about the 
practice of analogical reasoning. 
3.3  Analogical reasoning  
Analogical reasoning is a ubiquitous practice across a wide range of academic 
subjects and professions. Ethical theory provides a case in point, as moral reasoning 
will often look for analogous cases in establishing possible solutions to a problem at 
hand. This happens either by creating relatively abstract case studies for which 
findings are hoped to be transferrable to practical decision-making, or by establishing 
a 'likeness' between different moral conflicts which allows for the transfer of 
conclusions or intuitions from one case to the other. Cass Sunstein has pointed out 
that the same is true for legal rulings, which rely heavily on analogical reasoning.
170
 
Cummings has argued that analogical reasoning is also a common practice in 
addressing medical and epidemiological problems, especially when a previously 
unknown disease or pathogen is examined.
171
 Under conditions of uncertainty, 
important questions such as virulence or transmission paths are often tackled first by 
analogical reasoning. Thus, if another disease affects the same demographic, a first 
guess for epidemiologists will often be that transmission paths may be similar.
172
 
Cummings cites the case of Hepatitis B and HIV as an example, but there are 
numerous other cases, such as the preliminary risk assessment of a novel strain of 
influenza, which will often start by searching for similarities with particularly 
virulent strains that circulated in the past.
173
 The advantage of such an approach is 
that it permits the adjustment of an existing theory as new facts or observations 
become available.
174
 What makes analogical reasoning attractive in the first place, is 
thus its ability to not only rephrase complicated problems in more familiar terms, but 
also to develop solutions under conditions of epistemic uncertainty.  
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Sunstein has suggested that analogical reasoning follows a characteristic structure 
that can be divided into four steps.
175
 These are applied to analogical thinking in law, 
but they can equally be applied to moral reasoning.
176
 The four steps of analogical 
reasoning he describes are:  
 
(1)  Condition A has a certain characteristic X, or characteristics X, Y, and Z;  
(2)  Condition B differs from A in some respects but shares characteristics X, or 
X, Y, and Z  
(3)  It has been established that the best response to A is R  
(4) Because B shares certain characteristics with A, R applies to B as well.
177
 
 
A purely descriptive use of analogical reasoning would be restricted to the first two 
steps that Sunstein outlines. However, in developing a response to AMR, policy 
makers and researchers may wish to look beyond the purely descriptive use of 
analogies and instead use them to develop policy proposals.  
 
This, however, requires that both the analogous problem and its respective solution 
are sufficiently similar to the case at hand, a precondition that Sunstein describes as 
being "similar in all relevant aspects".
178
 Where this similarity is not present, there is 
a danger of employing broadly similar analogies, which capture part of a problem, 
but differ enough so as to not be applicable to AMR (or indeed any other case we try 
to solve by analogical reasoning). In this chapter, I will consider the most frequently 
used analogies to AMR, and argue that in fact they differ significantly from the 
problem at hand and thus are not suitable for deriving a policy response.  
This is not to say that the analogies discussed below do not serve a purpose - they are 
in fact tremendously helpful for mapping out more clearly what challenges AMR 
poses in the long run. Thinking through carefully which analogies are appropriate is 
a good way to work out, in what way AMR is different, and what aspects we need to 
take in to consideration. 
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3.4  Analogical reasoning and AMR 
There are a number of reasons why analogical reasoning may be helpful in the 
context of AMR. For the economist, who is familiar with economic dilemmas but not 
with intricacies of infectious disease control, it may provide a useful way of 
conceptualizing the problem in terms of his own academic discipline. Similarly, 
other groups such as policy makers or the public may find it easier if the highly 
complex problem of AMR is explained with reference to a scenario they are already 
familiar with and that does not require any familiarity with the bio-medical details. 
How widely analogical reasoning is employed when thinking about AMR is nicely 
illustrated by an interview, that microbiologist John Conly gave to the 'Bulletin of the 
World Health Organization' in 2010. In this interview, Conly stated that: 
"[a]ntimicrobial resistance may be likened to [...] overfishing scenario[s], to cattle 
overgrazing the grass of the commons or to deforestation on Easter Island, which led 
to the population dying out."
179
 This quotation not only reflects the breadth of similar 
cases that economic theory is thought to provide, but also illustrates how very 
different scenarios (which operate on different premises and subsequently come to 
very different conclusions) are being used to explain the same distributive problem; 
namely how to address the overconsumption of antibiotics, which is understood to be 
the main cause of AMR.  
 
We can also find evidence for attempts to use analogical reasoning as problem 
solving technique for AMR. Conly's colleague Richard James for example gave an 
interview to the Guardian, where he drew a comparison between AMR and the use 
of fossil fuels and remarked that "[i]f you consider antibiotic sensitivity as a 
resource like oil, you want to maintain that by introducing a tax".
180
 Similar 
proposals of a Pigovian tax or permit schemes analogous to carbon trading have been 
put forward by other authors as well, who draw similar analogies and consequently 
suggest an adapted version of emission trading as a method to combat the spread of 
AMR in the future.
181
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The  literature on AMR  frequently refers to at least three scenarios: (1) the tragedy 
of the commons, (2) the reduction of CO2 emissions, and (3) overfishing.
182
 I will 
argue that all three comparisons offer valuable insights into some of the underlying 
mechanisms of AMR, yet they ultimately are not similar in all relevant aspects. 
Despite their respective shortcomings (or rather the ways in which they differ 
significantly from the case at hand), considering the arguments for all three 
comparisons will be helpful in mapping out more clearly what exactly the 
distributive problems are that arise in the case of antibiotics and AMR and how 
ethics can help us to answer them.  
 
3.5  Antibiotic overconsumption - a tragedy of the commons? 
The most commonly cited economic case to which AMR is likened is the tragedy of 
the commons, which is a case study originally developed by Garrett Hardin in 
Science in 1968.
183
 Hardin describes a historic case of overgrazing on a shared piece 
of land - the commons. Individual farmers can realise a marginal benefit from adding 
more cattle to the commons - even if they thereby increase the overall number of 
animals beyond the sustainable level. Because using the commons is free and the 
costs are externalised while the benefits are only enjoyed by the individual farmer, it 
is rational for the individual to maximise his use of the resource beyond what is 
sustainable. Acting in this way will maximise individual utility. Hardin describes the 
commons scenario as a problem in which no party is compelled to change his or her 
behaviour and  subsequently suggests that there is no easily enforceable solution. 
Rather, the tragedy of the commons requires the competing parties to enter into a 
contractual agreement, according to which they voluntarily limit the consumption of 
the shared good. Hardin's case study is so important to economic theory because it 
outlines a case of severe market failure, and has become synonymous in Economics 
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textbooks with the overconsumption of common pool resources.
184
 A common pool 
resource is a good for which consumption is i) rival, and ii) non-excludable. Such a 
resource is sometimes also referred to as a common good (as opposed to a public 
good, which is both non-rival and non-excludable). In the case of the tragedy of the 
commons, every farmer is entitled to add more cattle to the shared piece of land, so 
the good is non-excludable. However, since every added cow leaves less grass for 
others, adding more cattle reduces the benefit that each farmer enjoys, which makes 
its consumption rival.  
 
Given that AMR is frequently linked to the tragedy of the commons, how relevant is 
the scenario for health policy makers? At first sight, there are obvious similarities: 
there appear to be no costs to the individual to consume more than is socially optimal 
in either scenario and personal benefits can be externalised, that is, their costs are 
shared by everyone. Indeed, this seems to be very similar to the case of antibiotics 
and may have prompted commentators in different disciplines to accept so readily 
that the two cases are comparable. Upon closer inspection, however, the common 
scenario varies significantly from many of the characteristics of AMR. 
 
A first striking difference between the commons case and the use of antibiotics is 
that the latter produces two types of externality, of which only one is represented by 
the tragedy of the commons. Externalities are costs or benefits of a product or 
service, which are not appropriately reflected by the price. In the case of a positive 
externality, the market price will therefore not reflect the real benefit of the good, 
leading to its underprovision, whereas in the case of a negative externality the 
opposite is true and not all costs that arise as a result of consumption are reflected in 
the current price level.
185
 How does this apply to antibiotics? As we saw in the 
previous chapter, antibiotics are effective against contagious bacterial infections. As 
a result, the cure of a contagious patient lowers the risk for future transmissions and 
reduces the prevalence of an infectious disease in the community, which is a positive 
externality.
186
 The negative externality of using the same drug, however, is the fact 
that it may lead to the development and spread of AMR. Calculating costs and 
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benefits of antibiotic therapy is thus complicated, as the presence of both, positive 
and negative externalities will require that these be somehow quantified and traded 
off against each other. The analogy of the tragedy of the commons fails to reflect this 
problem, since the addition of more cows to the pasture will yield negative 
externalities (by reducing the amount of grass that the rest of the herd can consume) 
without creating a corresponding positive externality. Adding another cow to the 
commons makes the farmer who owns it better off - but not the community as a 
whole. In this way, the case of AMR and the tragedy of the commons as described by 
Hardin vary significantly. 
 
Furthermore, it is questionable if the proponents of the similarity between the 
commons scenario and the case of AMR do in fact wish to argue for the close 
resemblance of the two cases. To do so would imply that (as Hardin argues in the 
case of the commons) overconsumption is entirely rational for the individual - a 
view, which should be called into question in the case of antibiotics. Rational 
consumption, as understood in the tragedy of the commons, occurs where there is a 
tangible benefit to the individual. It is thus entirely rational for the herdsman to put 
an extra cow on the commons, as there is a quantifiable, added benefit, namely the 
cow's ability to feed on the pasture.  Conversely, for a self-interested individual, it is 
only rational to take an antibiotic if there is a quantifiable added benefit in doing so, 
especially when factoring in the potential side effects of antibiotic therapy.
187
 
Furthermore, since antibiotics can at best restore a previous level of utility, but not 
provide any additional gains for the individual, rational consumers should be even 
less inclined to overconsume antibiotics. As a result, the commons scenario is not 
suitable for conceptualizing unnecessary and ineffective overconsumption of 
antibiotics, which is ultimately a case of irrational consumption.
188
 Instead, it would 
apply to cases, where the rational individual has good reason to take a drug - in other 
words, where consumption would be medically beneficial. 
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The tragedy of the commons scenario thus only pertains to those cases in which we 
deliberate whether or not to withhold treatment from those who have rational reasons 
to seek it in the first place. This means that the scope for application of the analogy is 
in fact much narrower than may initially be assumed, and does not cover the general 
overconsumption of antibiotics for which there is no quantifiable benefit. Instead, it 
is only relevant to cases where people receive a medical benefit from taking an 
antibiotic, and thus have reasons to seek such treatment, even if it produced negative 
externalities in the form of higher levels of resistance. This would be a case of 
rationing antibiotic treatment, rather than merely reducing overconsumption. 
However, as outlined above, current policies of prudent use sometimes allude to the 
tragedy of the commons but do not seek to actively ration the use of antibiotics.
189
  
 
3.6 Antibiotic effectiveness as a renewable resource - the analogy of 
overfishing 
In the tragedy of the commons scenario, an implicit assumption is that the 
overgrazed pasture can easily recover, if a sufficiently large number of cows are 
removed from it. This assumption is too simplistic to appropriately reflect the 
reversal to drug-susceptibility in the case of AMR, because we cannot easily 
eliminate a large share of antibiotic use to wait for a reversal of AMR. However, 
more carefully managed approaches, where certain drugs are given 'recovery time' to 
regain effectiveness have been suggested. In this context, the comparison to 
overfishing and the temporary ban on catching certain species of fish for periods of 
time has sometimes been drawn.
190
 Overfishing presents a serious problem to the 
sustainable use of marine resources and the ever-increasing demand for fish, which is 
fuelled by constant global population growth, has already led to the extinction of 
many species. One policy reaction to this has been the introduction of temporary 
bans on fishing to allow stocks to recover and grow. Following the collapse of cod 
stocks off the Atlantic coast of Canada in the 1990's, the Canadian government 
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declared a moratorium on fishing, with devastating effects for local industry.
191
 
However, cod populations have recently begun to grow again, although after almost 
twenty years only a third of full recovery has been achieved.
192
 
Analogous to the recovery of fish populations, it has been suggested that AMR is a 
reversible phenomenon, where discontinuing the use of specific drugs will result in 
bacteria subverting to drug-susceptibility.
193
 In principle, it is true that AMR is only 
an evolutionary benefit for bacteria as long as the drug is being used, a phenomenon 
that microbiologists refer to as the fitness cost of resistance.
194
 A number of 
corresponding studies have shown that at least for some bacteria, resistance to 
antibiotics is an evolutionary disadvantage in antibiotic-free environments.
195
 In 
practice, this phenomenon has also been observed in countries that banned the use of 
antibiotics in animal farming and reported a subsequent drop in infections caused by 
drug-resistant bacteria.
196
   
 
However, numerous factors make the analogy difficult to put to a meaningful use. 
For one, it is fairly straightforward to introduce a ban on a particular type of fishing 
and any negative effects that arise as a consequence of this can be financially 
compensated. In the case of AMR, however, a drug ban leads to a loss of health or 
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even life, which cannot be financially compensated in the same way.
197
 Thus, a 
temporary ban would only be useful for antibiotics for which an appropriate 
substitute is available, which excludes many second- and third-line antibiotics. 
Moreover, even where alternative drugs are available, the issue of cross-resistance 
would potentially undermine any recovery of effectiveness for certain antibiotics. 
The analogy is further complicated by the fact, that antimicrobial therapy is less 
likely to lead to the development of resistance, when a combination treatment of 
different drugs is used. As a result, the 'recovery' of the effectiveness of one drug 
may well come at the cost of a comparative acceleration in the build-up of resistance 
against the drugs which remains in use.
198
 It is also important to keep in mind, how 
long a reversal to drug-susceptibility would take in practice. The longer this period 
is, the higher the associated human costs due to limited treatment options are likely 
to be. And it is also reasonable to assume that for many types of AMR, return to a 
drug-susceptible state would take much longer than the acquisition of resistance in 
the first place.
199
 This makes it an unlikely solution to the problem of AMR in the 
long run. 
 
Finally, there is an important ethical difference between the case of overfishing and 
AMR. We may have good non-instrumental reasons for the protection of animal 
species e.g. the belief of many ecocentric worldviews that a species is intrinsically 
valuable and deserves our protection irrespective of its direct use to us.
200
 Whether or 
not such considerations contributed to the Canadian government's decision is another 
matter altogether, but in considering the ethical arguments for such a policy, the 
ecocentric approach to the protection of species is an argument that deserves 
attention. By contrast, antibiotic effectiveness is a purely instrumental commodity, as 
the protection of antibiotics (or disease-causing microbes for that matter) as an end in 
themselves that is worthy of protection is a highly implausible claim. 
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3.7   Is AMR analogous to greenhouse gas emissions?  
An alternative approach to the ones outlined above is to start not by looking at the 
remaining antibiotic effectiveness, but by examining the externalities that are created 
by using antibiotics. AMR can thus be understood as a negative externality that 
results from the consumption of antibiotics.
201
 In this respect, AMR resembles many 
forms of pollution, including CO2 emissions, which are not appropriately internalised 
in the cost of fossil fuels and thus result in consumption beyond a socially optimal 
level.
202
  
 
To address this problem, a number of policy options have been suggested, including 
the legal regulation of permissible usage of any commodity with a negative 
externality. A typical example of this is the introduction of emission standards. 
Another approach is the introduction of Pigovian taxes, which level consumer 
charges to cover the societal costs of negative externalities. However, what these 
approaches will often fail to reflect is the fact that different 'polluters' have different 
starting points in terms of their current level of pollution, and that a fulfilment of the 
legal requirement may put an unfair burden on some industries. The answer is thus 
often seen to lie in a permits market, where polluters who use less than their 
allocated maximum pollution can trade permits with polluters who cannot (yet) meet 
the legal requirements.  
 
How does this model relate to AMR? To begin with, levels of antibiotic use are at 
least partly dependent on the disease burden - higher prevalence of infectious 
diseases will require a wider use of antibiotics.
203
 Similarly, certain hospitals that 
specialize in invasive surgery or the treatment of infectious diseases will experience 
a higher demand for antibiotics even if they are used carefully and only where clearly 
medically indicated. To acknowledge these differences (which a rigid cap on 
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antibiotic use would not), a permit-trading system has therefore been suggested by 
some as an answer to the problem of AMR.
204
 
 
On the face of it, this appears to be a reasonable approach, but whether this is the 
case will very much depend on the level at which such a policy is being imposed. 
Introducing tradable permits at the micro-level for example, yields the chance of 
creating perverse incentives.
205
 GPs or hospitals in financial difficulties could be 
motivated to treat fewer patients with antibiotics than was medically indicated, in 
order to be able to trade the remaining 'antibiotic allowance' for money. Moreover, a 
strict allowance could also lead to instances of preventable illness or even death, if 
doctors had exhausted their allowance and there were no financial means to purchase 
further permits is at hand.
206
 A price adjustment level for antibiotics which creates a 
sufficiently large disincentive will therefore not just lead to higher financial cost to 
the user - it may end up causing otherwise preventable deaths as well, which makes 
the approach much harder to argue for.  
 
One important aspect that the analogy of greenhouse gas emissions highlights, 
however, is that both AMR and CO2 emissions pose a problem on a global scale that 
national policy alone cannot effectively combat. Recalling the case of the resistance-
conferring plasmid NDM-1 which was cause for international concern in 2010 and 
2011 and briefly discussed in chapter 2 illustrates this point.
207
 While originally 
found in India (NDM-1 stands for New Delhi Metallo Beta Lactamase-1), NDM-1 
containing bacteria quickly spread across the globe, with reports of locally contained 
outbreaks across most of Europe.
208
 However, as outlined above, due to the 
difficulties in implementing policies such as cap-and-trade agreements, it appears 
that the analogy is of limited use in developing workable solutions to the problem of 
AMR. 
                                                          
204
  Smith, R. D. and J. Coast (1997). The Transferable Permit Market: A Solution to Antibiotic 
Resistance? . Centre for Health Program Evaluation Working Papers, Centre for Health Program 
Evaluation. 61. 
205
  Anomaly, J. (2010). "Combating Resistance: The Case for a Global Antibiotics Treaty." 
Public Health Ethics 3(1): 13-22. p. 16 
206
  ibid. 
207
  Kumarasamy, K. K., M. A. Toleman, et al. (2010). "Emergence of a new antibiotic resistance 
mechanism in India, Pakistan, and the UK: a molecular, biological, and epidemiological study." The 
Lancet Infectious Diseases 10(9): 597-602. 
208
  Deutsches Ärzteblatt (2010). NDM-1-Resistenzen: Vier Fälle in Deutschland. Cologne, 
Deutscher Ärzte-Verlag. 12.08. 
66 
 
3.8  Antibiotic effectiveness as a non-renewable resource 
The analogies, which have so far been outlined in this chapter built at least in part on 
the assumption that AMR was reversible over time, prompting the comparison with 
depleting fishing stock. However, as we saw earlier, this comparison may be 
unsuitable, due to the time it would take for a complete reversal of current resistance 
patterns. As there is a very real danger that we will deplete available stocks of 
antibiotic effectiveness in the foreseeable future, the analogy of renewable resources 
thus runs the risk of underestimating the seriousness of the current situation. If this is 
the case, then it may be more appropriate to disregard the potential for renewed 
effectiveness at this point (at least at the policy level) and instead treat the current 
stock of antibiotic effectiveness as a finite resource that we can choose to exploit at 
varying rates.
209
 This would be a case where the usage of antibiotics is largely 
analogous to that of fossil fuels. In this instance, a limited quantity remains and its 
use produces negative externalities. Indeed, despite ignoring the potential for 
renewed effectiveness, this analogy captures the problem of AMR much better than 
the previously discussed scenarios, while simultaneously stressing the urgency to 
action. At first glance, however, this approach may appear counterintuitive, and non-
scientific. Surely, if AMR is in fact reversible, and new drugs can be developed, 
these facts should inform our decision-making. There are some pragmatic counter-
arguments to this view. First, given the length of time it takes to develop new drugs 
and the fact that currently few new antibiotics are in the pipeline, we must assume 
that in the near future, there will be a shortage of drugs to combat highly resistant 
bacterial strains.
210
 Second, given the projected demographic changes over the course 
of the next few generations and the ever-increasing number of people living on this 
planet, even a worldwide policy to restrict and control the use of antibiotics is not 
guaranteed to lead to a reduction in the total amount of drugs being used. While the 
average consumption per person may fall, the UN expects the world population to 
grow by 2.5 billion people until 2050, meaning that most reductions will simply be 
offset by population increases.
211
 In sum, we may therefore have good reasons to 
doubt how reversible AMR will be in practice, which makes the use of fossil fuels as 
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an analogy to the use of antibiotics compelling. Yet, I would suggest that there are 
nonetheless some important differences between the two cases, which any policy for 
the future use of antibiotics must bear in mind.  
We know that the cost of producing a barrel of crude oil will increase, as the 
remaining reservoirs continue to be depleted, simply because more effort is required 
for its production and demand outstrips supply. Yet, while the production cost of the 
resource increases, the effectiveness of a barrel of oil remains the same. For fossil 
fuels, effectiveness is commonly measured in terms of energy per unit volume.
212
 
Even as it becomes harder to find new oil sources in the future, we can expect the 
energy per barrel of oil to be consistent over time. In fact, one could argue that a 
barrel of oil produced in the future will yield a greater overall benefit, as combustion 
engines and heating systems become more efficient in their energy conversion, while 
producing fewer externalities in the form of pollution. For antibiotics, however, this 
is most certainly not the case.  
 
If we accept that in principle, any global use of antibiotics, even under the most 
careful and conservative approach, will create resistance in the future, it stands to 
reason that the effectiveness of antibiotics cannot be sustained at the current level as 
long as any quantity of drugs is in circulation.
213
 Again, it must be stressed, that via 
appropriate policies to control antibiotic use, the progress of AMR could be slowed 
down or delayed significantly. Yet, in principle antibiotic use will entail higher 
resistance and thus diminishing effectiveness in the long run. Lower effectiveness 
here means, that a Defined Daily Dose (DDD) of antibiotics that is used today will 
be worth less at some point in the future, where the drug is either i) no longer 
effective at all, ii) requires combination with other antibiotics, or iii) must be used in 
higher dosages, such that the DDD is no longer appropriate and must be increased by 
a factor >1. How quickly this effect takes place, and how much greater the factor is 
(or which other drugs will have to be used in combination) is likely to be different 
for specific pathogens. It will also depend on the overall amount of antibiotics that is 
being used. However, in the medium run, even under a restrictive policy for their 
use, antibiotics are likely to become less and less effective. This clearly separates 
them from other natural resources in one very important aspect, and we will have to 
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look at the consequences of this difference in more detail, to determine how it should 
be reflected in policy-making.  
 
3.9  Economics and AMR - taking stock 
So far, I have suggested that prudent use of antibiotics, while a common theme in the 
literature, is a poorly defined concept that provides little practical guidance in order 
to help us decide, what constitutes a sustainable and responsible level of 
consumption. I have then suggested that we must distinguish between the distribution 
of antibiotics, antibiotic effectiveness and the ownership of intellectual property 
rights to antibiotics, and that antibiotic effectiveness is a common good. While 
economic theory offers examples of a number of such goods, some of which are 
frequently compared to AMR, I have argued that these analogies fail to capture the 
problem in all of its relevant aspects. As a result, solutions that have been proposed 
for the analogous cases are unlikely to apply to AMR, because they deal with broadly 
comparable but not sufficiently similar problems. Instead, we should think of 
antibiotics as separate type of commodity, which - while bearings some resemblance 
to other commodities - raises a set of distinct and unique problems that policy makers 
will have to address. The following list attempts to capture all aspects of antibiotics 
and antibiotic effectiveness that will have to be considered in order to determine a 
fair distribution across societies and time. 
 
3.10 Characteristics of antibiotics as a commodity 
 So far, there is no viable alternative to the use of antibiotics. No other class of 
drug has been able to provide the same or similar medical benefits. We can thus 
not simply switch to an alternative technology or intervention. 
 Antibiotics are not only needed to treat acute infections, their availability also 
affects many other areas of medical care and is for example a precondition for 
many surgical interventions, where surgical site infections can be reduced by 
antibiotic prophylaxis. 
 Antibiotics are not suited to the distribution in free markets, due to the 
insufficient consideration for the externalities associated with their use.  
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 Antibiotics can confer positive externalities, in the case of reducing the risk of 
infection to others when used against contagious diseases. 
 The use of antibiotics results in negative externalities, when this leads to the 
creation of AMR. 
 Antibiotics are only effective against bacterial infections, and offer no benefit at 
all against other types of infection. 
 Using antibiotics can at best restore a previous level of utility or quality of life 
that the patient enjoyed before developing an infection. The consumption of 
antibiotics cannot yield additional utility beyond this point. 
 Overconsumption of antibiotics is not rational from a cost-benefit perspective, 
unless it occurs under conditions of uncertainty, where the risks of side effects 
are pitted against potential benefits, and resistance is an externality that is not 
only a burden to patient taking the drug but shared across all members of a 
community. 
 While in principle, AMR is reversible over time, if a drug is no longer being 
used, this may prove to be so difficult in practice that from a policy perspective, 
it makes sense to think of antibiotic effectiveness as a non-renewable resource. 
This applies in particular to the case of multi-resistant bacteria against which few 
drugs remain effective at this point and a switch to alternative drugs is therefore 
no longer an option. 
 Effective antibiotics - unlike other non-renewable resources - will not merely run 
out at some point. With progressing resistance, there will also be a diminished 
effectiveness over time. Ceteris paribus, a dose of antibiotics today is likely to 
have a greater effect than a dose in the future. This fundamentally distinguishes 
antibiotics from most other resources.  
 New antibiotics have so far not been a permanent solution to AMR, and have all 
displayed diminishing effectiveness over time.  
 
The following diagram represents the last three points graphically: 
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Diagram 1 
 
Consider the case of two antibiotics A1 and A2, which are used to treat the same 
condition C. A1 will be introduced first, while A2 is first introduced at a later stage 
(t1). A1's long-term effectiveness decreases as bacterial resistance to A1 develops, 
which happens at an accelerating rate until eventually, A1 is no longer useable to 
treat C.  To be able to continue treating C effectively, A2 is being developed and 
introduced. The additional antibiotic effectiveness provided by A2 is signified by the 
shaded light blue area under the curve of A2.  Like A1, A2 becomes less effective 
over time, until resistance is so widespread, that A2 no longer offers a viable 
treatment option for C.  For the purposes of the above diagram, it is assumed that 
antibiotics are used until they are completely ineffective and that there is no reversal 
of AMR between the introduction of A1 and the cessation of its use due to 
ineffectiveness.  The slope for fA1 and fA2 in the above diagram is non-linear to 
illustrate the diminishing effectiveness over time.   
Let us now assume further that a policy of prudent antibiotic use is introduced. This 
policy extends the effectiveness of A1 and A2 and shifts them to the right, which in 
the diagram above is represented by curves PA1 and PA2. Prudent use will thus 
extend effectiveness and delay the time at which a new antibiotic needs to be 
introduced. With prudent use, the new drug (PA2) will not be introduced at t1 but at 
t2. Yet, the overall slope of antibiotic effectiveness remains negative even with a 
prudent use policy and both antibiotics will ultimately become ineffective. Thus, 
prudent use delays the introduction of new drugs against C, but does not render their 
introduction superfluous. How much the time span of antibiotic effectiveness can be 
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extended by prudent use will depend on a number of factors, including the levels of 
AMR at t1 and the frequency with which bacterial infections that cause C occur.  
 
3.11 Summary 
In this chapter, it has been argued that preservation of antibiotic effectiveness - 
though similar to other distributive problems - poses some unique challenges, which 
attempts to produce policy solutions by analogical reasoning have so far overlooked. 
In particular, ethical accounts of AMR need to address the question how to distribute 
a resource that is vital for the protection of health, but which declines in  
effectiveness through use. So far, accounts of the fair use of antibiotics both within 
and across generations have not paid sufficient attention to these specific 
characteristics, and as a result have often suggested policy solutions, which are 
unsuitable because they fail to acknowledge the distinctive features of AMR.  
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Chapter 4: What makes AMR a moral problem? A 
consequentialist approach 
 
4.1 Consequentialism as the obvious answer? 
In light of AMR's potentially catastrophic consequences in the future, it seems 
obvious to suggest that precisely these consequences also make AMR a moral 
problem. This suggestion does not yet commit us to any particular moral theory - as 
Rawls notes, “[a]ll ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into 
account in judging rightness.”214 Yet, when considering consequences of actions as 
normatively relevant, it makes sense to examine more closely those ethical theories, 
for which the outcomes of actions matter most. This chapter will therefore discuss 
how a consequentialist account of AMR could be formulated. Consequentialism 
subsumes a number of ethical doctrines, which vary quite substantially but share the 
view that the normative properties of any act are solely determined by that act's 
consequences.
215
 A number of commentators have argued that certain forms of 
consequentialism - in particular certain types of rule utilitarianism - are particularly 
well suited as guiding principles for policy-making.
216
 William Shaw offers an 
explanation for this, which is worth quoting in full:  
 
“In the public realm, utilitarianism is particularly compelling. Because of its 
consequentialist character, a utilitarian approach to public policy requires officials 
to base their actions, procedures and programs on the most accurate, and detailed 
understanding they can obtain of the circumstances in which they are operating and 
the likely results of the alternatives open to them. Realism and empiricism are the 
hallmarks of a utilitarian orientation, not customary practice, unverified 
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abstractions, or wishful thinking. Promotion of the well-being of all seems to be the 
appropriate; indeed the only sensible, touchstone for assessing public policies[.]”217  
 
Shaw's argument thus views consequentialism as the ideal moral foundation for 
evidence-based policy-making. Since evidence-based decision making is often 
considered the gold standard for deciding on public health policy, it may therefore 
come as little surprise that consequentialist theories have also been promoted as a 
particularly suitable moral framework in this field.
218
 Roberts and Reich have 
suggested that this is because consequentialism "captures a critical concern [for 
public health], namely improving individual wellbeing" and therefore has a strong 
intuitive appeal for public health specialists.
219
 Others agree, arguing that "[i]t is easy 
for [public health] practitioners [...] to adopt utilitarian concepts almost 
unconsciously."
220
 On such an account, a successful public health measure will 
usually be one that produces better health outcomes (or prevents worse one) and 
therefore maximises utility. Mackenbach summarises this view succinctly, when 
arguing that utilitarianism is “[a particularly attractive] theory for public health 
people, because it provides […] a quantitative method for determining what is a 
good, and what is a wrong decision.”221  
 
Crucially, however, this does not only qualify consequentialist accounts as a moral 
framework for policy-making. It also distinguishes them from many other moral 
theories, which do not consider outcomes to be of paramount importance in deciding 
about the moral worth of an action. As a result, consequentialism has been 
championed by some as the pragmatic approach to making moral decisions in the 
public realm. Such a view, as Onora O'Neill notices, will commonly accuse non-
consequentialists of ignoring outcomes entirely and merely "valu[ing] acts for their 
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underlying motives or intentions, or for some other internal feature of agents, 
regardless of results."
222
 Consequentialism in turn seems to provide a much more 
pragmatic moral foundation for policy-making. 
 
Despite its initial plausibility, the view that consequentialism naturally lends itself to 
decision-making in the public realm has been met with considerable criticism. 
Stephen Holland has described the view that consequentialism is an obvious moral 
guiding principle for public health as 'naive'.
223
 This 'naivety', he argues, stems from 
the fact that a maximisation of health (however defined) is also straightforwardly 
treated as a maximisation of utility and therefore seen as ethically permissible or 
even obligatory.
224
 This rather simplistic view overlooks both practical and moral 
concerns, which shall next be addressed in more detail.  
 
First, the idea that consequentialism is a suitable moral framework to inform health 
policy rests on the assumption that we can reliably measure alternative health 
outcomes and compare them between persons. In other words, any consequentialist 
account of public health that aims to be convincing and useful in practice must 
provide a measure, by which we can evaluate and compare policies that generate 
different kinds of health benefits for different groups of people. There are some 
clearly defined health outcomes that are easily comparable, for example the number 
of deaths that result from two different policies. However, less definitive health 
outcomes will be much harder to compare between different persons. We will return 
to this point later on in this chapter, but for now it suffices to note that measuring 
health benefits across persons and comparing health gains for different conditions is 
a methodology that comes with a number of problems and raises more questions than 
it answers.  
 
A second point worth noting is that a 'naive' consequentialist account of public 
health, which seeks to simply maximise health outcomes, may legitimise policies that 
raise other ethical concerns. As Stephen Holland has observed, such a one-
dimensional approach to health care would allow very Draconian health measures, 
purely based on the premise that the overall expected health benefits that result from 
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such an approach are positive.
225
 To make this point more obvious, Holland imagines 
a scenario in which outlawing smoking and executing a small number of smokers as 
a deterrent may be morally permissible, if it reduces the overall prevalence of 
smoking and thereby also the number of people suffering from smoking-related 
diseases.  
 
4.2 A case for more sophisticated versions of consequentialism? 
While the objections to the 'naive' view of a consequentialist public health ethic are 
substantial, they do not apply to more sophisticated versions of consequentialism, 
which may have quite a bit more to say about what makes AMR a moral problem. 
 
To begin with, the majority of consequentialist models, such as the one proposed by 
William Shaw earlier in this chapter, are sufficiently sophisticated to avoid some of 
the pitfalls of the 'naive' concept that Holland criticises. They are not simple, 
hedonistic formulae, but are designed to develop regulations and institutions, which 
will maximise utility in the long run.
226
 This removes some of the tensions between 
short-term gains and long-term effects of a policy, as it does not commit 
consequentialists to the maximisation of short-term benefits if these conflict with a 
general principle or rule that the theory promotes.
227
 Such general rules are designed 
to be utility maximising in the long run, but do not commit consequentialists to 
endorsing extreme cases like Holland's smoker scenario.  Thus, at least some of the 
criticism of the naive view of consequentialism does not extend to more 
sophisticated versions.
228
 This, however, is not the only reason to reconsider the 
attractiveness of more advanced versions of consequentialism. Crucially, 
consequentialist accounts of public health offer a number of advantages, which are 
highly relevant to the discussion of AMR. 
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4.2.1 Compatibility with current practice of policy-making 
A first reason why consequentialism may be an attractive moral framework for 
considering AMR is that it fits many of the principles, which underline health policy-
making. To begin with, it is not only compatible with policies that focus on cost-
effective use of resources (which in most health care systems is a crucial 
consideration for any policy), but actively promotes their use. Cost-Effectiveness 
Analysis (CEA) is not in itself a moral theory but it is based on a principle of utility 
maximisation, which seeks to generate the greatest return on investment. More 
specifically, CEA is an economic tool to determine optimal rates of expenditure, 
which seeks to spend only up to the point where the marginal cost of a good is equal 
to the marginal benefit that it provides. This way, only goods for which benefits are 
at least as great as ensuing costs should be financed.
229
 Under conditions of scarcity, 
CEA can help to reduce wasteful (i.e. cost-inefficient) spending and is thus a method 
of using public funds to greater effect. A case in point is that CEA would rule out the 
overuse of antibiotics, as their prescription against e.g. viral infections, which cannot 
be treated with antibiotics, is clearly not cost-effective. Similarly, if AMR creates 
high costs in the long-run then CEA may require that we dedicate more resources to 
fighting its effects today.
230
 Of course, opponents may argue that we are not bound to 
accept CEA as a guiding principle - and therefore consequentialism is not a logical 
fit for policy-making either. Yet, the current practice of (health) policy-making 
nonetheless relies quite heavily on cost-effectiveness measurements for resource 
allocation and this would be supported by a consequentialist normative framework. 
 
4.2.2 The ability to trade off benefits between groups of people 
A second problem, which consequentialist theories can account for, is the trade-off 
between claims of different groups of people. Containing infections may necessitate 
the restriction of individual liberty to prevent harm to a greater number or the 
distribution of scarce resources, which can benefit different groups of people.
231
 
Pandemic vaccination strategies often aim explicitly at minimising any adverse 
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health outcomes, while maximising improvements of the public's health.
232
 Similarly, 
regulation to enforce social distancing of contagious patients seems to be built 
around the assumption that the wellbeing of the population at large outweighs the 
restrictions to personal freedom of the detainee.
233
 In these scenarios, an approach 
that focuses on saving the most lives seems to be ethically sound and should even be 
acceptable to many non-consequentialists.
234
 This method of aggregating wellbeing 
has been cited as one of the key advantages of consequentialist frameworks for 
policy-making.
235
  
 
Opponents of consequentialism commonly cite its inability to account for what 
Rawls has termed 'the separateness of persons’ as one of the theories major 
shortcomings.
236
 Rawls argues that consequentialists deem what is a rational choice 
for an individual (namely to maximise personal utility given the choices he has) to 
also be a governing principle for fair distribution within a society.
237
 In doing so, 
consequentialists treat interpersonal distributive principles in the same way as 
intrapersonal ones and thereby risk different personal interests being conflated into 
one.
238
 Thus, while consequentialism can indeed aggregate individual interests, it 
does so not by taking account of each individual's rights or claim to a certain 
outcome, but merely maximises societal utility levels. As a result, consequentialist 
and utilitarian theories have widely been dismissed as being unable to provide a 
coherent account of distributive justice.
239
  
 
However, by insisting on the separateness of individual persons and thereby ruling 
out any straightforward aggregation of wellbeing across persons, non-
consequentialist have often struggled with situations in which decisions about saving 
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one of two differently sized groups have to be made. A case in point is John Taurek's 
account of number-scepticism, which challenges the idea that saving a larger group 
of people is always preferable.
240
 Taurek rejects consequentialist theories because he 
believes that rather than to explain how the harm to greater number is worse, 
consequentialism merely asserts it as a factual truth.
241
  Few have followed Taurek's 
argument for the complete rejection of the moral relevance of saving the greater 
number, yet the difficulty in making a non-consequentialist case for saving the 
greater number remains. Moreover, while a number of non-consequentialist 
alternatives have been suggested, none is quite as simple and definitive as the 
consequentialist account.
242
  
 
4.2.3 Accounting for the interests of future persons 
Another argument in favour of employing consequentialist theories to examine the 
moral implications of AMR is related to the previous point, and while it will be 
explored in detail in later chapters, it shall briefly be mentioned here as well. 
Consequentialism's dismissal of the separateness of persons enables it to take into 
account the interest of future persons who do not yet exist. We shall see in chapter 8 
that for ethical theories, which focus on individual rights or the concept of 
reciprocity, the interests of future persons are much harder to take into consideration 
because their present non-existence complicates the formulation of notions of mutual 
respect or shared interests. Since, as we have already seen, consequentialism is not 
concerned with any specific individual or how benefits are distributed between 
different persons (so long as the overall benefits are maximised), it matters less to the 
consequentialist, whether persons already exist or not. 
  
4.3 The problems that remain: the case against consequentialism 
While the naive view of a consequentialist approach to public health and infectious 
disease policy is unconvincing, approaches that are more sophisticated seem to offer 
distinct benefits, such as the ability to aggregate interests and thus make coherent 
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decisions about the protection of the greater number of persons. As we have seen, 
even many non-consequentialists can agree that this is a reasonable goal of infectious 
disease policy. However, in spite of the benefits of a consequentialist account, which 
were expounded in the previous section, at least three significant problems remain. 
These pertain to 1) the method of measuring health outcomes, 2) the uncertainty of 
future outcomes and 3) the fact that consequentialism does not recognise individual 
rights claims. We shall next consider each of them in turn. 
 
4.3.1 The first remaining problem: measuring health outcomes 
One of the most obvious problems that a consequentialist justification of public 
health policies will encounter is that the measurement of health outcomes across 
different persons is a highly complex process and fraught with difficulties. Over the 
past decades, the measurement of health outcomes has shifted towards the use of 
multi-dimensional parameters, instead of merely focussing on single-value measures 
such as life expectancy or five-year survival rates.
243
 The most common 
multidimensional measuring tools are Quality or Disability adjusted Life Years 
(QALYs or DALYs respectively), which combine life expectancy with a measure of 
life quality or disease burden.
244
 The advantage of these measurements over single-
value parameters is their ability to better reflect the complexity of determining the 
health status of a patient. However, a reliance on QALYs and DALYs creates two 
worries. First, there are legitimate concerns about the accuracy of such measures. For 
example, it may not always be possible to incorporate all relevant aspects of a 
person’s health status into a general measurement of health.245 What weighs more 
heavily than these technical difficulties, however, is the second worry, namely that 
the use of QALYs and DALYs leads to the systematic discrimination of certain 
social groups, as exemplified by the problems of 'ageism' and 'double jeopardy' 
respectively. These problems arise in circumstances where the ability of a person to 
achieve a high QALY score upon recovery is reduced by old age or an already low 
quality of life. Both of these problems challenge the assumption of distributive 
neutrality on which the QALY approach builds and which is central to their use in 
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policy-making.
246
 Distributive neutrality presupposes that society is indifferent 
between who receives treatment, and that societal concern for health is merely the 
sum of individual health benefits.
247
 As outlined earlier, this supposed impartiality 
between who receives a treatment is often cited as a strength of consequentialism in 
the area of policy-making; by focussing on outcomes rather than recipients, policy 
makers do not favour certain social groups, they merely focus on creating the 
greatest positive impact. Yet, as the following sections will illustrate, this argument 
is much less convincing if the preferred method of measurement systematically 
discriminates some social groups. 
 
Ageism is a phenomenon that has been widely discussed in the literature on 
consequentialist allocation models of health care resources and QALYs.
248
 The term 
describes the systematic disadvantage that old people face when receiving scarce 
health care resources if these are distributed according to QALY scores. Since older 
people have a lower remaining life expectancy, they are automatically unable to 
derive high QALY scores from any medical treatment or intervention. 
In the context of fair resource allocation in health care, double jeopardy describes a 
concern, which is related to that of ageism. Specifically, the concern is that people 
who suffer a chronic condition will be unable to attain the same level of health as a 
person not afflicted by this long-standing condition.  Consequently, if a scarce 
resource had to be distributed between the two individuals based on the expected 
QALY score it produces, the healthy person would be prioritized, as this would yield 
more QALYs.
 249
  
 
Some commentators simply accept the inherent bias of QALYs as an unfortunate 
side effect.
250
 Others have tried to offer more sophisticated justifications for 
prioritising younger patients, by claiming that we should aim to create conditions 
where everyone’s chances to reach roughly an average life expectancy should be 
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given priority over helping those who have already lived a long life. This position is 
commonly referred to as the ‘fair innings’ argument.251 We need not solve this 
discussion here.
252
 For our purposes, it suffices to note that currently we do not have 
an ethically neutral methodology for allocating resources based on health outcomes.  
 
4.3.2 The second remaining problem: decision-making under uncertainty 
Let us recall William Shaw's quote cited earlier, in which he suggested that 
"[r]ealism and empiricism are the hallmarks of a utilitarian orientation, not 
customary practice, unverified abstractions, or wishful thinking."
253
 Shaw's argument 
in favour of consequentialism also points to one of its greatest weaknesses - the 
reliance on knowledge about what will happen. However, most policies are made 
under conditions of uncertainty. For obvious reasons, it is difficult to be concrete 
about what the world will look like in two years, let alone in twenty years, policies 
will  therefore always have to be formulated under conditions of uncertainty. 
Arguably, this is a concern not only for consequentialist theories, but also for any 
kind of moral theory, which, in deliberating the morally right way of action, takes 
into account the consequences. However, if a moral theory rests exclusively on the 
ability to compare different outcomes and rank their moral desirability by the utility 
they produce, significant uncertainty about what can reasonably be expected as an 
outcome presents a particularly serious obstacle.  
 
The case of AMR presents a particular challenge in this respect, as the development 
of drug resistance is not a linear process, which can easily be mapped out and 
predicted. The spread of extensively drug-resistant bacteria for example will at least 
in part be down to chance and depend on the place of origin, the mode of 
transmission, the availability of suitable vectors and the effectiveness of monitoring 
systems that can alert health authorities in time. In chapter 2, it was already outlined 
that uncertainty surrounding AMR complicates the use of cost-benefit analysis to 
determine appropriate expenditure on policies to slow down or reverse drug 
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resistance. This same problem also applies to the moral evaluation of future costs and 
benefits. While at first sight, consequentialism and its ability to trade off utility gains 
(or losses) between different groups seems to lend itself well to the project of 
establishing how antibiotics can be fairly used between persons and generations, this 
presupposes at least some level of knowledge about the size of future utility gains. 
Where such knowledge is not available, it would appear that the supposed advantage 
of consequentialism as an empirical normative concept, as Shaw called it, does not 
apply.  
 
Consequentialists may respond to this that, ultimately, they do not need to know the 
exact outcome of a path of action, as long as it is reasonably likely that one will 
produce considerable better outcomes than another. For instance, we may be unable 
to calculate the utility loss to the present generation if access to antibiotics is severely 
restricted, or the precise utility gains that the resulting preservation of antibiotic 
effectiveness may yield in the future. However, if we are reasonably certain that 
future gains will be very substantial (or, alternatively that inaction will lead to 
enormous costs), we would have a good enough reason to act, since 
consequentialism merely proposes that utility should be maximised, even if the 
precise magnitude of that utility gain is not know ex ante. This argument is strongest 
in the case of rule utilitarianism, where merely the general principle (as opposed to 
an individual action) must be utility-maximising.
254
  
 
Again, however, this kind of argument seems a long way from any claim that 
consequentialism provides an 'empirical' basis for policy-making, especially in light 
of the fact that even general principles of utility maximisation may be difficult if not 
impossible to formulate under sufficiently severe uncertainty. The true effects of a 
post-antibiotic era are impossible to calculate - but so are the odds of technological 
progress to replace existing drugs or the development of other medical procedures, 
which make the use of antimicrobials obsolete.  
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4.3.3 The third remaining problem: consequentialism and individual rights 
A commonly raised objection to consequentialism is that it does not recognise 
individual rights as relevant at all, which leads to implausible normative suggestions. 
Philippa Foot's well-known example of the enforced organ donation nicely illustrates 
this problem; a healthy patient who has come to hospital for a routine check is 
coincidentally found to be an exact match as organ donor for five terminally ill 
patients in the same hospital. These patients have no alternative way of receiving an 
organ and will die very soon. Leaving issues of legality aside, Foot raises the 
question, whether or not it is morally permissible to kill the patient who came for a 
routine check-up to save five lives by sacrificing his.
255
 As Michael Otsuka has 
observed, in these instances consequentialism often ends up promoting 'the wrong 
answer' and either has to bite the bullet by endorsing counter-intuitive actions (as 
illustrated for example by Foot's case of organ transplantation) or forego 
consistency.
256
 And while more sophisticated versions of consequentialism, such as 
rule-utilitarianism, are capable  of formulating general principles that appear very 
similar to rights, they are not grounded in the recognition that there are some things 
we simply must not do to an individual (or, conversely, have a duty to do). Instead, 
they are merely supposed to maximise utility in the long-run.
257
 These theories are 
therefore incommensurable with any notion of patient rights or even a particular 
concern with the wellbeing of a specific individual. The last point in particular makes 
consequentialism an unattractive concept for health policy, as it does not show any 
concern with individuals. And while the approach claims impartiality, we have seen 
that it may overlook those that are particularly vulnerable and in need of help. 
 
4.4 Consequentialism and AMR - not such an obvious match after all 
From what we have seen so far, consequentialism's ability to aggregate utility across 
persons and its strong focus on outcomes make the approach a promising candidate 
for providing a moral account of infectious disease policy. In this field, and 
particularly in the control of AMR, trade-offs between the interests of different 
groups appear unavoidable and consequentialism offers a coherent account of how to 
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make these decisions. However, it is also important to note that citing 
consequentialism's congruence with current health policy as an argument in its 
favour risks getting the argument backwards. After all, a moral theory should be 
adopted because of its persuasiveness or coherence, not merely due to the extent to 
which it explains or justifies current policies. It may indeed be true that, as Stuart 
Horner argues, many public health practitioners subconsciously make decisions that 
follow some sort of consequentialist calculus.
258
 Yet, while this may explain the 
partial fit between theory and current practice, it does not provide an argument, why 
we should endorse consequentialism in the first place. 
 
Nonetheless, what this chapter has shown is that some issues which are easier to 
explain for consequentialist than for non-consequentialist theories will have to be 
accounted for in any normative examination of AMR. As we have seen, non-
consequentialists who believe that saving the greater number is morally warranted, 
may find it more difficult to make this claim than consequentialists do.
259
 However, 
this added difficulty seems insufficient as an argument for endorsing a 
consequentialist perspective, especially in light of its significant limitations. 
 
The argument presented in this chapter does not amount to a refutation of 
consequentialism, nor does it rule out its application to the case of AMR. What the 
discussion in this chapter has shown is that despite its apparent (often self-
proclaimed) suitability as normative framework for policy-making, consequentialism 
has to deal with a host of problems and inconsistencies. These problems need not be 
worse than the ones faced by the alternative theories discussed in this thesis. 
However, they should cast doubt on the assumption that consequentialism is an 
obvious candidate for the ethical analysis of AMR. In the following chapters, we will 
therefore examine alternative approaches to explain the moral relevance of AMR. To 
start with, this will require a more detailed look at the concepts of harm and risk 
which are employed in this context.  
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Chapter 5: AMR and Wrongful Harm 
 
In the previous chapter, we saw that  there are significant problems with using 
consequentialism for the purposes of guiding AMR policy, especially in light of the 
uncertainty surrounding the future consequences of AMR. This worry does not solely 
apply to consequentialism; the problem of uncertainty will also affect other 
normative theories, which care about the consequences of a proposed policy. 
However, we also saw that there is a more fundamental normative worry about 
consequentialism, namely its focus on reducing harm and improving consequences in 
the aggregate. This approach looks to be insufficiently attentive to the moral claims 
and moral standing of individuals. 
 
The next four chapters (5-8) therefore aim to work out what a viable approach to 
AMR policy, which takes the claims of individuals seriously, would look like. The 
starting point for this analysis will be the idea that AMR policy should, in the first 
instance, focus on ensuring that individuals are not wronged. This view departs from 
the consequentialist approach, which merely looks to reduce the overall harm caused 
by AMR. The main point of chapter 5 is to clarify the idea of wrongful harm, in the 
context of AMR. The chapter examines both, the concept of harm, and the kinds of 
harm caused by AMR that are morally wrongful. The chapter then discusses two 
facets of the idea of harm that might prima facie make a difference to whether a harm 
is wrongful: the causation of harm, and the scale of harm. It will be argued that only 
harms with certain kinds of human cause can be wrongful, and that there is no 
minimum size of harm that can be considered wrongful. Moreover, arguments for 
thinking that risk imposition can be harmful in the absence of any awareness of the 
risk, or any other adverse consequences, are rejected. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 look at different attempts to explain and to justify - from the 
perspective of rights theory, and contractualism - how AMR could be responsible for 
wrongful harm to individuals. It will be argued that for various reasons, the 
contractualist approach seems to be a superior way of explaining and justifying both, 
why AMR can wrong individuals and under what circumstances it will do so. 
Chapter 8 considers an additional complication posed for AMR policy, namely the 
question of intergenerational justice, and examines this both from the perspective of 
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consequentialism and contractualism respectively. Consequentialism is reconsidered, 
because when considering how policy should be formed for generations of 
individuals who have not yet been born, its weaknesses in attending to the moral 
claims of currently existing individuals become something closer to a strength.  
We shall begin this discussion by considering in detail what harms are caused by 
AMR and which kinds of harm can be considered to be morally wrongful. 
 
5.1 What is a harm in the context of AMR and why should we 
consider it? 
The concept of harm in public health ethics has received attention from a number of 
commentators, primarily in relation to J.S. Mill's discussion of the restriction of 
individual liberty.
260
 In what is perhaps the most widely cited principle of 
establishing limits to personal freedom, Mill writes that 
 
"[t]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of 
a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral is not a sufficient warrant."
261
  
 
Originally conceived as a principle to govern the limits of criminal law, the harm 
principle has found widespread application in public health. Its appeal is that it 
appears to clearly delineate the limits of right trade-offs between people.
262
 While not 
a definitive benchmark for the moral permissibility of an action, it has often been 
used to justify a given course of action in public health policy.
263
 It should be noted 
that the harm principle is by no means an uncontested approach to regulating health 
policy and some public health measures that are widely used clearly conflict with it. 
For example, regulations enforcing the use of motorcycle helmets or seatbelts are 
primarily designed to protect the people on whom the restriction of liberty is 
                                                          
260
  See e.g. Krom, A. (2011). "The Harm Principle as a mid-level principle? Three problems 
from the context of infectious disease control." Bioethics 25(8): 437-444. Powers, M., R. Faden, et al. 
(2012). "Liberty, Mill and the Framework of Public Health Ethics." Public Health Ethics 5(1): 6-15. 
261
  Mill, J. S. (1989). On Liberty and Other Writings. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
p. 13 
262
  Holland, S. (2007). Public Health Ethics. Cambridge, Polity Press. 
263
  Upshur, R. (2002). "Principles for the justification of public health intervention." Can J 
Public Health 93: 101 - 103. Holland, S. (2007). Public Health Ethics. Cambridge, Polity Press. p. 54 
87 
 
placed.
264
  The harm principle has often been applied to the case of infectious disease 
control, especially when deliberating how individual liberty can be curtailed to 
reduce the chances of transmission of communicable diseases.
265
 In this chapter, 
however, a broader concept of harm will be explored.  Instead of focussing merely 
on the trade-offs of liberty to prevent harm, we shall  explore, what exactly 
constitutes a morally wrongful harm, and how this notion can be applied to the case 
of AMR. The chapter consists of two parts. The first will discuss the concept of 
morally wrongful harm in relation to AMR. The second part will then examine, if the 
additional risk that AMR creates can be viewed as a harm in itself.  
 
5.2 Defining harm 
The concept of harm is often only defined in very general terms, which may be partly 
due to the fact that the term is used widely and in very different contexts in everyday 
language. As Shiffrin has observed, many of these uses reduce harm to "notions of 
mere loss, damage, or opportunity costs", which do not always describe morally 
problematic cases.
266
 Thus, in many instances, 'harm' will simply refer to situations 
of  "nonwrongful setbacks to interests, or harms that are no wrongs", as Feinberg 
notes.
267
  Such 'harms that are no wrongs' include for example some forms of damage 
to persons that are caused by natural catastrophes (although we shall see later that 
this does by no means have to apply to all such instances).
268
 Another example of a 
non-wrongful harm is to lose in a fair competition, which the participant voluntarily 
entered. In these instances, a person will experience setbacks to their interests, but 
these setbacks do not generate any moral claims. This more descriptive use of 'harm' 
is also reflected in parts of the medical literature,  where the term has frequently been 
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used interchangeably with related concepts such as 'adverse event' and 'injury'.
269
 
However, the resulting lack of clarity of what it means to 'harm' a person has also 
made it difficult to develop a common understanding of what it is that health care 
professionals and policy makers are trying to prevent.
270
  
 
In this chapter, the focus will be on harms that are also moral wrongs or - to adapt 
Feinberg's terminology - wrongful setbacks to interests. More specifically, it will be 
considered to what extent the emergence and spread of AMR can be said to 
constitute a morally wrongful harm. This discussion requires two clarifications. First, 
we will have to distinguish between human and natural causes of harm. Secondly, we 
must develop an account of what exactly makes a harm morally wrongful.  
 
5.2.1 Causes of harm: natural versus man-made 
Brooks has pointed out that we tend to distinguish between harms caused by humans, 
and those caused by nature. As an example, he points out that a person who is hit by 
lightning is harmed in a physical but not a morally wrongful way, since the 
occurrence of lightning is neither controlled nor influenced by other persons.
271
 Such 
a view is also supported by Feinberg's formulation of harm. According to Feinberg, 
morally wrongful harm has two distinct components. It must:  
 
1) lead to some kind of adverse effect on the victim's interest (or create a risk of 
such an effect occurring) and 
2) be inflicted wrongfully, and violate the victim's rights.272 
 
While 1) could apply to natural causes of harm, 2) presupposes some greater level of 
human agency.
273
 Yet, in practice, it may actually be difficult to distinguish between 
natural and man-made causes of harm. Consider an instance where a poorly 
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constructed building, which fails to meet basic safety regulations, collapses in an 
earthquake, thereby killing all its inhabitants. While the trigger of this event was a 
natural phenomenon, namely the movement of tectonic plates, the collapse of the 
building could have been averted if existing building standards had been met. Since 
many harmful situations could be averted or mitigated by better preparation, one 
therefore has to be careful in distinguishing properly between those kinds of harm, 
which are genuinely the result of natural causes and those, which also contain an 
element of human (in-)action and would meet the second component of morally 
wrongful harm as defined by Feinberg.  
 
In light of this difficulty, an account of morally wrongful harm that is caused by 
AMR will have to be very clear about which aspects of such harm can be assigned to 
natural causes, and which are the result of human agency. For example, dying from 
an infectious disease certainly constitutes a case of being harmed by a pathogen. Yet, 
as will  be discussed below, we may have to say a bit more about whether it also 
follows that the person has been wronged in the process. To make this point more 
obvious, consider two cases, Albert and Barry. 
 
Albert 
Albert likes to spend his holidays in remote locations - the fewer people he 
encounters, and the further away he is from civilization, the better. On one occasion, 
while out travelling in the wilderness, Albert hits his knee, the wound becomes 
infected and Albert develops sepsis. Because he cannot get himself to a hospital 
quickly, Albert dies from the bloodstream infection that could have otherwise been 
treated. 
 
Barry 
At the gym, Barry hits his head and starts to bleed. Using a sweaty towel to cover the 
little cut, Barry goes home. The wound becomes infected with a particularly virulent 
type of community-acquired MRSA. Barry gets worse and is sent to hospital, where 
he is put on antibiotics. Because of the drug resistance, he does not respond to the 
initial treatment and shortly after succumbs to the infection. 
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Both Albert and Barry die from a bacterial bloodstream infection and are thus both at 
the very least harmed in the descriptive sense that they are now significantly worse 
off. However, in one of the two cases, it is more difficult to see, how this harm could 
be viewed as wrongful. Albert's death is the result of a personal choice to go to a 
remote location, without access to medical services. He could have been helped, had 
he been elsewhere, but he chose to travel in a remote area and - let us assume - knew 
the risks involved in distancing himself so far from civilization. Consequently, the 
harm that Albert experienced is not morally wrongful. The existence of bacteria is 
not controlled by humans, so Albert could not reasonably expect to be in a bacteria-
free environment (similarly, as we shall see in a bit, neither could Barry).  
 
It should be noted that this argument only pertains to the specific case of Albert, and 
not all cases, in which there is insufficient infrastructure to provide help. What makes 
the claim that Albert was not wronged plausible is that he actively sought to distance 
himself from civilization for the duration of the holiday. As a result, he could not 
reasonably expect to be rescued. In many other instances, however, lack of access to 
health care should be viewed as a wrong. Think of a different scenario, where Albert 
(2) was living in a rural area, in which few resources had been invested into 
establishing emergency services. If Albert (2), who did not choose to be away from 
all amenities of society in the same way as Albert (1) when he fell ill, we might very 
well think of his condition as one in which he was wrongfully harmed. If we accept 
that in Albert's particular situation, the infection he acquired was harmful, but that no 
wrong was committed, we still need to examine whether Barry's case is different. 
Unlike Albert, Barry found himself in a setting where help was available, and he 
sought it accordingly. Yet, due to the fact that he had acquired a drug-resistant 
infection, and the initial treatment failed to work, Barry was unable to receive the 
initial help he needed.  
 
Does this mean that Barry has been morally wronged? It has already been suggested 
that accidentally acquiring a bacterial infection does not generally amount to being 
wronged.
274
 Thus, if we want to identify a way in which Barry has been wronged, we 
must look elsewhere. A more promising approach could instead start from the 
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premise that AMR diminishes the availability of a scare resource (namely effective 
antibiotics). This circumstance could be viewed as one in which Barry is morally 
wronged, if his expectation of benefitting from this resource could no longer be met, 
because it was wasted or mismanaged. Whether there is any wrongdoing in Barry’s 
case will therefore depend on the question if the resource that Barry can no longer 
use has in fact been previously mismanaged or wasted. Determining if is the case 
will not be a simple judgement to make and depends on what kind of knowledge, 
resources and constraints the managers of the resource had in the past. But, as 
chapter 2 outlined, the causes for the emergence of AMR (and the consequences of 
current drug use) have been well documented for a long time. Moreover, we already 
saw that there is broad consensus among experts that antibiotics are being used 
wastefully and excessively. This would suggest that it is possible to develop an 
argument according to which Barry has indeed been wronged. 
 
There are thus a number of differences between the harm caused in Albert’s and 
Barry’s case. To begin with, Barry’s death was (at least to some extent) the result of 
human action. While AMR can occur naturally, current rates of MRSA, and its 
spread in the community are largely the result of past prescribing practice and use of 
antibiotics.
275
 Albert, on the other hand, fell victim to what - for the purposes of this 
argument - we might call a 'natural' infection. Moreover, due to his own choices there 
was no help available to him. By contrast, Barry's death from MRSA was the result 
of previous use of antimicrobial drugs, which rendered some bacteria resistant, and 
made their treatment more difficult or even altogether impossible.  
 
From what has so far been proposed, we cannot conclude, however, that all 
infections caused by drug-resistant bacteria necessarily constitute cases of morally 
wrongful harm. After all, some forms of drug resistance have occurred naturally for 
millions of years.
 276
 Yet, it will here be argued that at least in those instances, where 
we can reasonably assume that the prevailing level of AMR is a direct result of 
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previous antibiotic use, the ensuing harm is also morally wrong.
277
 Barry’s case 
seems to constitute such a case.  
 
Albert's and Barry's cases also underline the importance of distinguishing clearly 
what kinds of human agency we wish to consider as contributing factors to a morally 
wrongful harm. The mere assertion that a harm is (partially) man-made may not be 
enough to establish whether a harm can be legitimately seen as morally wrongful.  
For instance, to say that a harm is man-made does not have to imply that 
responsibility-carrying acts figure among the most proximate causes.
278
 This is to say 
that in many instances, even for a man-made harm, it will be impossible to identify 
the people who are directly responsible for the outcome. No one infected Barry 
directly with MRSA, he merely contracted it because of a small skin wound. 
Considering his case a 'man-made' health problem therefore presupposes that in 
doing so, we will not only take into account direct causal link of disease contraction 
(in which other persons only played a role as unknowing vectors), but also wider 
social, political and medical factors that contributed to the emergence of this 
particular type of infection.  
Doing so offers a more complete picture of responsibility for the emergence of 
AMR, but it also raises a question about limits to responsibility. To illustrate this 
point, let us briefly reconsider the previous example of the structurally weak building 
that collapses during an earthquake. We may view the harm caused in this instance to 
be man-made on a number of different levels: Policy makers who allowed buildings 
to be erected in an area with high tectonic activity might be blamed. However, so 
could the building company that did not meet the required safety standards, or the 
council that failed to ensure that standards were met. Which of these levels to 
consider and what consequences to draw from it, are questions that the mere 
assertion of a man-made problem cannot answer. Similarly, if we call AMR a man-
made problem, we may wish to say more about who did actually create it.  
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5.2.2 Harmed by whom?  
Since our definition of morally wrongful harm rests on the assumption that such 
harm is in some way caused by human agents, the case of AMR presents a challenge. 
To be sure, as chapter two illustrated already, there is overwhelming scientific 
evidence that despite the natural occurrence of AMR before the invention of 
antimicrobial drugs, current levels of AMR are largely the result of their excessive 
use. Yet, despite this knowledge it is difficult to ascertain who (if anyone) bears the 
responsibility for the harm caused by AMR today. This is primarily due to the fact 
that the number of people who contributed to current levels of AMR by mis- or 
overusing antibiotics is extraordinarily large. However, it is not only the large 
number of actors that complicates an assessment of who is responsible for the harm 
caused by AMR. Discussing the case of climate change, which - in this respect -  
resembles that of AMR, Sinnott-Armstrong has pointed out that establishing personal 
responsibility for contributing to large-scale social, or health problems is rendered 
almost impossible because the actions of each individual are neither sufficient nor 
necessary to produce the resulting harm.
279
 This observation would also appear to 
apply to the emergence of AMR. One individual's misuse of antibiotics does not 
make any perceptible difference in the emergence of AMR as a large-scale health 
problem, nor is this individual's use of antibiotics a necessary condition for the 
emergence of AMR. Had one person in the past not been given antibiotics, this 
would most likely not have had any measurable impact on the size and characteristics 
of today's challenge. Thus, while in principle the contributors to the problem can be 
identified, this does not mean that their actions satisfy the criteria for morally 
wrongful harming, as outlined above, at least not on an individual level. 
 
This distinction may appear somewhat artificial. After all, it could be argued, if we 
collectively contributed to the status quo, we are also collectively responsible for 
bringing it about in the first place, even if individual responsibility cannot be 
calculated. Yet, for the purposes of our discussion, the observation that personal 
contributions to AMR are so negligible that they cannot reliably be calculated 
amounts to more than mere semantics. At the very least, it suggests that the harm 
principle is unsuited to legitimise restrictive antibiotic usage polices. To see why this 
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is the case, recall Mill's formulation of the harm principle, which states that 
individual liberty can only be curtailed, "to prevent harm to others".
280
 However, if 
there is no clear causal link between the individual's misuse of antibiotics and some 
future harm caused by AMR, it stands to question, how collective responsibility can 
justify specific restrictions of personal liberty. This point is exacerbated by the fact 
that AMR can also result from antimicrobial usage, which follows best practice and 
takes all precautions to avoid resistance (albeit at much lower rates than currently 
observable). Consequently, when we consider those who are adversely affected by 
AMR to be harmed in a morally wrongful way, we cannot limit the discussion to 
instances of obvious misuse of antibiotics (which are at the centre of attention of 
current 'prudent use' policies). We will have to consider all cases of antibiotic usage, 
clinically justified or not.  
 
5.2.3 What counts as harm? AMR and the minimal threshold problem 
So far, it has been argued that the use of antibiotics will lead to an increase of drug-
resistant bacteria and that the subjection to an infection, which has become resistant 
to antibiotics due to our previous use of them may constitute a morally wrongful 
harm. Yet, there is a problem of defining who has responsibility for causing this 
harm. If an individual's contribution to overall rates of AMR is indeed negligible, 
and if the (mis-)use of antibiotics by any one person is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to create a measurable increase in AMR, then the question arises, if the 
actions of anyone can properly be classed as causing harm to others. One objection to 
this suggestion is that even if we cannot measure the direct causal pathway, this does 
not mean that it does not exist. According to this argument, while such a causal link 
may be weak, and the overall effect of each individual's (mis-)use of antibiotics on 
the emergence of AMR is too small to be reliably measured, we know in principle 
that it exists. This, however, raises another question, namely whether we need to 
establish a minimum level of harm that can count as morally wrongful. Let us call 
this the minimal threshold problem. When invoking any argument, which relies on 
the measurement of wellbeing and harm, we must be clear about when an adverse 
effect becomes a morally wrongful harm. There are two possible answers, which will 
be discussed next. First, we may argue that for a harm to be morally wrongful, it has 
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to be of a certain magnitude and lie above a threshold. I will suggest that this 
argument is unconvincing. Secondly, it could be argued that even if we view very 
small harms to be morally wrongful, this does not commit us to the view that all of 
them should also be prevented by state regulation.  To illustrate both of these points, 
consider the following example. 
 
Charles 
Charles is goes to his doctor, where he is treated for a bacterial infection. The doctor 
prescribes penicillin. Charles, however, has acquired an infection with a low level of 
resistance against penicillin, so that he gets better after being given a standard course 
of treatment, but the infection does not fully clear. Charles is told to come back a few 
days after the first visit for a routine check-up. His doctor realises that some bacteria 
have survived, and he administers a second, larger dose of penicillin. This time, all 
remaining bacteria are killed, and Charles is cured. 
 
In the above scenario, Charles is the victim of AMR. His infection can ultimately be 
treated, although it requires a second visit to the doctor and it takes slightly longer 
for Charles to get better. The harm that Charles experiences is much smaller than the 
one described earlier on in the case of Barry (who succumbed to his infection). In 
principle, however, the cases are similar - both Charles and Barry contract a bacterial 
infection that shows (different levels of) resistance to antibiotics, which is at least 
partly caused by human actions. If we accept that Barry has been wrongfully harmed, 
the same argument should extend to the case of Charles. Yet, intuitively, to intervene 
in Charles' case or compensate him for the harm caused seems excessive. After all, 
Charles gets better, much of the discomfort that the infection caused is reduced by 
the first course of treatment and he fully recovers.  This difference in how Barry's 
and Charles' case are perceived may be explained precisely by a threshold magnitude 
of (morally wrongful) harm that lies above the harm caused in Charles' case, but 
below that caused in Barry's case.  
 
However, there may be an alternative way of thinking about the role of a minimal 
threshold. Some philosophers, including Jonathan Glover and Derek Parfit, have 
argued that when considering harms, we should not at all be concerned about 
96 
 
minimal thresholds.
281
 This is due to the fact that those who seek to analyse small 
individual contributions to large, collectively created harms make the mistake of 
treating them as if they had occurred in isolation, rather than in conjunction with 
other person's actions. It will be useful to consider this point in detail. 
Glover suggests that many discussions about collective responsibility overlook what 
he calls the principle of divisibility. His argument is that those who reject the moral 
consideration of undetectably small harms overlook the contribution each individual 
makes.
282
 To make this point more obvious, Glover provides the following example:  
 
"Suppose a village contains 100 unarmed tribesmen eating their lunch. 100 hungry 
armed bandits descend on the village and each bandit at gunpoint takes one 
tribesman's lunch and eats it. The bandits then go off, each one having done a 
discriminable amount of harm to a single tribesman. Next week, the bandits are 
tempted to do the same thing again, but are troubled by new-found doubts about the 
morality of such a raid. Their doubts are put to rest by one of their number who does 
not believe in the principle of divisibility. They then raid the village, tie up the 
tribesmen, and look at their lunch. As expected, each bowl of food contains 100 
baked beans. The pleasure derived from one baked bean is below the discrimination 
threshold. Instead of each bandit eating a single plateful as last week, each takes one 
bean from each plate. They leave after eating all the beans, pleased to have done no 
harm, as each has done no more than sub-threshold harm to each person" 
 
The overall outcome in both cases that Glover describes is of course the same - the 
bandits eat all the food. Yet, to say that sub-threshold harms do not cause any moral 
harm, is to suggest that the actions in scenario two are morally superior. It should be 
obvious, how this case translates to the problem of AMR. The harm that the 
individual causes by taking a course of antibiotics, thereby contributing to higher 
levels of AMR in the future is similar to the case of taking a single bean. One may 
suggest that the harm caused by this action is imperceptibly small, but recall the for 
both cases involving the bandits, the overall outcome is the same. Insisting on the 
imperceptibility of the individual contribution to the problem as an argument against 
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moral responsibility for the total outcome fails to recognise that the individual action 
cannot be reasonably separated from the context it occurs in. Moreover, it must also 
be viewed in conjunction with the actions of all other persons. 
As a result, an argument for a threshold, which defines the magnitude of when a 
harm can be considered to be morally relevant must provide a reason why we should 
view each individual's action in isolation. Otherwise, it fails to be convincing. 
 
Derek Parfit has made a similar argument in Reasons and Persons. In discussing 
"five mistakes in moral mathematics", Parfit points out two inconsistencies in moral 
reasoning that apply directly to the problem of sub-threshold harms.
283
 In what he 
calls the fourth and fifth mistake, Parfit suggests that moral philosophers are 
mistaken if they believe  
i) that bringing about a benefit to other people is not morally required, if the 
size of that benefit is imperceptibly small and that  
ii) an act cannot be morally right or wrong if its effects are imperceptible to 
those who are subjected to them.
284
  
According to Parfit, this belief is mistaken because it starts from the wrong premise, 
namely by asking if the acts of one individual will harm others. Instead, Parfit 
suggests, we should focus on the question what consequences the actions of the 
individual in conjunction with the acts of others will produce. Parfit writes:  
 
"It is not enough to ask 'Will my act harm other people?' Even if the answer is No, 
my act may still be wrong, because of its effects. The effects that it will have when it 
is considered on its own may not be its only relevant effects. I should ask, 'Will my 
act be one of a set of acts that will together harm other people?' The answer may be 
Yes. And the harm to others may be great. If this is so, I may be acting very 
wrongly."
285
  
 
While this view appears to be intuitively plausible, it comes with an obvious 
problem: how can the individual know, whether their act belongs to a class of acts, 
which together harm other people? In the case of AMR, an answer to this question 
may be somewhat easier to find than in other instances. We could conceive of the 
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following classificatory principle: Any use of antibiotics, which does not comply 
with a strategy that aims for a balance between satisfying current urgent needs, and 
preserving future effectiveness of antibiotics will lead to harm to others and is 
therefore morally wrong. This principle is quite broad and does not catch every 
conceivable case of antibiotic use, but it can classify the majority of antibiotic 
prescriptions.
286
 Moreover, it would suggest that the current use of antibiotics (which 
certainly does not strike a balance between present and future needs) does cause 
morally wrongful harm for those who are affected by it.  
 
Whether or not one agrees with Parfit's consequentialist view that the wrongness of 
the action is primarily determined by its consequences is not relevant for our 
discussion. Even non-consequentialists should be concerned about the isolated 
consideration of components of collective actions. Glover and Parfit thus do not only 
provide a model of analysing the moral significance of collective action problems 
where the effects of individual actions are small.  They also provide a consistent 
argument as to why people have a moral obligation not to contribute to these harms, 
even if the size of their own contribution appears to be negligibly small.   
 
As mentioned earlier, however, we may still require a different kind of threshold 
value, namely one which determines, which morally wrongful harms justify state 
intervention to prevent them.
287
 To examine this argument more closely, let us 
reconsider Barry's and Charles' cases.  
The two cases lie at opposing ends of a spectrum. In Barry's case, it may be quite 
obvious that harm has been caused and that controlling the spread of MRSA is a 
cause for state intervention. In Charles' case, however, it is unlikely that the harm - 
even if morally wrongful - is sufficiently serious to warrant similar interventions. 
Charles has suffered a setback in health but it was comparatively trivial and, while 
undesirable, the adverse effects he experienced were negligibly small. Cases at the 
extreme end of the spectrum, where harms are either imperceptible or enormous are 
fairly easy to classify. Yet, most cases about which we have to decide will be more 
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ambiguous. We therefore face a choice in considering morally wrongful harms 
caused by AMR. Either, we can exclude those kinds of adverse events which are 
trivial (however we define this), or we include all kinds of harm into our 
considerations. Both of these choices come with their own problems. If we consider 
all harms as a cause for state intervention, this forces us to regulate extensively 
against every kind of conceivable harm, no matter its magnitude. On the other hand, 
if we define some sort of threshold value to decide at which point we respond to 
morally wrongful harms, this may rule out the inclusion of cases like that of Charles. 
At the same time, however, it creates an arbitrary cut-off point. This problem of harm 
definition and its impact on the usefulness of related concepts such as the harm 
principle has been described, especially in legal and jurisprudential writing.
288
 
However, there appears to be no satisfying solution thus far. One can therefore either 
bite the bullet, and accept the arbitrariness of a threshold value for policy-making 
(not for the recognition of morally relevant harm) or one has to endorse state 
legislation that seeks to regulate every potential cause of harm (which will likely be 
impossible in practice). I have no proposal for a solution to this conflict, but would 
want to note that in the case of AMR, erring on the side of caution, and regulating 
more rather than less may be advisable, purely because the control of infectious 
disease often requires very strict rules to contain the initial spread of infection.  
 
5.2.4  Harm and AMR - taking stock 
So far, it has been suggested that harm caused by AMR should be considered as 
morally wrongful, even if the direct causal relationship between individual agency 
and adverse outcome is weak. This argument rests on the premise that harms can be 
morally wrong even when they are imperceptibly small and therefore rejects the 
notion of a minimal threshold, above which has a harm has to register in order to be 
morally wrong. There remains, however, a related question, namely if all morally 
wrongful harms (irrespective of size) should also be subject to legislative or 
regulatory efforts that seek to curb their effect. I have proposed that in the case of 
infectious disease control, fairly extensive regulation may be necessary to contain the 
spread of infection. However, it remains possible that some kinds of small harm fall 
below the threshold of what will be covered by state regulation. The definition of 
such a threshold is borne out of practical concerns more than it is a matter of moral 
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arguments for harm prevention, since I have argued that all harms caused by AMR, 
have the potential to be morally wrongful.   
So far, however, our discussion of harm is not yet complete as we have only 
considered those instances, in which AMR causes measurable adverse health 
outcomes. For everyone who is not infected by a drug-resistant pathogen, AMR still 
leads to increased risks of either falling ill (if  bacterial infections which are difficult 
to treat become more prevalent) or of suffering adverse health outcomes, should they 
become infected (due to the limited effectiveness of antimicrobial treatments). In the 
following section, it will therefore be discussed, whether this subjection to an 
elevated risk should in itself be considered to constitute a harm.  
 
5.3 AMR and Risk 
The role of risk in ethical inquiry has so far received comparatively little attention.
289
 
Instead, much of moral philosophy has been concerned with cases of direct causality, 
where one person's action will lead to any one of a set of specified outcomes, and it 
will do so with absolute certainty. Consider, as a case in point, the frequently cited 
trolley case in which the reader is given the choice to either divert a trolley (which 
will certainly kill one person in a tunnel), or to leave the trolley on its current course, 
which will result in the deaths of a greater number of people.
290
 A crucial component 
of the trolley case is that the possible outcomes are well-known and indisputable. 
Either one person will die, or many will, but there is no room for any alternative 
outcome. Real world examples, however, have the tendency to be much more 
complicated, and it is rarely the case that outcomes of different paths of action will 
be known precisely before a decision about an appropriate response to a given moral 
problem is reached.
291
 This also appears to be the case for many discussions in health 
care ethics and public health ethics, in which the outcome, and who will be affected 
by it is often only available as a modelled prediction of a statistical frequency.
292
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Why should we consider the role of risk in the case of AMR? To begin with, the 
impact that an individual's actions will have on the emergence and spread of AMR 
will vary, depending on a vast number of factors, including where the person lives, 
with whom they interact, etc. Thus, two persons behaving in the same way will likely 
contribute differently to the emergence of AMR. This separates it as a problem from 
other cases of collective (in)action such as global warming.  
 
In the case of global warming, every person who emits CO2 contributes to the 
problem. And while there is a natural absorption rate, as soon as this is exceeded, 
everyone's emission is of equal importance, irrespective for example of his or her 
respective location.
293
 Emitting ten metric tons of CO2 per year should roughly affect 
changes in the atmosphere the same way if this occurs in an isolated settlement on 
the outskirts of civilization, or in a city centre of in Europe.
294
 The same,  however, 
cannot be said for the use of antimicrobial drugs.  
 
Let us assume that there are two persons, Dan and Erik, who are scared of catching a 
dangerous infection and thus frequently use antibiotics, which they have bought on 
the internet. Both understand the risk of AMR emerging from their behaviour, but 
both also believe that the personal benefits of preventing an infection will outweigh 
any negative side effects of drug resistance. Dan lives in his own in rural Alaska, and 
barely interacts with other people, while Erik works in a big city, shares a flat and 
has an active social life. Both Dan and Erik use the same drug irresponsibly - but 
they do not contribute equally to the problem of AMR. Erik interacts with other 
people, some of whom may have weak immune systems and be more vulnerable to 
opportunistic infections. Dan, on the other hand, may harbour resistant bacteria in his 
body but the risk of their transmission to other persons is much lower. The difference 
between Dan and Erik seems to lie in the difference in risk which these actions bring 
about respectively and to which they expose others. It will therefore be worth 
examining, if the subjection to a risk is morally relevant, even if the threat does not 
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materialise. We will consider this question in detail in the following sections. For 
now, however, it will be useful to be more precise about what exactly I understand a 
risk to be. 
 
5.3.1 The definition of risk 
While the term is widely used, there is no single definition of what a 'risk' is and 
everyday usage differs greatly from scientific understandings of risk.
295
 Castree et al 
have offered a succinct summary of this 'common' use of the term: 
 
"In common usage, 'risk' focuses on the potential negative impacts of being exposed 
to harm and is therefore synonymous with loss. It extends the concept of uncertainty 
to decision making, where the potential for loss is known (e.g. in terms of time, 
money, property, environmental quality of human life), but the precise nature of the 
loss, whether it will occur, or even how probable it is, are unclear."
296
  
 
There is a multitude of different understandings of what the notion of risk 
encompasses. Hansson for example has defined five commonly used definitions of 
risk, which are often used without clear distinction.
297
 What complicates matters 
further is that often assumptions about what constitutes a risk are merely implicit in 
writings on the topic, and the usages of the term in associated concepts such as 'risk 
communication' or 'subjective and objective risk' are not always consistent with one 
another.
298
 
For the purposes of this discussion, I shall follow a commonly used technical 
definition, and understand a risk to be "the statistical expectation value of unwanted 
events, which may or may not occur".
299
 In this definition, ‘expectation value’ 
describes the (weighted) average of all outcomes that are conceivable for a given 
event. It should be noted that this is a general definition of risk, and that it may not 
be the only relevant way of considering risks attached to AMR. Public health 
interventions for example will often not focus on absolute risks to individuals, but 
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instead start by calculating the relative risk to a given population by comparing the 
risk in an exposed group to a risk in a non-exposed group.
300
 However, since we are 
primarily concerned with a general understanding of risk and its ethical implications, 
a more broadly applicable definition will suffice for our purposes.  
 
5.3.2 Subjecting people to risks: the case of AMR 
As is the case with harm, not all types of exposure to risk are morally wrongful.  
Arguably, many risks that people are exposed to exist independently of human 
actions. NASA for instance routinely calculates the risks of asteroids hitting earth.
301
 
If such an asteroid was large enough, it could cause serious harm, and the risk factor 
itself cannot currently be controlled by human action. Consequently, present and 
future people will have to live with this risk, yet it appears that this is not a moral 
problem, because there is simply no path of action available to us that might change 
the chances of this event occurring. There may be cases, in which a distinction 
between controllable and uncontrollable risks is not as clear-cut, for example in the 
case of volcanic activity. In this case, people could refrain from living in the vicinity 
of the volcano or invest into early detection mechanisms to better control for the 
risks. However, even in cases where human action can potentially mitigate the 
consequences of an adverse event, the existence of the risk itself lies outside of 
human control. 
 
In the case of AMR, on the other hand, the current risk of suffering an adverse health 
outcome as a result of drug resistance can be traced back to human actions, which 
have greatly helped in exacerbating this risk since the invention of antimicrobial 
drugs in the mid-20th century.
302
 Using antibiotics widely (and in many instances 
inappropriately) has created selection pressure that favours drug resistant strains of 
bacteria.
303
 This has in turn not only made it more difficult to treat some infections, it 
has also increased the risk for people to be infected with a drug-resistant strain and 
suffer a more severe course of the disease. 
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5.3.3 Does being subjected to a risk constitute a harm in itself?  
So far, we have seen that AMR does constitute an additional risk to which people are 
subjected. But what are the moral implications of this observation? One possible 
answer to this question is to suggest that subjection to a risk constitutes a harm in 
itself. The harm in this instance is not the materialisation of a health threat - it is 
merely the subjection to an elevated risk, irrespective of whether or not the adverse 
event occurs. There are two possible arguments for such a view, which we shall now 
consider. The first relates to the consequences of being subjected to a known risk. 
  
In cases where people are aware of the additional risk posed by AMR or another 
hazard, this may cause severe psychological pressure. For instance, if I live in an area 
that is suddenly subjected to higher pollution levels and thus elevates my risk of 
contracting lung cancer, the grief and fear that the awareness of this risk causes me, 
can reasonably be considered a morally wrongful harm. Similarly, fear of contracting 
not only a bacterial infection, but one that is resistant to available antibiotics can 
reasonably be assumed to have a negative impact on my wellbeing; it raises worries 
about contagious diseases or of being hospitalised if nosocomial infections are no 
longer treatable. It may also have wider social implications in terms of how people 
interact with one another. Yet, much of whether subjection to risk can count as a 
morally wrongful harm rests on the assumption that there is awareness of the risk 
factor.
304
 Stephen Perry has suggested that most arguments about risk as harm appear 
to be based on "estimations of relative frequency that are made on the basis of 
existing knowledge rather than relative frequencies that exist whether or not anybody 
knows about them".
305
  
 
A second argument that an exposure to risk constitutes a harm could go further and 
suggest that it is not merely awareness of a risk factor, but the subjection to a risk 
itself, which constitutes a harm. Yet, such an argument appears difficult to sustain. 
Suppose that researchers discover in ten years that we were in the past subjected to 
some form of previously unknown health risk but that no one to that date had 
actually suffered any adverse effects as a result. To claim that the mere subjection to 
a risk constitutes a harm would then imply that we are presently being harmed by a 
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risk we are unaware of and that has not materialised. This seems to make for a 
counterintuitive conception of harm.  
 
The conceptualisation of risk exposure as harm poses an additional epistemic 
problem, namely how to establish, what magnitude of risk a person is actually 
exposed to. In epidemiological terms, this will require that we assign the correct 
reference class for risk exposure to an individual.
306
 This, as we shall see is a 
particular problem for infectious diseases, which affect different cohorts in varying 
degrees. Consider the following example, as an illustration of the problem. If we 
wish to determine the risk of a patient suffering adverse health effects after a 
nosocomial infection with MRSA, we will have to take into account different risk 
factors that affect the likelihood of such an outcome. These risk factors may include 
age, the degree to which the patient is immunocompromised, whether or not the 
patient has IV lines or a catheter, etc.
307
 We can now define different reference 
classes for establishing what risk the patient is exposed to. Say that in a given 
hospital, the presence of all risk factors listed above translates to a frequency of 3 in 
10 people experiencing adverse health outcomes (however defined). It would in 
consequence appear reasonable to assume that there is a 30 percent chance for 
patients to experience such an adverse outcome. Yet, as Stephen Perry has pointed 
out, there are some variables that such an approach does not account for. For 
instance, the narrowest definition of a reference class may still not account for all 
risk factors but only those that we are aware of. However, this would mean that if 
exposure to risk does constitute a harm in itself, the extent of said harm would vary 
depending on our state of knowledge.
308
   
 
In summary, the strategy of describing the moral wrongfulness of AMR in terms of 
risk of suffering a harm fails to yield a satisfying result. First, it comes with 
substantial epistemic and conceptual problems. Second, the approach limits the scope 
of morally wrongful harm to instances in which wellbeing is affected by exposure to 
a known risk, rather than considering all cases in which people are adversely affected 
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by AMR. Framing the moral problem of AMR in terms of increased risk of suffering 
harm does not appear to be a successful strategy.  
However, recalling our initial definition of morally wrongful harm, its causation does 
not only require the occurrence of an adverse effect; it also presupposes that the 
victim's rights have been violated in some way.
309
 In the following chapter, we will 
therefore consider in greater detail, if and how AMR can be viewed to constitute a 
violation of rights. 
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Chapter 6: Does the emergence of AMR  constitute a rights 
violation? 
 
This chapter will examine, whether the emergence of AMR constitutes a violation of 
moral rights. Moral and legal rights often overlap but they are not identical and it 
will be important to distinguish between them throughout the discussion. However, 
since many legal rights also point to underlying moral right claims, a brief look at 
legal questions in the context of AMR may be helpful for mapping out more clearly 
the variety or moral rights that may be affected. There exists a significant body of 
work that focuses on legal implications of drug resistance. This work relates to a 
broad range of problems, such as the use of antibiotics (both in humans and 
animals)
310
, the restriction of personal freedom for patients with communicable 
diseases that have become difficult or impossible to treat as a result of AMR
311
, or 
the protection of intellectual property rights for antimicrobial drugs.
312
 Many of these 
discussions also point to normative claims, which we will consider in greater detail 
throughout this chapter. 
 
Why should we phrase the moral problem of AMR in terms of rights? One suggested 
answer to this question has recently been proposed by James Wilson, who argues that 
there are good reasons for justifying health policy and infectious disease policy in 
terms of rights. Wilson writes:  
 
“If each citizen has a right to a particular resource, or freedom, then the duty holder 
of the right must secure that particular freedom or resource for each individual to 
whom the right applies. Rights are highly resistant to aggregation: the fact that many 
people have their rights fulfilled does nothing to reduce the claims of those who do 
not."
313
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The quote highlights two things. First, it shows what separates rights from mere 
policy goals, which a regulator can be said to legitimately pursue even if ultimately 
not everybody benefits from these efforts.
314
 Secondly, it underlines why a rights 
approach appears to be better than a utilitarian account at capturing the principles of 
a state-funded health care system like the NHS. The NHS was set up with the goal to 
meet the health needs of everyone, be free to users and provide services based on 
clinical need, not ability to pay. Moreover, in its constitution the NHS defines rights 
that patients and users of its services have.
315
 Its stated purpose is thus not to create 
the greatest amount of aggregated health benefits but to provide access to free health 
care to everyone. A rights-based approach seems to reflect these values and 
principles better than the previously discussed approaches could. However, before 
examining in greater detail how the concept of moral rights can help to delineate the 
ethical challenges presented by AMR, it is important to note that the introduction of 
rights terminology to the field of health policy is not without problems.  
 
First, as Jonathan Wolff has pointed out, the introduction and formulation of new 
rights has sparked worries among some commentators that there is a current trend of 
'rights inflation', which leads to the creation of an increasing number of rights claims, 
thereby "devaluing the currency of rights".
316
 If the concept of rights continues to be 
expanded and more and more specific interests are being interpreted as rights claims, 
the argument suggests, the relative value we assign to respecting these rights may 
diminish. 
 
Second, there is, as Stephen Holland notes, "a danger of merely restating the 
dilemma at the core of public health ethics, in terms of rights."
317
 In other, words, the 
formulation of ethical problems in terms of conflicting rights (held by individuals or 
communities) risks being mostly descriptive, without advancing the discussion, or 
getting any closer to its solution. Put differently, from a pragmatic point of view it is 
not enough to identify a conflict of rights if no suggestion as to how it should be 
resolved is proposed. Of course, to what extent this concern applies will depend on 
the kind of rights conflict in question. However, we should be aware of the fact that 
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identifying a rights conflict can merely be a starting point and does not yet tell us 
how to reconcile competing rights claims.  
 
Finally, there may arguably be a number of different moral rights violations that are 
associated with the use of antibiotics, but are not affected by AMR directly. Consider 
a patient who contracts a drug-resistant nosocomial infection like MRSA. We may 
wish to argue that health care providers have a moral duty not to harm their patients 
(and - correspondingly - the patient has a right to be protected from such harm). On 
such an account, the patient who is infected with MRSA (e.g. through an non-sterile 
catheter) might be able to claim that his rights have been violated - but this claim 
does not appear to relate specifically to AMR. If he had contracted a drug-sensitive 
infection, the right to not be harmed in the delivery of health care would still have 
been violated. Arguably, AMR may exacerbate the clinical effect of such a rights 
violation but it does not create a distinct moral challenge. Instead, AMR appears to 
merely worsen an existing problem. This matters to our discussion, because we are 
here concerned with what makes the creation of AMR a distinct moral problem. The 
following analysis will therefore not focus on situations where AMR exacerbates 
other rights violations. Instead, it will be analysed, if and when the occurrence of  
AMR itself constitutes a moral problem.  
 
6.1   The definition of rights  
While the terminology of rights claims is widely used, there exists a long-standing 
dispute in jurisprudence over the appropriate definition of what constitutes a right. 
Since we will not be able to resolve this dispute at this stage, we shall adopt a widely 
used concept of rights proposed by Joseph Raz, which understands rights as 
fundamental interest of persons. Raz states that if a person X has a right this "is to 
say that X has interests which are sufficiently weighty to impose obligations on 
others."
318
 Thus, when considering the protection of antibiotic effectiveness, a 
Razian understanding of a corresponding rights claim would suggest that people have 
an interest in access to effective antibiotic treatment and that this interest in turn 
creates obligations for society to provide a sufficiently high level of antibiotic 
effectiveness.  
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Raz’s interest theory of rights is not universally accepted and is particularly 
contested by proponents of a ‘will theory of rights’.  Proponents of the latter believe 
that by having a rights claim, its holder is given control over another person's duty, 
which H.L.A. Hart puts as follows:  
 
"The idea is that of one individual being given by the law exclusive control, more or 
less extensive, over another person's duty so that in the area of conduct covered by 
that duty the individual who has the right is a small-scale sovereign to whom the duty 
is owed."
319
  
 
For will theorists, a right is therefore a way of granting exclusive control over a 
correlating duty.
320
 We will discuss this aspect in greater detail in the following 
section. By contrast, the interest theory proposed by Raz holds that "X has a right’ if 
and only if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an aspect of X's 
well‐being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be 
under a duty."
321
 In other words, interest theorists ground the existence of rights 
claims in furthering the right holder’s interest.322  
 
In light of this controversy, why should we adopt an interest theory of rights? While 
both will theories and interest theories are subject to conceptual challenges, will 
theories have some intuitively implausible implications.
323
 Will theories restrict 
rights to moral agents and claim that a right confers control over the duty to act in a 
particular way to that agent.
324
 Yet, this understanding of rights does not seem to 
lend itself well to a health care setting. Patients are not independent agents who 
chose between different options but – more often than not – are merely recipients of 
treatment, which is decided by health care professionals. This seems to contradict the 
principle of agency, which lies at the core of will theory of rights. This principle, as 
McCormick has noted, also prevents young children or people with impaired 
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intellectual capabilities (e.g. comatose patients) from holding any rights.
325
 I shall not 
conclusively defend an interest theory of rights at this stage, but will merely note that 
it does not share the previously discussed counterintuitive implications.  
 
6.2  Rights and correlative duties 
So far, our discussion of rights has implied that a rights claim entails a duty. This 
position follows Hohfeld’s argument, which states that rights presuppose correlative 
duties and that that "rights will be grounds of duties in others."
326
 It will be 
worthwhile to elaborate on this assumption and its implication. In particular, it will 
be useful to say more about the moral foundation of rights claims, before examining 
in  greater detail the correlation of rights and duties, as the case of AMR presents a 
challenge to the formulation of obligations that are derived from rights claims. 
 
In light of the multi-causality of drug resistance, which we have explored over the 
previous chapters, and the lack of a clearly established causal relationship between 
individual actions and subsequent emergence of AMR, a rights approach in the 
Hohfeldian sense seems an unsuitable approach from the outset. If rights can be 
identified but the rights violation is a collective action problem, then how can we 
determine who holds a correlative duty to respect such rights? To illustrate this point, 
suppose that within a community, everyone has  a right to effective antibiotics (we 
will return to this point in greater detail later), but it cannot clearly be established 
who holds responsibility for the emergence of drugs resistance in the first place. 
Under such conditions, one can imagine an argument to the effect that we are able to 
state who is owed something - but in the absence of clear causal correlations, it is 
then impossible to determine who has an obligation to meet these rights claims. 
Following this line of argument, the worry would be that if we cannot clearly define 
who has to fulfil a duty and what exactly this duty entails, the corresponding right 
can never be fully met in the first place. This would render its formulation somewhat 
redundant. 
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However, it would be premature to dismiss a rights account based on its inability to 
provide unequivocal answers to these challenges. As Joseph Raz has argued 
convincingly, even if we cannot always identify clearly, who holds a correlative duty 
to a specific  rights claim, we may nonetheless be in a position to develop a 
consistent account of rights violations. 
First of all, a rights claim may entail more than one duty and the definition of the 
right does not entail uncompromising protection from all harm. As Raz observes, 
"[m]any rights ground duties which fall short of securing their object, and they may 
ground many duties not one."
327
 For example, Raz notes, a right to security does not 
imply a correlating duty that every conceivable harm be subsequently averted.
328
 
Similarly, as we shall discuss in greater detail below, a right to health does not mean 
that every person should receive the most advanced medical treatment currently 
available.  
On Raz's account, this is not to say that wherever the duty falls short of the objective, 
no rights violation has occurred. In the case of AMR, this means that even if we 
cannot fully protect everyone from AMR, nor define a comprehensive set of duties in 
order to do so, there may still be scope for a moral rights claim. For the purposes of 
this discussion, I will therefore follow Raz's understanding of rights and suggest that 
even if it is difficult to identify correlative duty holders, the emergence of AMR can 
still be seen to constitute a rights violation. To develop this argument further, we 
shall next consider, what kind of rights could conceivably be violated by the 
emergence of AMR. 
 
6.3 AMR and rights - A right to what? 
In chapter 3, it was asked, which commodity we should be trying to distribute fairly 
in the case of AMR - a discussion that was entitled 'Distribution of what?'. It was 
argued that we could focus on either the distribution of antibiotics themselves, or the 
distribution of their remaining stock of effectiveness and it was proposed that, for the 
purposes of applying principles of distributive justice to the case of AMR, a focus 
should be placed on the latter. Analogously, a discussion of potential rights 
violations in the context of AMR inevitably raises the question what kind of rights 
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are violated, who the right holder is and - in line with Wilson's argument cited above 
-  what corresponding duties arise to whom. A discussion of rights will thus, as 
Onora O'Neill succinctly summed it up have to determine "who has to do what for 
whom".
329
 To examine what this means in the context of AMR, it will be useful to 
begin by reconsidering the cases that were discussed in the previous chapter, in 
particular Barry's case. 
 
Barry 
At the gym, Barry hits his head and starts to bleed. To stop the bleeding, Barry uses a 
sweaty towel to cover the little cut. The wound becomes infected with a particularly 
virulent type of community-acquired MRSA. Barry is sent to hospital, where he is 
put on antibiotics. Because of the drug resistance, he does not respond to the initial 
treatment and shortly after succumbs to the infection. 
 
When we first considered Barry’s case in the previous chapter, it was suggested that 
if Barry had been harmed in a morally wrongful way, this was because his legitimate 
expectation of benefiting from a resource (namely effective antibiotics) had been 
thwarted. It was argued that to show a morally wrongful harm in this instance 
presupposed that we could show that the resource in question had been mismanaged. 
So far, it was assumed for the sake of argument that Barry had been harmed in a 
morally wrongful way. At this point, we can examine, whether or not our earlier 
claim can be substantiated by framing Barry’s legitimate expectation as a right, and 
the subsequent failure to meet this expectation as a rights violation. If this can be 
shown, then we have a strong case for the claim that AMR constitutes a morally 
wrongful harm. To this end, we should ask two questions: First, can we identify a 
moral right that Barry holds, which was violated by his MRSA infection, and second, 
which duties would this right entail, and on whom do they fall? 
  
Answering these questions is no small challenge and there are a number of different 
rights we could try to appeal to; a right not to be harmed, for example, or a right to 
health care or perhaps a more specific and yet to be defined right to antibiotic 
effectiveness. An examination of what right Barry holds thus quickly runs into the 
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difficulty of distinguishing between different rights that he may reasonably have a 
claim to. Furthermore, depending on the right that we identify to be relevant in this 
context, the corresponding claims and resulting obligations are likely to change.  
Finally, we may also  have to decide if some of these rights have lexical priority over 
others or - to borrow an expression from Joseph Raz - if they are core rights rather 
than derivative rights.
330
 Raz argues that some rights are merely derived from other 
rights claims. An example he provides is that people may be said to have a right to 
walk on their hands, but that this right is ultimately derived from a (core) right to 
personal liberty.
331
 The relationship between these two notions of right is not that one 
entails the other. Instead, the distinction between core and derivative rights is useful 
for determining the order of justification.
332
 Thus, when making a case for the 
protection of a moral right, the claim can be strengthened, if we can successfully 
distinguish between core and derivative rights, and appeal to the latter only. Note that 
derivative rights do not have to follow from a single core right. For example, a 
potential right to antibiotic effectiveness could be derived from a right to health or a 
right to a certain type of property. However, since there is no set of universally 
agreed-on core moral rights, such an argument will have to be developed 
systematically and carefully.  
 
A first attempt at defining a rights violation in Barry's case may start from the (fairly 
uncontroversial) premise, that Barry has a moral right to not be harmed by others.
333
 
Given the fact that AMR is primarily caused by the over- and misuse of antibiotics, it 
could be argued that the subsequent inability to treat Barry’s infection also 
constitutes a violation of his rights. But for this argument to be convincing, more 
must be said about what exactly makes the contraction of an infection a rights 
violation and - just as importantly – what obligations arise as a result of this. 
 
Despite its human causes, no one has deliberately created MRSA, or tried to spread it 
at Barry’s gym. The fact that Barry contracts the infection is the result of a large set 
of individual actions, none of which were individually sufficient to bring about the 
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final result. Consequently, it appears difficult to assign personal responsibility to any 
individual for bringing about Barry’s death, and it is hard to see who has violated 
Barry’s right not to be wrongfully harmed. 
 
As was the case in discussing the causation of harm earlier, it may therefore be 
important to contrast Barry's circumstances of death with those of Albert (recall that 
Albert contracted a drug-susceptible infection but was too far away from anyone who 
could have provided help and died). The difference between Albert and Barry does 
not lie in the outcome (both die of bacterial infections). Instead, it appears to lie in 
the fact that Barry's death was preventable, had a previously available resource been 
used differently. The specifics of Albert's case make it unlikely that he could have 
been helped. After all, part of the appeal of his trip was to get away as far as possible 
from civilization.  
The comparison between the two cases shows that while Barry’s death could have 
likely been prevented if antibiotics had not been so widely misused, the same is not 
true for Albert’s case. We have earlier provisionally assumed a right not to be 
harmed and suggested that Barry has been denied this right. Albert has not been 
wrongfully harmed and it would appear that even though he dies in the wilderness, 
none of his rights have been violated. Albert’s case therefore suggests that there is no 
legitimate rights claim to be protected from all bacterial infections.  This helps us to 
sketch out more clearly, what kind of rights violation Barry may have been subjected 
to. Let us therefore consider the following alternative: 
 
Proposition 1  
Barry has a moral right to the protection from adverse health outcomes, where such 
outcomes are preventable without undue cost.  
 
To give this proposition more substance clearly requires that more be said about what 
can generally count as 'preventable'. In the context of health care delivery, it is 
unlikely that 'preventable' is equivalent to 'technologically feasible', since there are 
inevitable resource constraints within which health care practitioners have to operate. 
For example, it may be technologically feasible to cure a single patient with an 
exceptionally rare and otherwise deadly disease, if the entire research budget was 
allocated to this cause. However, from this it cannot be inferred that this feasibility 
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entails a duty to do so, as this would occur at the cost of violating the rights (or 
interests) of so many other people.
334
  
 
For now, it suffices to note that proposition 1 creates a challenge of defining what 
will count as preventable. One could suggest economic solutions to this question. 
One example for this is the provision of cost-effective health care up to a predefined 
level of health care expenditure, as incorporated in the National Institute of Health 
and Care Excellence’s (NICE) approach to defining a ceiling to health care cost per 
quality-adjusted life year.
335
 However, as we saw in chapter 4, the calculation of 
costs and benefits in the realm of infectious disease control is fraught with 
methodological difficulties. The exact specification of a right based on proposition 1 
will therefore likely remain controversial. Of course, this could simply be accepted 
as an unfortunate reality of defining complex right claims. But any appeal to 
proposition 1 has to accept that the rights claim can often be challenged on the 
technical matter of what counts as preventable (or technologically feasible). It may 
therefore be useful to consider alternatives to this proposition. 
  
What is particular about Barry’s case is that the lack of access to the resource is not 
the result of general scarcity in the health care system, but stems from the fact that 
the effectiveness of one antibiotic has not been preserved sufficiently. Consider 
therefore as an alternative to proposition 1 the following: 
 
Proposition 2 
Barry has a moral right to the protection from adverse health outcomes, if an 
effective treatment could  be made available by having used appropriate resources in 
such a way as to avoid their over- and misuse.  
 
As outlined in chapter 2, AMR is an inevitable by-product of antibiotic use. It can be 
slowed down, either by inventing new drugs or by using them more restrictively, but 
it cannot be entirely avoided. Disregarding for now the possibility of entirely new 
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treatment alternatives to antibiotics, any regime of using antibiotics will thus 
ultimately exhaust the resource. This would suggest that fulfilling such a right has 
some peculiar implications, because it establishes a claim to an inevitably 
diminishing resource. While the interests on which a right like proposition 2 may be 
based remain constant, the actual possibility of meeting this rights claim will 
diminish over time. Assuming that at some point in the future we will run out of 
effective antibiotics, proposition 2 would become practically ineffective (though not 
normatively irrelevant, as we shall see later). In between the present situation and a 
presumed moment in time at which all antibiotic effectiveness has been depleted, we 
find ourselves in a situation, where the previously specified right will be increasingly 
difficult to meet. Furthermore, through the depletion of antibiotic effectiveness, 
every instance of fulfilling the right of one claimant will at the same time reduce the 
possibility of meeting the same rights claim in the future.  
Let us assume for the sake of argument that every individual has an equally strong 
interest not to suffer from the effects of a bacterial infection, and that consequently 
every person has an equally strong claim to the right specified in proposition 2. In 
this instance, we could conclude that the normative force of the right we specified 
remains constant, but that its ‘purchasing power’, i.e. its ability to realise the good in 
question will diminish over time. Thus, the moral value of the right remains, but its 
practical value will be reduced until its disappearance. 
To make this more obvious, consider a case in which Barry lived 500 years from 
now and to this point, the use of antibiotics had been highly restrictive with a view to 
preserve their effectiveness for as long as possible. If under such conditions, Barry 
no longer had access to an effective antibiotic, the practical value of his rights claim 
would have disappeared. Yet, Barry would not have become the victim of 
wrongdoing, because antibiotic effectiveness was managed as well as possible and 
past generations thus tried their utmost to also respect Barry’s rights claim. Had 
antibiotics instead been used carelessly, the future Barry would have been wronged. 
What this suggests is that the normative force of the right remains, even when its 
realisation is no longer practically possible. 
 
Of course, the previous argument inevitably raises the question if and how we can 
determine what counts as a reasonable level of commitment to preserving antibiotic 
effectiveness to avoid (or minimise) any rights violations to future people. There may 
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not be a clear-cut answer to this question and no threshold value that we can easily 
define. However, in light of the evidence that until now little emphasis has been 
placed on the preservation of antibiotic effectiveness, this problem may not be too 
much of a practical concern. After all, we know that past and current use of 
antibiotics most certainly falls short of any such a standard (however it is ultimately 
defined).  
 
So far, it has been shown that if a right to antibiotic treatment can be justified, then it 
provides a clear case for seeing the emergence of AMR as a morally wrongful harm, 
and an unusual and difficult one at that. What we have so far overlooked, is the 
possibility of fulfilling proposition 2 not only by reducing consumption of antibiotics 
and avoiding waste, but also by developing new types of treatment. Chapter 3 
suggested that due to the time this takes, it makes sense to treat antibiotic 
effectiveness as an exhaustible resource in the short and medium run. However, if we 
consider a longer time span, it may also be possible to argue for a right to novel 
treatment options. 
 
6.4  AMR and a right to new drugs? 
As outlined in chapters 2 and 3, antibiotic effectiveness differs from finite natural 
resources such as fossil fuels in that it can in principle be renewed through scientific 
progress and the invention of new drugs. When we speak of a right to an effective 
treatment, an obvious question that extends from this discourse is therefore whether 
this right also entails an obligation to develop new drugs.
336
  
An answer to this question may partially depend on empirical evidence. If it were 
shown that antibiotic effectiveness was in fact sustainable in the long-run, for 
example by restricting the use of antibiotics and using drugs cyclically to allow 
antibiotic effectiveness to 'recover', the question of whether or not new drugs need to 
be developed might be redundant. In other words, there is no argument for the 
development of new antibiotics, if the effectiveness of existing drugs could be 
preserved equally well in other ways. This argument also applies to alternative types 
of treatment: if, for instance, new vaccines reduced the use of (and need for) 
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antibiotics then any rights claim to the development of new antibiotics would 
subsequently be weakened. However, given the speed with which AMR is currently 
progressing and the fact that some bacterial infections have already become 
essentially untreatable, it would appear safe to assume (at least in the medium run) 
that the protection of antibiotic effectiveness will also require the development of 
new drugs, in particular against Gram-negative bacterial infections.
337
 Thus, if we 
can identify a right to effective antibiotic treatments, then this would also appear to 
entail some kind of obligation to attempt to develop new drugs.  
 
One argument against such an obligation comes in the form of an extension of what 
Waldron has called the 'no hardship' argument.
338
 The argument stipulates the 
following: If a new invention (such as a new antibiotic) is not shared with some 
people, who – by not having access to this resource are no worse off than they 
otherwise would have been, then these people cannot be said to have been harmed. 
Usually, the argument is applied to the distribution of (and access to) private 
property. However, Wilson has suggested that the argument could also apply to the 
regulation of access to essential drugs.
339
 Wilson suggests that the no hardship 
argument is unconvincing, because it can justify a failure to provide essential aid, for 
example in a rescue situation. In such a scenario, the no hardship argument could be 
invoked by simply stating that the position of the person who is in need of help is 
independent of the actions of potential rescuers and that a failure to provide help 
therefore does not make the person in need worse off than he or she would otherwise 
have been.
340
 Wilson argues, however, that a failure to provide such help amounts to 
a rights violation of the person who is not granted access to such help and cites the 
prohibitive pricing of patent-protected drugs as an example. Of course, this case 
differs from the failure to develop new drugs. In one instance, a resource already 
exists and is unfairly distributed. In the other, the failure to help stems from not 
having developed such a resource in the first place. 
Yet, while this difference is clearly important, a variant of the ‘no hardship 
argument’ could also be extended to the case of having failed to develop new drugs. 
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However, we need to be specific about the stakeholder(s) whom we view to be 
morally responsible for the current lack of research into new drugs. In addition, we 
will have to specify, what criteria would have to be satisfied for such a right to be 
met. 
 
As chapter 2 outlined in detail, there has been a chronic lack of investment into new 
antibiotics over the past decades, driven by other emphases in the research agenda 
and greater potential for private companies to maximise returns on investment by 
focussing R&D efforts on other areas. Determining who holds responsibility for the 
lack of new drugs is complicated by the fact that much of the necessary research has 
traditionally been carried out by private, for-profit organisations in developed 
countries. In most countries, the key government strategy in developing 
pharmaceuticals appears to have been the creation of incentives to promote the 
development of certain drugs that were needed.
341
 However, as the current lack of 
effective drugs clearly illustrates, the strategy has been unsuccessful in securing a 
sufficiently high level of output. One way of framing the right to new drugs would 
thus be to suggest that governments have an obligation to promote a sufficiently high 
level of research activity into new drugs to secure scientific progress. But this is an 
unsatisfying strategy, as the success of research may depend on other factors than 
just the appropriate provision of incentives. 
 
An alternative way of thinking about a right to new drugs is in terms of the human 
right to the "highest attainable standard of health", as put forward by the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
342
 It seems 
plausible to read such a right as implying that health care systems must not only 
protect their citizens from infectious diseases with existing means but also advance, 
improve and further develop existing treatments. It may be difficult to define exactly 
what such a right entails but it seems rather uncontroversial to suggest that if one 
accepts a (human) right to health, respecting the resulting rights claims should lead 
governments to actively promote research designed to avert catastrophic health 
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outcomes such as complete or very extensive forms of AMR. As a result, a right to 
new antibiotics will probably only be a derivative right that stems from a more 
fundamental right to health and it remains unclear what governments need to do in 
order to adequately honour the right holders' claims. Nonetheless, the substantial lack 
of research (or effective tools to promote such research) would suggest that over the 
last decades, health care systems in developed countries and with sufficient resources 
at their disposal have failed to do enough to invigorate research efforts and that this 
failure can be framed as a shortcoming in honouring the human right to health.  
 
6.5 A right to the protection from externalities caused by antibiotic 
consumption 
So far, our discussion has centred on the question whether people who suffer from a 
drug-resistant bacterial infection have experienced a violation of their rights if they 
have no access to effective drugs. However, there is a second rights concern that 
needs to be mentioned at this point, namely the rights conflict that arises from 
antibiotic consumption. To be more specific, the concern is that antibiotic 
consumption itself may violate other peoples' rights, in that it harms others by 
creating externalities in the form of higher rates of AMR.
343
 Jonathan Anomaly has 
made this point in relation to the pricing of antibiotics, arguing that AMR should lead 
us to make antibiotics more expensive to reflect the true cost of their use and to 
discourage overconsumption and misuse. Anomaly recognises that this may increase 
health inequity, by making access to antibiotics disproportionately more difficult for 
people in resource-limited settings but argues that "nobody has the right—not even 
the poor—to inflict uncompensated harms on other people against their will".344 
On Anomaly's account, the use of antibiotics and the subsequent harm caused by the 
emergence of AMR also generate rights claims, namely not to be subjected to this 
kind of harm.  Note that in the case of such a rights claim, and in line with Raz's 
position regarding correlative duties that was outlined earlier, it does not matter 
whether or not we can fully meet it in practical terms, nor do we have to be able to 
identify exactly, who bears the corresponding duty. Furthermore, by focussing on the 
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actual harm, rather than the potential for it, Anomaly's suggested rights claim is not 
subject to the critique levelled against the use of the concepts of risk and harm that 
were discussed in the previous chapter. While we saw that it is difficult to phrase the 
subjection to a small additional risk as a harm, it seems entirely plausible to define a 
right according to which people must not be subjected to uncompensated harm. On 
the other hand, by avoiding the inclusion of subjection to risk, Anomaly's definition 
raises the question how we can know ex ante whether a specific dose of antibiotic 
treatment will in fact produce AMR that will harm others. 
 
While the latter question is a technical problem for Anomaly's account, it nonetheless 
points to an important challenge to the rights approach to AMR, namely a conflict 
between competing rights claims. As argued above, people can be seen to have a 
rights claim to effective antibiotic treatment. However, utilising this resource will 
result in negative externalities, which exacerbate the problem of AMR and in turn 
affect the rights of other persons. Therefore, granting universal access to antibiotics 
in recognition of a right to effective antibiotic treatment may ultimately undermine 
the availability of such treatments in the first place. As Millar has noted, "equal 
access for individuals with equal need irrespective of wealth has the potential to 
shorten further the effective life of currently available antibiotics."
345
  
 
6.6 AMR and rights – some concluding remarks 
This chapter has shown that a theory of moral rights can make sense of the normative 
challenges of AMR. Moreover, by showing that AMR does constitute a rights 
violation, we have strengthened the case for AMR being a morally wrongful harm, 
which was developed in the previous chapter. Since Feinberg’s definition of harm, 
upon which we built our analysis stipulated that for a harm to be morally wrongful it 
had to violate the rights of those affected by it, the conclusions of this chapter are 
highly relevant. The rights approach has a number of advantages. To begin with, it 
allows us to consider different aspects of the moral challenge that AMR poses, since 
it is entirely possible for drug resistance to impact on more than one right. Secondly, 
the rights approach, which was developed in this chapter, was able to recognise the 
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moral claims of persons, even if they could not meet them appropriately. Thus, a 
rights based approach could make sense of a normative claim to effective antibiotics 
at a point, where no effective drugs were available. This seems to support the 
intuitively plausible view that future claims to antibiotics have equal moral worth, 
irrespective of how much antibiotic effectiveness remains. 
 
There are, however also a number of drawbacks to the rights-based approach. To 
begin with, it remains unclear, what happens if different rights come into conflict 
with each other. Certainly, rights theorists can deal with this, either by rephrasing the 
rights, or by establishing conditions under which it is permissible to infringe upon 
them.
346
 However, the precise process of this remains contested. Nevertheless, 
proponents of a rights approach would be correct to point out that the difficulty of 
specifying rights and dealing with their conflicts rules out neither that this is 
possible, nor distinguishes it from its alternatives.   
 
Yet, there are two challenges to the rights approach and its application to AMR, 
which weigh more  heavily. The first concerns the size of the rights violation in 
question. While the rights approach can show that AMR leads to the violation of 
individual rights, the causal remoteness of the corresponding duty makes it difficult 
to generate a coherent account of what rights that are affected by AMR compel 
anyone to do. For a problem that involves so many stakeholders, this is a significant 
practical concern. 
The second problem, which a rights account faces in the case of AMR is that the 
good to which people have a moral right diminishes over time. As we saw earlier, a 
right to effective antibiotics will therefore progressively lose its ‘purchasing power’ 
and will be of diminishing practical relevance for the use and distribution of 
antibiotic effectiveness.
347
  
 
We are therefore left with a sense that AMR seriously affects the interests of people 
and that something should be done about them, but – given its restrictions - a rights 
approach will meet this requirement only in a limited and unsatisfying way.  
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In the following chapter it will therefore be suggested, that a better way of framing 
the challenge of AMR is through a contractualist approach. In particular, it will be 
argued that contractualism is better equipped to deal with the kinds of collective 
action problems that AMR presents, and can justify schemes of cooperation among 
people whose interests are partially conflicting.  
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Chapter 7:  Contractualism and AMR 
 
Contractualism most commonly refers to a theory developed by Thomas Scanlon.
348
 
Scanlon's work builds on social contract theory, in particular the work of John 
Rawls.
349
 However, while they share the view that morality is grounded in a 
contractual agreement between  persons, Rawls’ and Scanlon’s theories differ in a 
number of important aspects. 
Rawls develops a theory built on hypothetical scenarios, in which decisions are made 
under abstract conditions. To this end, he famously introduces a ‘veil of ignorance’, 
behind which rational individuals would chose rules for the distribution of primary 
goods without knowing their own social position in the hypothetical society they are 
constructing.
350
 Scanlon, on the other hand, focuses less on the question what kind of 
principles people could agree to. Instead, he proposes that moral decisions should be 
based on principles that no one could reasonably reject.
351
 We shall return to Rawls' 
approach in the next chapter but will begin by examining Scanlon’s argument more 
closely. 
 
7.1 Scanlon’s account of contractualism 
According to Scanlon "thinking about right and wrong is, at the most basic level, 
thinking about what could be justified to others on grounds that they, if appropriately 
motivated, could not reasonably reject."
352
 This position, Scanlon argues, gives us 
reason "to be concerned with other people's points of view: not because we might 
[...] actually be them, or because we might occupy their position in some other 
possible world, but in order to find principles that they, as well as we, have reason to 
accept."
353
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Scanlon thus locates the moral value of actions in their (reasonable) justifiability, not 
in whether or not they are merely in line with rational (self-)interest.  
An immediate objection to this may be that this is hardly a distinctive feature of 
contractualism. Other moral theories (including consequentialist accounts) also seek 
to justify why their actions are the rights ones to pursue. For a utilitarian for example, 
an action is morally justified if it maximises utility. Scanlon accepts this but points 
out that justifiability of the action in the utilitarian's case is merely derivative. What 
makes the action right, according to the utilitarian, is not that it can be justified to 
others but that it maximises utility. Contractualism, by contrast, claims that it is 
justifiability rather than outcome, which determines the moral rightness of an action. 
As Scanlon puts it, his theory "explain[s] the distinctive importance and authority of 
the requirements of justifiability to others by showing how other aspects of our lives 
and our relations with others involve this idea."
354
 Scanlon thus identifies the need to 
provide coherent and reasonable justification for our actions. On his account, an act 
is morally wrong, "if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed 
by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could 
reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement."
355
  
 
It is significant that Scanlon believes that this principle rules out the interpersonal 
trade-offs between serious harm to some people and aggregated small harms to a 
larger group.
356
 A common objection to consequentialist views, namely that 
aggregation of small inconveniences to many individuals may ultimately outweigh 
serious harm to a smaller group of people, thus fails to extend to the Scanlonian 
principle, because such a trade-off could be reasonably rejected.
357
 To illustrate this 
point, Scanlon envisions a scenario, in which Jones, who works in a television study 
during the broadcast of a world championship match, has an accident and his hand is 
trapped. Immediately helping Jones would lead to a disruption of the TV signal, 
resulting in an inconvenience to millions of sports fans watching the match. Not 
helping Jones until the broadcast is over would entail that he suffers very painful 
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electrical shocks in the meantime.
358
 Scanlon proposes that no sports fan who 
experiences the inconvenience can reasonably reject a principle, which would 
inconvenience him but save Jones the agony of electric shocks.  The serious harm to 
Jones, he suggests, matters more than the inconvenience caused to sports fans. 
However, for this argument to be convincing, more must be said about the way in 
which a contractualist principle can be formulated and what constitutes a reasonable 
rejection of it. 
 
7.1.1 Contractualist principles 
Scanlon argues that "[t]o justify an action to others is to offer reasons supporting it 
and to claim that they are sufficient to defeat any objections that others may 
have."
359
 This, he suggests, corresponds to the way in which we make everyday 
moral judgements, which tend to not simply conclude "that an act is wrong but that 
it is wrong for some reason."
360
 Principles, in Scanlon's theory, are "general 
conclusions about the status of various kinds of reasons for action".
361
 Principles 
may thus rule out certain reasons for action as being legitimate or reasonable but they 
are not as clearly delineated as some kinds of rules or laws. In other words, a 
principle cannot simply be applied to settle a dispute. To do so will require careful 
deliberation of how and why a principle is not met.
362
 According to Scanlon, there 
can be an unlimited number of principles and their formulation will depend on the 
way that people interact with one another.
363
  
 
7.1.2 Reasonableness of rejections 
To assess reasonableness, Scanlon's theory measures the strength of what he calls 
objections to permission and objections to prohibition respectively.
364
 Thus, when 
determining if carrying out a certain act is morally right or wrong, the two questions 
we must ask are what burdens are imposed on those affected by permitting the act 
and what burdens are imposed (and on whom) by prohibiting the act.
365
 Depending 
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on the answer to these two questions, we may then decide if it is reasonable to 
endorse or reject a principle that regulates the act in question. The question of 
reasonable rejection is thus a comparative one that weighs objections to either 
outcome against each other.
366
 Unlike other moral theories that place an emphasis on 
rational choices, Scanlon distinguishes reasonableness from rationality by suggesting 
that rational choices do not always lead to morally acceptable outcomes.
367
 To be 
reasonable, according to Scanlon, is much closer to an everyday understanding of 
this term, where "what it is reasonable for a person to do presupposes a certain body 
of information and a certain range of reasons which are taken to be relevant, and 
goes on to make a claim about what these reasons, properly understood, in fact 
support."
368
 The distinction between rationality and reasonableness is not merely a 
matter of definition. Scanlon identifies a number of instances in which it may be 
reasonable to make moral demands on other people under circumstances where this 
is not rational (for example, because doing so is unlikely to generate the desired 
effect, or have some negative side effect).
369
 Reasonableness, according to Scanlon, 
therefore avoids some of the counter-intuitive moral judgements that a focus on 
rational choice may generate. 
  
7.2 Can contractualism avoid interpersonal aggregation? 
It was argued earlier that, among other things, contractualism differs from 
consequentialism because it does not consider aggregated interpersonal benefits to 
determine the morally right way of action. However, as we have just seen, 
contractualism is in principle open to some forms of interpersonal trade-offs and can 
demand fairly substantial sacrifices in order to generate a larger benefit elsewhere. 
What Scanlon rules out categorically (and where his view differs from some forms of 
consequentialism) is a trade-off of small benefits to a large number against 
substantial harm to a few.
370
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However, some critics doubt whether Scanlon's version of contractualism 
successfully avoids the need for consequentialist considerations.
371
 Derek Parfit in 
particular has expressed scepticism regarding the ability of contractualism not to 
collapse into consequentialism.
372
 Parfit argues that while Scanlon assumes personal 
responsibility to depend entirely on justifiability of the action to the individual 
(thereby ruling out aggregation), he is also bound to accept that an action can be 
reasonably rejected if it creates a greater burden than its available alternatives.
373
  
 
Scanlon accepts that in situations where two unevenly sized groups of persons face 
harm of comparable magnitude but only one group can be aided, contractualism 
favours the larger group.
374
 In fact, Scanlon’s concession to a utilitarian calculus go 
even further, as he also acknowledges that in a situation, where we face a choice 
between either saving the lives of a few, or preventing serious, non-lethal harm (such 
as blindness or paralysis) to a large number of people, contractualists may have to 
protect the greater number.
375
 Interestingly, however, Scanlon does not develop this 
argument fully and remains ambivalent as to whether or not such a consideration 
could be reflected by a contractualist principle. Rather, he seems to acknowledge that 
these cases merit closer inspection, but remains unsure if they can be accounted for 
in a contractualist theory. This is a challenging question, but ultimately we may not 
have to resolve it here. Scanlon’s consideration of extreme trade-off scenarios, in 
which it may be necessary to forego a life-saving intervention in order to prevent 
harm to a very large group of people does not seem to reflect the kind of trade-off we 
are facing in the case of AMR. Scanlon seems to envision very concrete trade-offs, 
when he writes that “it could be wrong to save one person’s life when we could 
instead have prevented a million people from going blind or becoming paralyzed.”376 
In line with the argument that was developed over the past chapters, it should by now 
be obvious that trade-offs in the case of restricting access to AMR are much more 
subtle. They do not create large-scale dilemmas but present cases of risk increase of 
unknown magnitude, which do not resemble the kind of case that Scanlon proposes. 
                                                          
371
  Ashford, E. (2003). "The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism." Ethics 113(2): 273-
302. 
372
  Parfit, D. (2011). On What Matters. Oxford, OUP. Vol. II, Part 5 
373
  ibid. p. 192-197 
374
  Scanlon, T. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. 
p. 238 
375
  ibid. p. 239-240 
376
  ibid. 
130 
 
It may therefore make more sense to read Scanlon’s discussion of interpersonal 
trade-offs as an acknowledgement that ‘large-number cases’ are difficult to solve for 
non-consequentialist. Nevertheless, we should note at this point that contractualism 
does not propose straightforward aggregation. It is sensitive to the severity of 
potential harm that could be mitigated and – to a lesser extent – is also concerned 
with the number of those affected, even though maximisation of overall utility is not 
its goal. We shall next consider, how such a contractualist approach can be applied to 
the case of AMR. 
 
7.3 A contractualist approach to AMR 
The idea of considering the problem of AMR from a contractualist perspective is 
relatively novel and has so far only been systematically employed in the work of 
Michael Millar. Millar proposes a model of Scanlonian contractualism that seeks to 
fairly distribute antibiotic effectiveness and links antibiotic use to the analogy of "a 
leaky rescue craft which becomes less effective the more it is used."
377
 The 
foundation for a contractualist restriction of antibiotic availability thus lies in the fact 
that a scarce resource can be used in different ways, not all of which are equally 
acceptable. This is important, because for the application of contractualism to work, 
different alternatives to act must be feasible. Rejecting a principle based on entirely 
impossible distributive scenarios (for example by demanding a distribution that 
requires more goods than are actually available) misses the point of what it means to 
be reasonable. Millar also notes that feasibility should not be seen as equivalent to 
cost-effectiveness (which may be a common misreading in the context of health 
policy) but rather "require[s] that the alternative arrangement is within the sphere of 
influence of the [acting] institution."
378
  
Millar has developed his contractualist account of morally permissible use of 
antibiotics in two recent publications.
379
 He suggests that the use of antibiotics 
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should be restricted according to the following principle, which he believes cannot 
reasonably be rejected: 
 
"[A]ntibiotics should be used to prevent some substantial risk of irretrievable harm 
in patients or their contacts, where a substantial risk is a level of risk that can be 
reduced by the use antibiotics, and which exceeds the range of risks of irretrievable 
harm that we tolerate in our day-to-day lives." 
380
 
 
 Millar’s proposal appears to rule out two types of antibiotic usage. First, it excludes 
the possibility of entirely inappropriate or wasteful use of antibiotics. If antibiotics 
should be used to prevent some substantial risk, this implies that their use must be 
able to prevent a risk at all. Since the use of antibiotics against viral infections does 
not aid the recovery, Millar’s principle would rule out this kind of use as excessive. 
As no benefit (neither individual nor societal) is realised through such a use, this 
seems an uncontroversial restriction.
381
 The second type of antibiotic use, which 
Millar’s principle rules out is for infections that bring with them an insubstantial risk 
of irretrievable harm. Anticipating the question, how such a substantial risk is 
defined, Millar proposes that it must be higher than everyday risks. We will return to 
this requirement shortly. The principle he proposes, Millar argues, cannot reasonably 
be rejected, because "[t]he argument for reasonable rejection of the use of 
antibiotics for any condition other than those conditions associated with a significant 
risk of irretrievable adverse consequences is founded on the dire consequences of 
selecting antibiotic resistance for some.”382 As a result, Millar’s principle also 
justifies the restriction of antibiotics in instances where their use would be beneficial 
for the recipient. These could be self-limiting infections, or infections where the use 
of antibiotic no longer affects the overall health outcome (such as in the final stages 
of terminal illness).
383
 On a Scanlonian account, this can be justified by a rescue 
principle. This states that it is unreasonable to reject a principle, which demands 
small or moderate sacrifices, if these could alleviate some much greater pain or 
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suffering.
384
 Scanlon concedes that this rescue principle may end up being very 
demanding. For instance, it may be the case that we could not reasonably reject 
permanent physical harm, if this saved someone else’s life, though contractualism as 
a theory does not tell us exactly, what level of sacrifice will be required.
385
 
Ultimately, this principle thus appears to permit rather far-reaching restrictions of 
antibiotic use. We will revisit this concern in section 7.6. 
 
7.3.1 Strengths of a contractualist approach to AMR 
In light of the discussion in the preceding chapters, one of the strengths of Millar's 
argument appears to be that it can take into account the consequences of today’s 
actions, without requiring a detailed cost-benefit analysis. Specifically, Millar 
contests that placing a monetary value on human life can generate a valid moral 
argument for the availability of treatment. Moreover, and similarly to the argument 
developed in chapter 4, he doubts whether existing cost-calculations can reliably 
assess the future impact of AMR.
386
 The contractualist model expounded above 
foregoes the common attempts of defining costs and benefits for health care 
interventions and therefore does not have to engage in highly speculative trade-off 
scenarios. It is not motivated by the maximisation of some benefit (or the 
minimisation of cost) but focuses on the individuals affected by it. As Millar puts it:  
 
"The contractualist approach of Scanlon requires that we take account of those who 
will suffer adversely from infection with antibiotic-resistant microbes, however 
unpredictable their numbers may be, and in so doing makes it clear why we should 
not use antibiotics for small gains (even when cost-effective to do so), or to treat 
patients with otherwise retrievable, or inevitable outcomes. There is no requirement 
that we cost the consequences of infection with antibiotic-resistant bacteria; it is 
sufficient to know that some will suffer irretrievable adverse consequences."
387
   
 
A contractualist approach to the challenge of AMR would therefore also rule out on 
ethical grounds certain market-based solutions that have been suggested, such as 
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tradable or transferable permits.
388
 If we can identify a principle that reasonably 
rejects antibiotic use unless there is a substantial risk of irretrievable harm, then 
clearly such a position is at odds with a model that simply seeks to internalise costs 
by making buyers pay a premium for its use, rather than restricting use to certain 
conditions. A price premium does not control for which infections antibiotic will be 
used or how urgently they are needed. It merely reduces the number of potential 
consumers by making the treatment unaffordable for some. This concern is of course 
strongest in states without a comprehensive state-funded health care system where 
such a policy effectively limits the access of poor people, who tend to be most 
vulnerable to infectious diseases in the first place.
389
  
Moreover, Millar’s proposed principle seems to fit well with the argument, which 
has been developed over the previous chapters. It also considers AMR in terms of 
diminishing antibiotic effectiveness and is therefore compatible with the account that 
has been presented so far. However, despite this compatibility, more must be said 
about Millar’s approach before we can judge its persuasiveness. To begin with, we 
have to consider in greater detail what exactly constitutes a substantial risk in 
Millar’s account. 
 
7.3.2 What is a substantial risk and when is it acceptable? 
The proposition Millar puts forward is that a substantial risk must be greater than the 
everyday level of risk that we are faced with, yet not greater than the maximum level 
of a risk that someone can be exposed to without his or her consent.
390
 Millar notes 
that the current Health and Safety Executive (HSE) legislation defines tolerable (or 
acceptable) levels of risk of death as 1/10,000 p.a. for an imposed risk and 1/1,000 
p.a. for a consented risk.
391
 It is not clear, where in between these two threshold 
values the maximum level of tolerable risk for AMR lies, but Millar suggests that 
this may be determined by "empirical research, evidence synthesis, statistical 
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analysis and public debate" as longs as the final figure is clearly and openly 
communicated to allow for transparency in policy-making.
392
 However, the figures 
that the HSE defines are somewhat arbitrary. Since there is no external standard to 
which they could appeal, they are the result of expert opinion, revealed preference 
studies, or available statistical evidence. As a result, conceptions of acceptable risk 
will vary between countries or policy areas. A case in point is the US Environment 
Protection Agency’s (EPA) level of acceptable risk for a waterborne parasite 
infection through drinking water. The EPA puts the level of acceptable risk of 
infection at 1/10,000 p.a., which translates to an acceptable annual risk of illness of 
approximately 1/20,000.
393
 However, these infections are rarely fatal, reducing the 
rate of acceptable risk of death to an even smaller number than the one proposed by 
HSE.
394
  
 
Not everyone sees this inconsistency as a problem. Hansson has suggested that levels 
of acceptable risk vary between policy areas and context, because perceptions of 
what is acceptable reflect social beliefs and preferences, which rank some risks 
higher than others. To treat risks of equal magnitude as equally relevant, he suggests, 
would make sense “in complete isolation from other decisions in society.”395 
However, since this does not reflect actual practices, Hansson suggests that 
assessments of acceptable risks should be sensitive to public perceptions to be 
compatible with democratic decision-making.
396
 
 
What does this mean for the case of AMR? Millar points out that one somewhat 
surprising implication of the concept of substantial risk is the conclusion that some of 
the existing thresholds for antibiotic prescribing may be unreasonably high. A study 
by Daneman et al, for example, reports that existing guidelines for the treatment of 
pneumonia endorse 'therapy-attributable mortality' of around 1 in 100 patients, i.e. a 
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1 in 100 risk of death as a result of AMR.
397
 On Millar’s account, this policy 
produces a mortality risk, which far exceeds what is acceptable as an everyday risk. 
Consequently, it would appear that such a policy could be reasonably rejected by 
everyone who suffers an irretrievable harm as a result.
398
 
 
7.4 The relevance of consequences for contractualism 
Even if one rejects the argument that contractualism easily collapses into a 
consequentialist calculus, we saw in section 7.2 that the consequences of actions still 
matter more to the contractualist than is commonly assumed.
399
 Aaron James has 
recently called into question to what extent reasonableness of actions can be assessed 
without reference to their consequences. James’ view departs from that of Millar, 
who suggests that the exact magnitude of adverse consequences are a secondary 
concern for a principle of regulating access to antibiotics, as long as we can 
reasonably assume that a significant damage will be inflicted on an unspecified 
number of people. Instead, James argues that for assessing the reasonableness of a 
principle, we must know more about the probabilities of expected outcomes.
400
 
James' concern addresses the fact that when we talk about a reasonable rejection of a 
principle, it is not clear if the outcomes are merely projected (i.e. seen to occur with a 
given probability) or taken to be certain outcomes. James separates these two 
versions of contractualism, calling them ex ante and ex post contractualism 
respectively.
401
 An ex post position would take an imagined retrospective, which 
then serves as the foundation for assessing reasonableness. But this version of 
contractualism seems entirely unsuitable as an action-guiding principle, since it 
cannot be prescriptive about how to act but merely assesses events retrospectively. 
Therefore, it would promote a version of contractualism that would struggle to reach 
normative decisions about future use of antibiotics. However, if for the sake of 
                                                          
397
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argument, we accept the possibility of an ex post reading of contractualism, the 
method may create some additional problems. For instance, if we knew 
retrospectively that some instances of antibiotic would not have contributed to AMR 
at all, but did generate a positive effect for the user, then an ex post reading would 
give rise to reasonable rejection of Millar's principle.
402
 Of course, this is more of a 
thought experiment than an actual scenario we must consider. As Millar notes: "It 
may be that there are some categories of patient or conditions that provide no 
contribution to the burden of antibiotic resistance, but it is hard to identify any 
current human treatment or condition in which this would generally apply."
403
 The 
burden of proof would therefore be on anyone who felt that the assumption about 
antibiotic use not contributing to AMR applied to cases, in which people could lead 
to a reasonable rejection of Millar's principle. As things stand, however, it is simply 
not plausible to argue for a rejection of Millar's principle on these grounds. 
For our purposes, it is therefore not particularly relevant to work out if an ex post 
reading of Scanlon's contractualism is possible. In order to be able to deal with the 
problem at hand, namely the current and future distribution of health care resources, 
a version of contractualism must be able to assess the moral permissibility of actions 
that concern the future.  
 
7.5  How far does contractualism go (and is it far enough)?  
So far, we have considered the general premises of contractualism and examined 
Millar’s proposed principle to restrict antibiotic use, as well as some of the 
challenges that it may face. To remind ourselves, Millar wants to restrict the use of 
antibiotics to situations in which they prevent a substantial risk of irretrievable harm, 
where the risk is greater than those we face in our day-to-day lives and could broadly 
correspond to categories of acceptable risk in other policy areas. 
 
Millar’s proposed principle has two implications. First, in clinical practice it may be 
very difficult to distinguish between some cases of substantial and insubstantial risk, 
if the threshold for the former is set at a low level. Put differently, if a substantial risk 
of irreparable harm was defined as greater than the HSE’s previously cited 1/10,000 
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chance of death per year, only very few instances of restricting antibiotic use could 
reliably be ruled to fall below this threshold.
404
 A second, related implication is thus 
that a corresponding principle to govern antibiotic use might fail to restrict their use 
in a particularly meaningful way.  
 
Such an objection, however, risks getting the argument backwards. After all, Millar's 
principle is not designed as a justification to reduce antibiotic use to an absolute 
minimum. Instead, it merely proposes a model of fair use that cannot be reasonably 
rejected. A failure to be more restrictive thus does not undermine Millar's principle. 
It just points to the fact that use that is more restrictive is not compatible with this 
theory. However, for a number of reasons it would be premature to propose that a 
contractualist principle of restricting AMR could not lead to effective policies to 
reduce the use of antibiotics.  
 
First, the cited figure for an acceptable risk of death may simply be set too low in the 
case of AMR and there is indeed statistical evidence to support this view. As 
discussed in chapter 2, estimates for the United States put mortality from AMR at 
around 100,000 per year. Given the current US population size of 314 million, this 
means that annually, at least 0.03% of Americans (or 3/10,000)
405
 die from a drug-
resistant infection and the reported figures on mortality from AMR are likely an 
underestimate.
406
 Thus, the risk of death from AMR that people face in the United 
States is already higher than the lower threshold defined by the HSE. Millar’s 
principle stipulates that in order to justify antibiotic use, the risk of harm people face 
must be greater than their day-to-day risk. For the US case, this would imply at the 
very least that an acceptable level of risk of irretrievable harm from foregoing 
treatment could be set as equivalent to the risk of death from AMR, which people 
already face. However, this observation also highlights a problem of Millar’s 
approach, namely whether or not the level of acceptable risk is sensitive to location 
and context. Millar suggests that antibiotic use should be limited to instances where 
                                                          
404
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the risk of irretrievable harm exceeds the risks of everyday activities – but these 
obviously vary across countries, regions and even socioeconomic groups. The risk of 
dying in a road traffic accident, for example (which should fall under Millar’s 
category of everyday risks) is highest in low and middle income countries and varies 
by age group (with young drivers being more likely to be killed).
407
 Given that many 
everyday risks are higher in less developed countries, an approach that was sensitive 
to regional differences in risk would have the advantage that it would not create 
unrealistically high expectations regarding risk mitigation, which health care systems 
could not meet in the first place. However, in light of the fact that AMR presents a 
global challenge, this approach would also distribute the burden of reducing the 
global consumption of antibiotics very unevenly, by promoting greater 
restrictiveness in countries in which levels of everyday risk might generally be 
higher. Moreover, as we saw in previous chapters, there is a limit to the feasibility of 
reducing antibiotic consumption, because their use does not only aid the patient but 
also creates positive externalities for infection control and reduces the risk of 
contagion.
408
 Nevertheless, the question how to deal with different levels of everyday 
risk still remains for self-limiting infections that are not contagious.  
 
Another argument why we might have reason to support a higher level of acceptable 
risk than the lower threshold defined by the HES is that this figure relates to the risk 
of death, whereas the use of antibiotics, according to Millar's principle should be 
restricted to cases where there is a risk of irretrievable harm. This would certainly 
include the former (death would after all constitute the most severe form of 
irretrievable harm) but it is not limited to these instances. Other kinds of irretrievable 
harm, e.g. permanent tissue damage, scarring or chronic pain, would also be 
subsumed under Millar's proposal. This has two implications. First, the overall harm 
of AMR is obviously greater than merely the number of fatalities it causes, which we 
should keep in mind when calculating the level of risk that people are exposed to at 
present. Secondly, while highly undesirable, many forms of irretrievable harm 
caused by AMR are less grave than a fatal outcome of contracting an infection. 
Consequently, it may be reasonable to assume that the level of acceptable risk for 
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irreversible, non-fatal outcomes may also be higher than in cases where we merely 
determine a tolerable rate of fatal outcomes. 
 
7.6.  AMR and contractualism – the case for more restrictive policies? 
As we saw in our initial discussion of Scanlonian contractualism in this chapter, it is 
unreasonable for me to reject a principle that would lead to a loss if any alternative 
principle would require others to suffer a loss that is significantly greater than 
mine.
409
 It was argued earlier that this might motivate much more restrictive 
principles, which cannot be reasonably rejected even by those who suffer a serious 
harm. However, if one wanted to emphasise the importance of reducing antibiotic 
consumption further, there might be alternative formulations to Millar's principle. 
Two such alternatives shall be considered at this point. The first seeks to balance the 
severity of harm we can prevent by using antibiotics now against their future use, 
while the second is based on a probabilistic model to assess future outcomes.  
A first proposed alternative to Millar’s principle of contractualist distribution of 
antibiotic use (call this A1) could be summed up as follows: 
 
A1:   Antibiotics should only be used if the severity of the harm we can prevent by 
using them now is the same or greater than the harm we can prevent in the future. 
 
At first sight, A1 seems to allow for greater restriction of antibiotic use than Millar's 
principle by placing greater emphasis on the reduction of harm in the future and 
reflecting the trade-off inherent in their use. Proponents of A1 would have to be 
specific about whether or not they would adopt a positive discount rate, but as 
chapter 8 will argue later, there are no good reasons for discounting human 
wellbeing. A more complex challenge to proponents of A1 is the trade-off of current 
and future benefits itself.  
 
In terms of outcomes it deems to be morally permissible, A1 differs rather 
substantially from Millar’s principle. Let us assume that John cuts himself and his 
wound becomes infected with a multi-resistant bacterial pathogen. Without the use of 
antibiotics, there is a high probability (say 50 percent) that John’s hand will have to 
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be amputated. However, successfully treating John’s infection would require the use 
of a cocktail of antibiotics of last resort. Millar’s principle would clearly suggest that 
we should use antibiotics, since John stands to suffer irretrievable physical harm, and 
the risk for this far exceeds a tolerable level. Yet, the above principle would not have 
to lead to the same conclusion. Say, for instance, that the same antibiotics could save 
Klaus’ life at a later stage, at which their effectiveness had diminished further due to 
their previous use. On such a view, it might be plausible to suggest that 
contractualism prescribes that Klaus can reasonably reject to the use of drugs in 
John’s case but not vice versa. Scanlon expresses uneasiness about such trade-offs 
and states that he “would for example not say that we would be required to sacrifice 
an arm in order to save a stranger.” 410 Ultimately, however, he accepts that this is 
far from self-evident and requires further judgement.
 411
 Moreover, Scanlon 
maintains that such acts would not count as supererogatory. Just because a principle 
does not attach more weight to one’s own interests is an insufficient reason for 
rejecting it.
412
  
 
A contractualist principle based on A1 could thus legitimise much more restrictive 
antibiotic usage policies. However, there remain some issues that must be addressed 
before we can decide whether or not we should adopt A1 or a variation of it. First, 
the case of John and Klaus is problematic, because it appears to employ both ex ante 
and ex post considerations of contractualism. Klaus could only have a claim 
retrospectively if he knew that he would contract a serious bacterial infection later 
on. But we may be able to sidestep this by merely asking if there will be anyone who 
could reasonably reject to our current use of the resource in the future.
413
 Second, A1 
seems to require too much information to be a useful guiding tool for the use of 
antibiotics. By comparing outcomes between current and future uses of antibiotics 
and making reasonableness of claims dependent on future persons, a principle like 
A1 requires a degree of information about future outcomes that is unfeasible in 
practical terms. For Scanlon, this does not necessarily pose a challenge to his theory. 
Contractualism, he argues, merely provides “a framework which allows the relevant 
                                                          
410
  Scanlon, T. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. 
P. 225 
411
  ibid.   
412
  ibid. p. 225 
413
  We will return to this point in greater detail in the following chapter 
141 
 
factors to be considered.”414 The fact that an exact calculation of harms is tricky may 
be true – but contractualism simply cannot say more about the practical implication. 
It merely points out what the salient aspects are. Furthermore, we could adjust A1 to 
represent possible outcomes rather than certainties. Such a revised version, A2, could 
read: 
 
A2:  Antibiotics should only be used if we have reason to believe that the severity 
of the harm we can prevent by using them now is greater than the harm we can 
prevent in the future. 
 
The revised principle A2 recognises the limitations of what we can know but still 
maintains that a reasonable principle should take into account future need for the 
resource we are using. This would address the previous concerns with A1. 
There remains, however, a final problem, which applies to both A1 and A2 and 
should lead us to reconsider, whether or not these principles constitute an 
improvement over Millar’s account. As we saw, Scanlon’s rescue principle could 
invoke very far-reaching restrictions of current use of antibiotics for the realisation of 
some greater future benefit. However, as its name suggests, the rescue principle 
seems to require an immediacy of action. In other words, it is only unreasonable for 
John to reject a principle like A1 or A2, when the harm he would experience had 
directly led to the avoidance of a greater harm to Klaus. This, however, was not a 
part of our scenario. As things stand, John’s use of antibiotics is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for Klaus’ inability to receive treatment later on. Since Scanlon is 
already unclear about the permissibility of demanding a sacrifice such as the loss of 
an arm in the rescue case, it appears unlikely that his position could support such far-
reaching restrictions to antibiotic use in a scenario like John’s and Klaus’, especially 
not in circumstances where the premises of the rescue scenario are not met. 
 
This does not necessarily commit us to endorsing Millar’s principle either. And what 
our discussion of alternatives to Millar’s account has shown is that in principle, the 
contractualist account permits more restrictive policies for the protection of antibiotic 
effectiveness than the one proposed by Millar. However, rather than rejecting the 
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latter, an alternative might be to propose a higher level of acceptable level of risk for 
irretrievable harm. In this chapter it has been suggested that in light of the already 
significant risk that people face, as a result of AMR (a risk which is likely to increase 
further in the future), a more restrictive policy of antibiotic use may be justifiable. 
However, such a policy would also have to take into account the positive 
externalities of using antibiotics, especially with regard to reducing the prevalence of 
infectious diseases. It will also have to deal with the problem of defining a 
meaningful threshold for the acceptable level of risk, to which we can subject 
individuals by withholding antibiotic treatment from them. This is not an easy task 
and despite the widespread use of such threshold values in policy-making, there 
appear to be few normative arguments, which point towards a specific level of 
acceptable risk. Nevertheless, the contractualist approach developed in this chapter 
arguably offers a more consistent account of what makes the use of antibiotics 
morally problematic. And while it takes into account the consequences of policy 
decisions, it does not seek to aggregate or maximise benefits in the way 
consequentialist theories do.  
Throughout this chapter some of the problems of distributive justice that involve 
future persons were already alluded to. In chapter 8, we will examine these questions 
in more detail.  
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Chapter 8: AMR and intergenerational justice 
 
In the previous chapters, the problem of AMR was categorised as a policy challenge 
for which no technological solution was available and it was suggested that there are 
good reasons to endorse a contractualist model of restricting the use of antibiotics. 
This chapter will examine in greater detail what follows from these two conclusions 
for claims of justice between contemporary and future persons. The discussion starts 
from the premise that in the absence of readily available technological solutions for 
the problem of AMR, we must consider if (and how) the interests of future persons 
should be taken into account when deciding how to fairly use antibiotics whose 
effectiveness diminishes over time. To begin with, it will be useful to outline the 
concept of intergenerational justice and consider some of the associated challenges. 
It will then be examined how a contractualist model of distributive justice that was 
introduced in the previous chapter may address these challenges, and what specific 
questions emerge in the case of fairly distributing antibiotic effectiveness over time.  
 
8.1 Intergenerational justice 
Theories of intergenerational justice seek to apply considerations of justice (or 
fairness) to cases between different generations who - for the most part - will be non-
contemporaries.
415
 Broadly speaking, questions of intergenerational justice arise, 
when one generation can be seen to hold legitimate claims vis-á-vis another 
generation, from which corresponding duties or obligations ensue.
416
 Approaches of 
intergenerational justice have been developed to address both, concerns of historical 
injustice and the prevention of future injustice.
417
 Our discussion here shall largely be 
concerned with the latter, i.e. a discussion of future injustice that may be caused by 
AMR and the ways in which we can respond to the challenge. Specifically, it shall be 
considered how questions of distributive justice can come to apply in the 
intergenerational context and how the fairness of distributive patterns for antibiotic 
effectiveness is affected when interests or claims of future persons are taken into 
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account. These considerations raise a number of questions that are quite distinct from 
the fair distribution of goods among contemporaries. As Brian Barry has observed, 
while we have developed rather sophisticated methods of evaluating relations 
between contemporaries, these methods often translate poorly to the 
intergenerational context.
418
  
 
Discussions of intergenerational justice are not new to political philosophy and 
ethics, nor are they exclusive to the problem of AMR. The argument that today's 
generation ought to act in a way that respects the interests of future persons has been 
made in relation to topics as varied as climate change, nuclear waste management, or 
the financing of social security and health care systems.
419
 In contemporary political 
philosophy, John Rawls' and Derek Parfit's respective discussions of 
intergenerational equity, both of which we will discuss later in this chapter, are 
generally seen to constitute a starting point to this discourse.
420
 However, the 
growing body of philosophical writing on climate change and global warming has 
added significantly to these discussions and will therefore be equally relevant to our 
analysis, especially because it highlights the importance of distinguishing between 
issues of distributive justice for renewable and non-renewable resources.
421
  
 
Traditionally, theories of distributive justice were limited both in terms of time and 
place, since cooperation between people took place within the same generation and 
was largely restricted to domestic trading.
422
 As a result, many of these theories work 
on an assumption of reciprocity, that is to say: people have duties towards others, but 
they also enjoy rights. The case of intergenerational justice breaks with this 
assumption (especially where generations do not overlap), as it constitutes a case of 
what Rawls refers to as "unidirectional dependence".
423
 What this means is that a 
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current generation does not depend on the action of future generations (again 
assuming no overlap), yet the living conditions of future generations will be shaped 
to a large extent by the choices made today.
424
  
 
While it would perhaps appear uncontroversial to most that present generations have 
some form responsibility for the future, it is rather difficult to map out what 
particular obligations this entails, and to what extent current actions should be 
influenced by considerations of the wellbeing of future people.
425
 In other words, 
while we may feel that we owe it to future generations to preserve resources, there is 
no obvious answer to the questions why and to what degree we should do so, 
especially when the interests of current and future persons conflict. The remainder of 
this chapter will consider these questions in greater detail. 
 
8.2 Intergenerational justice and some of its challenges  
Discussions of intergenerational justice differ from considerations of justice among 
contemporaries in a number of ways. As alluded to before, the most obvious 
difference is arguably that the people to whom potential obligations are owed do not 
yet exist. And it is not clear how such non-existing persons can be recipients of any 
obligations.
426
 We shall see later that this problem is of particular relevance for those 
kinds of moral theory that are built around theories of reciprocity. 
At the same time, actions of current generations will obviously affect future people 
(in much the same way as that today's world has been shaped by previous 
generations). This happens irrespective of whether or not it is intended. Our actions 
will necessarily affect later generations and for example make a lifestyle comparable 
to our own more resource-intensive or unattainable for a greater number of persons. 
An obvious example of this is the process of global warming and climate change, 
which carries grave implications for future generations’ wellbeing.427  
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A second major difference between intergenerational ethical problems and those that 
occur between contemporary people is the non-identity problem, posed by Derek 
Parfit. Parfit argues that the existence of specific future persons is the direct result of 
our previous actions. If, however, the existence of a specific person depends on all 
our actions, including the potentially harmful ones, it is difficult to see how the 
actual person that does come into existence can have been harmed by our actions.
428
 
This, Parfit claims, is true for all persons who live a life that is generally worth 
living.
429
 The non-identity problem presents one of the major challenges to accounts 
of intergenerational justice and will be considered in greater detail later in this 
chapter. 
 
Another problem for intergenerational justice, which shall at least be briefly 
mentioned is that the actions of contemporary people will not only affect the quality 
of life of future persons, but also the size of future populations.
430
 This creates a set 
of related questions about the ‘right’ size of future populations, which our actions 
can actively bring about. However, this discussion extends beyond the scope of our 
discussion and I shall here focus on the two challenges outlined before. First, it will 
be important to be more specific about how we should define generations and 
separate between them when considering questions of distributive justice. 
 
8.3  What is a generation? 
When we talk of intergenerational justice, the first complication we encounter is that 
despite the widespread use of the term 'generation' it is not really clear what it 
represents. Furthermore, common  uses of the term differ considerably. Familial 
generations, for example, describe kinship relations between parents and offspring. 
On the other hand, sociological or historical descriptions often interpret generations 
as communities with shared knowledge and socio-historical backgrounds, rather than 
as clearly distinguishable cohorts.
431
 Consequently, they are more likely to focus on 
particular groups of people who share a set of experiences, such as the 'lost 
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generation' that shared the trauma of WWI or 'generation X', which was defined by 
the experience of eroding financial and social stability in the 1980s.
432
 These uses 
stand in stark contrast to other concepts of generations, such as an epidemiological 
definition. Here, the concept of generation is sometimes used in relation to birth 
cohorts that are examined over a time span and are used to measure population 
changes.
433
 
 
It is interesting to note that despite considerable interest for questions of 
intergenerational justice, moral philosophers seldom take the time to explore in 
greater detail, what particular concept of generation they employ. Whether or not 
omitting a clear definition constitutes a problem for philosophical analyses of 
intergenerational justice will largely depend on the time frame of the discussion. 
Since much of the discourse on intergenerational justice focuses on obligations 
between non-contemporaries, the precise definition of a generation becomes less 
relevant, if the time span under consideration is large enough to rule out overlap (say 
a time span of multiple hundred years). If there is no overlap between these groups, 
generations will necessarily become discrete units. Adopting such a time frame does 
not make the discussion of intergenerational justice easier per se and may in fact 
create a distinct set of problems, which we will return to later. As we shall see next, 
however, a discussion of intergenerational justice that can usefully be applied in the 
case of AMR cannot adopt such a large time scale and will have to take into account 
the more immediate future.  
 
8.4 AMR and the problem of generational overlap 
It is a truism that the further some effect lies in the future, the greater the chance that 
it will predominantly affect future persons. However, as chapter 2 already outlined, 
many of the effects of widespread AMR and potential total drug resistance are likely 
to also affect currently living generations at a later stage in their life. This 
necessitates a careful consideration of instances in which there is generational 
overlap. These cases raise the question if actions which will largely affect a currently 
living generation at a later stage can qualify as challenges for justice between 
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generations. Generational overlap occurs when considering the near future, where a 
significant number of new persons will have been born, but a large proportion of the 
current generation is still alive. In such an instance, distinguishing between 
generations is not straightforward, since we cannot think of them as discrete units.  
 
A first systematic account of the problem of intergenerational overlap was developed 
by Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson was concerned about the legitimacy of laws that were 
democratically agreed upon by a majority of a generation that at a later stage would 
no longer be alive. This, he argued, risked that future persons would be subjected to 
laws that no longer reflected a majority vote, since those who made the original 
decision would be deceased. As a result, Jefferson suggested that laws should be 
periodically renewed, by his calculation once every 19 years when the majority of 
the previous generation’s electorate had been replaced by the next.434 In his 
discussion, Jefferson was obviously concerned with a problem that is distinct from 
the case of AMR. His focus was on political legitimacy of constitutional documents, 
rather than distributive justice of resources between generations.
435
 However, the 
fundamental question that Jefferson's discussion introduced is equally relevant to the 
discussion of intergenerational justice in the case of AMR. If considerations of 
justice between generations differ from considerations of justice among 
contemporaries, it appears necessary to also be able to clearly distinguish between 
these two groups.  
 
To make this difficulty more obvious, consider the following case. We could decide 
that a generation counts as the group of people that are alive at time t0 and that 
anyone born at t0 + x belongs to one of the following generations. If we then compare 
the conditions of the group of persons at t0 with those at a different subsequent 
moment in time (call this t1), we could claim to make intergenerational comparisons. 
Yet, for this argument to be plausible, the time difference t1-t0 must be sufficiently 
large. If it is very small (for example 5 minutes), then - on a global scale - some 
persons will have been born and some people will have died. However, the 
difference clearly does not represent a time span, which is great enough to lead to the 
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problems of intergenerational justice that were alluded to above. The question is 
therefore at which point the time span between t0 and t1 becomes sufficiently large to 
truly represent an intergenerational case. There is no straightforward answer to this - 
and indeed some writers have suggested that justice between neighbouring 
generations, i.e. instances where there is some overlap between groups at t0 and t1 do 
not properly constitute instances of intergenerational justice in the first place.
436
 
However, as we shall later see, for the discussion of AMR, the case of neighbouring 
generations is of paramount importance and we shall therefore place particular 
emphasis on this specific aspect. 
 
Returning to Jefferson's example for now, his discussion is of interest to us because it 
seeks to systematically establish when one generation is replaced by the next. The 
figure of 19 years that he uses is of limited use today - it is based on the much lower 
average life expectancy in the outgoing 18th century and it also does not merely take 
into account life expectancy, but defines generations with reference to the population 
of voting age. In the case of AMR, such a restriction is nonsensical, since health care 
provision is obviously not linked to suffrage. What is interesting, however, is that the 
cut-off point between generations according to Jefferson should be defined by the 
time it takes for half of the (voting) population to be replaced. Applying such a 
model in the case of AMR may be difficult for at least two reasons.  
 
First of all, if life expectancy is to be used as the foundation for defining the length 
of a generation, the question arises whether we define global, national or regional 
averages. Given the discrepancy between life expectancy in different countries, using 
a global average would distort the actual length of a generation in many countries.
437
 
If - at least for the sake of argument - we accept that a generation is replaced by the 
next once more than 50 percent of the population at a given time are superseded by 
future persons, then a global average would lead to an overestimate of the length of a 
generation in countries with low life expectancy and an underestimate in countries 
with high life expectancy. This very simplistic model of defining a generation also 
cannot make sense of variations in population size: rapid increases in birth rates 
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would shorten the length of one generation while low birth rates would have the 
opposite effect. On the other hand, a model that considers generations differently 
between countries appears to create a truly confusing system of intergenerational 
ethics, which would constantly have to be adjusted to account for population 
changes. 
 
A second concern that arises from an application of a model of generational change 
akin to Jefferson's suggestion is that for democratic legitimacy, a population 
replacement of 50%+1 vote would obviously entail a significant cut-off point. 
However, in the case of health policy (which in most instances is not the result of 
direct democracy), it is at least not immediately obvious that the same principle 
applies. 
 
What consequences does this have for the discussion of AMR? If we assume that in 
the near future, AMR will create a significant disease burden for newly born persons 
as well as members of the current generation at a later point in their life, two distinct 
sets of moral problems become apparent. Michael Millar helpfully distinguishes 
them as inter- and intragenerational problems of distributive justice.
438
 However, 
Millar's own definition (whether consciously or not) more or less excludes the 
possibility for generational overlap. Millar writes:  
 
"For the purposes of this analysis, I take intragenerational distributive justice to 
require comparisons of individuals from the same generation (e.g., 2-year-old 
children in Europe with 2-year-old children in Africa) alive at the same time. 
Intergenerational justice requires comparison of different generations at the same 
chronological age (e.g., 35-year-old adults born in 1900 and 1970)."
439
  
 
What is interesting to note about this method is that many of the problems outlined 
above are sidestepped by comparing specific age groups at two different moments in 
time, rather than entire generations. This method by default rules out overlap (people 
can only be of one age once), but it also raises another question. Millar assumes that 
we compare people at one age, and chooses 35 as an example. However, if not 
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everyone out of a single generation is considered, this begs the question, which age 
group we ought to consider. If, for example, we chose a different, more elderly age 
group of all 75 year olds at two different points in time, the observable differences 
(depending on age-specific disease burden) may well be greater than for the groups 
of 35-year olds for the same dates. 
  
There is of course another way of reading Millar's proposed method, namely to 
suggest that we consider all age groups at two different moments in time, not just 
selected ones. But this merely reintroduces the problem of intergenerational overlap, 
since some of the younger persons from the first date will now show up in an older 
age group for the second date (a five year old in 1900, for example, would then 
simply reappear in the 75-years group in 1970). One would therefore either have to 
bite the bullet and select chronological age groups in such a way as to avoid overlap, 
or accept that overlap will occur, in which case we return to the question, how to 
clearly distinguish between generations. 
There does not appear to be a definitive answer on how to make this distinction. 
However, at the very least it is possible to state that any discussion of AMR and its 
implications for intergenerational justice will have to specify, whether considerations 
of intergenerational justice include the possibility of generational overlap. In this 
discussion, I will start from the premises that  
 
a) intergenerational justice also applies to cases of neighbouring generations, but 
that 
b) some of the demands of intergenerational justice (and with it their associated 
challenges) may be less relevant in cases that concern the near future. 
 
At this point, it should be stressed that the effect of generational overlap need not be 
a problem for ethical discourse and may in fact help to address some of the specific 
challenges outlined before. Steiner and Vallentyne for example point out that in the 
case of generational overlap, many of the problems that intergenerational justice 
creates for contractualist moral theories are less poignant, due to the fact that 
cooperation and reciprocal acts are possible and agreements that are mutually 
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beneficial can be entered into.
440
 We will return to this point later on in our 
discussion of the contractualist model of intergenerational justice. First, however, it 
will be worthwhile to look in more detail at the difference between considering the 
far and the near future and the implications this will have for distributive justice. 
 
8.5  Considering the far future versus the near future 
It appears plausible to assume that the reliability of predictions about outcomes of 
current policies decreases, the further these outcomes lie in the future. In some 
instances, however, the opposite is true. For example, we can predict with great 
certainty that - given current rates of exploitation - fossil fuels will no longer be 
available in 500 years, whereas such a prediction for the next 50 years may be more 
difficult. We may discover more efficient methods of extraction, or tap into 
previously undiscovered reservoirs, which will slightly prolong the availability of 
fossil fuels. If, however, we use current energy consumption as a base line for future 
use and calculate the time frame until complete exhaustion of resources, even such 
technological improvements will be insufficient to continually meet the needs of 
energy consumption in the long run.  
 
On the other hand, considering the long-term future also creates some additional 
problems. First of all, the replacement of existing technology by entirely new and 
unforeseen scientific advances becomes increasingly likely and renders the 
prediction of future resource needs impossible. Consider as a case in point the fact 
that one hundred years ago the increased demand for precious metals such as 
platinum was not predictable, as many technologies that require these resources, such 
as the catalytic converter, had not yet been invented. Similarly, the discovery of 
nuclear energy would have severely impacted on any model of depletion of coal, oil 
and gas resources. Thus, the predictability of events in the future will usually rely on 
some ceteris paribus condition that may not reflect later de facto developments. 
      
Beyond these more pragmatic concerns, the consideration of events in the far future 
also raises some serious ethical dilemmas, in particular from a consequentialist 
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perspective. Nicholas Beckstead has considered one of these dilemmas in his recent 
work, namely the question how demanding a theory of distributive justice can be 
when considering the interests of generations in the distant future. Beckstead argues 
that since the number of future persons will likely be very large, even small utility 
gains to their existence will generate a greater overall level of utility than the present 
use of many resources.
441
 As a result, theories which seek to apply a utility-
maximising principle would prescribe a preservation of most resources for future 
persons, that would be incompatible with our current mode of living (and resource 
consumption). Beckstead acknowledges that this is an uncomfortable conclusion, but 
suggests that if we truly care about intergenerational justice (and endorse a principle 
of utility maximisation), we should nonetheless restrict our consumption 
accordingly.
442
  
 
There are two responses to Beckstead's argument. The first is to deny that we should 
act on a utility-maximising principle, as most non-consequentialists would. However, 
this does not solve the conundrum. As we saw in chapter 4, even if one does not take 
a consequentialist approach, the severe effects on the wellbeing of a large group of 
people should be of relevance to any credible theory of distributive justice. The 
second, more promising response to Beckstead's conclusion is to suggest that it 
cannot easily be applied to the case of AMR and antibiotic usage policies. As we 
shall see next, this is due to the specific consequences of antibiotic use. If we accept 
Beckstead's proposal, it would appear that we have a strong case for severely 
restricting the use of antibiotics, so as to preserve as much antibiotic effectiveness for 
future persons. Yet, the case of antibiotics differs from other scenarios of resource 
distribution, because: 
 
1) overuse of antibiotics will (ceteris paribus) render the resource unusable in 
the future, but 
2) underuse of antibiotics will lead to a higher disease burden, if patients with an 
infection are not treated, remain contagious and infect others.
443
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In other words, even if we share Beckstead's view that the availability of resources in 
the future is far more important than it is today because of the greater number of 
people it affects, the case of AMR does not create overly demanding obligations for 
the current generation. While it would certainly propose the limitation of antibiotic 
use, a utility-maximising principle would also have to account for the associated 
positive externalities for infection control. Thus, even if the interests of generations 
in the far future are included into a utility calculation, the justifiable restrictions to 
the use of antibiotics would still have to permit infection treatment and control today. 
Consequently, such restrictions would likely not lead to highly restrictive antibiotic 
usage policies.  
 
Beckstead's argument differs in many ways from the actual policy decisions that 
concern future persons. One would be hard pressed to identify any policy area in 
which the interests of future persons are given the same weight as those of current 
generations. Instead, a number of policies seem to be built around the concept of 
actively discounting the value of not only future commodities but also that of future 
persons. We shall consider this practice next and examine how it can and should be 
applied in the context of AMR. 
 
8.6  Discounting the future 
When considering the interest of future persons, one of the most frequently discussed 
questions is if (and how) future benefits ought to be discounted.
444
 Broadly speaking, 
time discounting rests on the assumption that benefits accrued at some point in the 
future are worth less than benefits accrued in the present time. In economic theory, 
this principle stems from the assumption that marginal utility of a good decreases 
over time as its production cost falls and that present value should therefore exceed 
future value. The discounting of the value of physical commodities is widely 
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accepted in economics. On the other hand, discounting immaterial goods such as 
wellbeing of future persons poses significant philosophical challenges.
445
 
 
In particular the concept of pure time discounting, which views future benefits to be 
worth less just because they are in the future has been viewed critically by many 
philosophers and economists. John Broome and Derek Parfit for example, have 
argued extensively against the underlying logic of pure time discounting when 
applied to future persons and their wellbeing.
446
 In describing what he calls the social 
discount rate, Parfit explains why the interests of future persons should not count for 
less, just because they will not be realised immediately. Parfit defines this discount 
rate as "the view [that] we can discount the more remote effects of our acts and 
policies, at some rate of n percent per year."
447
 In criticising this common approach 
in welfare economics, Parfit writes  that even though remoteness in time increases 
the chance of unpredictability of events, it does not follow that such remoteness 
should lead us to discount future wellbeing as such and that on this view with a 
discount rate of five percent (which is commonly assumed in economics) "one death 
next year counts for more than a billion deaths in 500 years."
448
 This outcome is 
strongly counterintuitive and Parfit rejects it because it stands against a utility-
maximising principle that is insensitive to when a benefit is realised.
449
 John Broome 
has developed a similar version of this argument by applying it retrospectively. He 
envisions a case, in which people are faced with a calculation of pure time 
discounting. In this case, a small event in the distant past is seen to be worse than a 
large scale catastrophe in the present (an example that follows fundamentally the 
same logic of time discounting as Parfit's example). Broome argues that most people 
will reject this approach, because "the value of one event compared with another 
depends on the time when the valuation is made".
450
 Broome thinks that because we 
tend to only employ time discounting arguments to cases in the future, we have a 
relativist bias, which leads us to view our own situation as comparably more 
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important. The fallacy of this argument, he suggests becomes more obvious when the 
perspective is reversed and current wellbeing counts for less than past wellbeing. 
 
So far, we have considered consequentialist reasons against pure time discounting. 
However, the concept is equally unconvincing on non-consequentialist accounts of 
intergenerational justice. Rawls for example dismisses pure time discounting, writing 
that "[t]he mere difference of location in time, of something's being earlier or later, 
is not in itself a rational ground for having more or less regard for it."
451
 Simon 
Caney has made a similar argument, in which he distinguishes between what he calls 
different 'subjects of discounting'.
452
 While we may discount the value of a 
commodity based on falling production cost, the irrationality of pure time 
discounting becomes apparent, when we talk about ‘goods’ to which the intuition of 
falling production costs does not apply. Caney suggests that discounting moral rights 
constitutes such an irrationality. Consequently, he rejects the idea that a positive 
discount rate should be applied to the wellbeing of future persons whose moral rights 
count just as much as those of present persons.   
 
However, despite reasonable scepticism about pure time discounting we should not 
be too quick to dismiss the concept of valuing present and future benefits differently. 
First of all, as already noted, the discounting of the value of most physical 
commodities (based on falling production costs) is a far less problematic concept. It 
is however doubtful, to which extent this is relevant in the example of antibiotics. As 
noted in chapters 2 and 3, the true value of antibiotics is not the production cost of 
the individual dose but its effectiveness in combating bacterial infections. 
Discounting antibiotic effectiveness, however, would only appear to be a sensible 
strategy if its value could reasonably be expected to decrease. It would appear that 
the most obvious way in which this could be justified is to treat antibiotic 
effectiveness as a renewable resource, as some commentators have done.
453
 If drugs 
can either be recycled or replaced, so that the available 'stock' of antibiotic 
effectiveness can be regularly replenished, then the effectiveness of a specific drug 
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could be discounted. Note, however, that this is not the same as discounting the value 
of antibiotic effectiveness per se, as the assumption is merely that a specific drug can 
be easily replaced. The value of antibiotic effectiveness in general would remain 
unchanged. In addition, as outlined in chapter 3, we should be careful in attempting 
to frame antibiotic effectiveness as a renewable resource. 
While pure time discounting does not appropriately value antibiotic effectiveness 
over time, we may nonetheless have good reasons to treat present and future benefits 
derived from this resource differently. As Cowen has observed:  
 
"Many of the reasons for treating future benefits differently from current benefits do 
not have to do with time discounting per se. For instance, we should discount future 
benefits that are uncertain, but this is discounting for risk rather than for time. 
Similarly, we may discount benefits for future generations because they accrue to 
wealthier persons, but then we are discounting for wealth. Or altruism may affect 
how we weight the future, but again this factor is distinct from time discounting as 
traditionally construed."
454
  
 
How broadly such considerations of uncertainty can be applied has been illustrated 
by Tonn.
455
 His argument for discounting the future starts from the premise that 
human extinction may be inevitable and could be caused by external factors that we 
cannot control (e.g. a meteorite collision with Earth). This element of uncertainty, he 
argues, should be taken into account when deliberating how to value benefits in the 
future and might lead us to discount the value of all future investments because there 
is a chance that they will be left for a time when human life no longer exists. 
However, since most scenarios for human extinction are actually based on human 
actions (e.g. nuclear or biological warfare, or climate change), this line of argument 
is actually more likely to support greater investment into safeguarding the future by 
limiting the use of certain technologies and resources (including antimicrobial drugs) 
than to serve as a justification for discounting it.
456
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Nevertheless, Cowen's observations about discounting also appear to apply to the 
case of AMR. While the absence of clearly identifiable medical innovation to combat 
AMR in the new future should lead us to restrict the use of antibiotics wherever this 
can be fairly and reasonably achieved, it is true that such innovation may be 
technically possible. Consequently, the usefulness (or 'utility') of a given dose of 
antibiotics in the future is variable. It is greater if there are fewer alternative 
antimicrobial drugs and higher levels of drug resistance, which restrict the number of 
alternative therapy options. And it is smaller if technological progress and innovation 
have temporarily or permanently reduced the effect of AMR. Either way, this 
position is entirely compatible with Parfit's, Caney's and Broome's respective 
arguments, because it does not suggest that the value of individual wellbeing or 
health should be discounted. Instead, it merely points out that in light of potential 
technological progress we should not assume the utility of a given resource to be 
static over time. Whether or not one takes this to mean that a positive discount rate 
should be applied, will largely depend on how optimistic one is with regard to 
medical and technological innovation. However, given the current dearth of research 
into new antimicrobial drugs, there does not appear to be a sound argument for the 
discounting of antibiotic effectiveness over time. 
 
In the previous sections it was outlined why AMR presents a special case for 
considerations of intergenerational justice, both with regard to the definition of 
separate generations and the possibility for discounting future benefits. We shall now 
consider how - in light of these caveats - we can come to develop a model of 
intergenerational distributive justice for antibiotic effectiveness. To this end, we will 
examine in greater detail, how consequentialists and contractualists account for the 
interests of future persons. We will begin by considering a consequentialist approach 
to intergenerational justice, which is a useful starting point, because it also introduces 
one of the main challenges to intergenerational justice, namely Derek Parfit's non-
identity problem.   
 
8.7 Consequentialist approaches to intergenerational justice 
As the discussion in chapter 4 already suggested, some of the weaknesses of 
consequentialism in the intragenerational case can be seen as a strength when 
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considering justice between generations. In particular, consequentialism appears well 
suited to account for the interests of future persons that do not yet exist. This 
distinguishes the consequentialist approach from theories that are based on the 
concept of reciprocity, such as most contractualist doctrines, for which the 
consideration of non-existent persons is much more difficult. Consequentialism's 
principle of interpersonal aggregation of benefits and its indifference to their precise 
distribution among people were shown to be problematic for the distribution of 
goods among contemporaries. However, in the intergenerational case both of these 
characteristics are an advantage. As long as utility will be maximised in the long run, 
it should not matter to consequentialist whether the persons to realise these utility 
gains exist at the present time or not.
457
 It is therefore not surprising that 
consequentialist accounts of intergenerational justice have become influential. In 
particular, this is due to Derek Parfit's work, which has not only developed a detailed 
account of intergenerational justice but has also pointed out some fundamental moral 
problems for the fair distribution of resources between generations.
458
 It will 
therefore be useful to consider his arguments in detail.  
 
With 'Reasons and Persons', Derek Parfit has developed one of the most influential 
accounts of intergenerational justice to date - and many of the problems he outlines 
remain central to current discussions of intergenerational justice. The extent of his 
influence is illustrated by the fact that the authors of a recent volume on the topic 
wrote in the introduction that their aim was to broaden the discourse "beyond the 
mere non-identity problem" that Parfit defined.
459
 It is not the purpose of this 
discussion, to summarise Parfit's work on intergenerational justice in its entirety. 
However, the aforementioned non-identity problem and some of its associated 
concerns are highly relevant for the development of a distributive model of antibiotic 
effectiveness that is sensitive to intergenerational justice.  
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8.7.1 AMR and the non-identity problem 
Parfit's consequentialist account of distributive justice proposes that if we accept a 
view of harm which he calls the person-affecting view, it becomes difficult to see 
how exactly future persons can be harmed by the actions of currently living persons. 
He calls this conclusion the non-identity problem.
460
 Parfit rejects the idea that 
consequentialists can only engage with the needs of persons that already exist. In 
'Reasons and Persons' he defends this rejection by suggesting that to create a life that 
is worth living is to realise a benefit, irrespective of whether that person will live in 
the present or the future.
461
 While the question what makes a life worth living seems 
difficult to answer exhaustively, consequentialism allows for a fairly straightforward 
response. If the utility of being alive outweighs the associated disutility, then a 
consequentialist account would suggest that the standard of a 'life worth living' ought 
to be met.
462
 Parfit suggests that if one shares his view about creating lives that are 
worth living, one will also have to endorse a second principle, namely that we benefit 
a future person (who will live a life that is worth living) even if part of the conditions 
that are necessary for creating this specific person will ultimately lead to a lower 
quality of life in the future.
463
 Put differently, even if choices we make today lead to 
a lower overall level of utility in the future, those who will be affected by it cannot 
reasonably be said to be harmed if: 
 
a) our actions were a necessary part of their specific person coming into 
existence and 
b) future people lead lives that are worth living (by the previously defined 
standard). 
 
Parfit explains his position in a quotation that is worth citing in full: 
"Suppose that we are choosing between two social or economic policies. And 
suppose that, on one of the two policies, the standard of living would be slightly 
higher over the next century. This effect implies another. It is not true that whichever 
policy we choose, the same particular people will exist in the further future. Given 
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the effects of two such policies on the details of our lives, it would increasingly over 
time be true that, on the different policies, people married different people. And, even 
in the same marriages, the children would increasingly over time be conceived at 
different times. As I have argued, children conceived more than a month earlier or 
later would in fact be different children. Since the choice between our two policies 
would affect the timing of later conceptions, some of the people who are later born 
would owe their existence to our choice of one of the two policies. If we had chosen 
the other policy, these particular people would never have existed. And the 
proportion of those later born who owe their existence to our choice would, like 
ripples in a pool, steadily grow. We can plausibly assume that, after one or two 
centuries, there would be no one living in our community who would have been born 
whichever policy we chose."
464
 
 
What results from this suggestion is Parfit's non-identity problem (or contingency 
problem): the specific persons who are born in the future owe their existence to the 
actions of previous generations. And if these actions are a necessary precondition for 
future lives that are worth creating, it seems like future persons cannot reasonably 
make a claim to have been harmed by previous actions. The longer the time frame 
we consider, the greater the contingency of general social policies will be. In other 
words, when looking at the far future in a couple of hundred years Parfit suggests 
that it is reasonable to assume that it will affect "the details  of all the lives that, in 
our community, are later lived", including the identity of all living persons.
465
  
  
The non-identity problem poses a serious challenge to claims of intergenerational 
justice. It is also of particular relevance to our discussion of the case of AMR, 
because it implies that, due to the contingency of future peoples' existence on today's 
actions, theories of intergenerational justice cannot invoke a rights claim of future 
persons to preserve limited resources for their use.
466
 Parfit explains this with 
reference to a policy of depletion of natural resources. If we choose to deplete a 
resource, rather than to conserve some or most of it for future generations, this may 
lead to a dramatic reduction in the quality of life in the far future. For a 
consequentialist this reduction of utility is problematic and should be avoided if 
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possible. But if we take the challenge of the non-identity problem seriously, we 
cannot claim that a policy of depletion violates the rights of any future person 
because it will be worse for no one, as long as the life of people in the far future is 
worth living. To be sure, the policy of depletion would lower peoples' living 
standards and life expectancy. However, since their life is the result of all previous 
policy choices, they themselves should not regret that these choices were made, since 
they were the precondition for their existence. 
 
With regard to antibiotic usage policies, the non-identity problem would appear to 
create a significant limitation to any claims that future generations may have - 
especially in the more distant future. Not even the potentially catastrophic scale of 
the consequences of a post-antibiotic era would alter this. And while we could 
choose to preserve antibiotic effectiveness, we could certainly not demand the 
restriction of their use beyond what is medically indicated, as the supposed rights 
clash between current and future persons simply would not exist. The non-identity 
problem leads to the conclusion that future persons, and especially those in the far 
future have no moral right to effective antibiotics.  
 
8.8 Does the non-identity problem really apply to the case of AMR? 
As we have seen, the non-identity problem creates serious challenges for accounts of 
intergenerational justice. However, in the case of AMR it may be less of an obstacle 
to developing a fair distributive model. Primarily, this is due to the speed with which 
AMR has been progressing and the relatively short time period we can expect to pass 
before the remaining antimicrobial resources are depleted. Put more drastically, the 
intergenerational dimension would be much more relevant for the case of AMR, 
were it not for the very fast progression of drug resistance that we witnessed over the 
past decades. As a result, the full consequences of widespread and perhaps even 
complete AMR will likely already affect current generations.  
This observation does of course not resolve Parfit's challenge to intergenerational 
justice. However, the immediacy with which total AMR can be expected shifts the 
focus of the discussion to some extent to a question of intragenerational justice. 
Parfit's discussion of the fair depletion of natural resources is based on the 
assumption that benefits and costs of the policy will be enjoyed in different centuries, 
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thereby not allowing for an overlap between those who (don't) act on the policy and 
those who enjoy its benefits.
467
 Given that it has taken less than seventy years to go 
from the introduction of penicillin to extensive drug resistance that often only leaves 
a single class of effective antibiotics, an argument built on a time frame of multiple 
centuries appears unsuitable for the question at hand.
468
 Nevertheless, even if the 
effects of AMR will already be experienced by current generations, the non-identity 
problem suggests that all future people whose existence is a result of current AMR 
policies, do not have a subsequent moral claim to effective antibiotics. Thus, if we 
take the non-identity problem seriously it therefore weakens the case for rationing 
antibiotics to preserve their effectiveness for the future. 
 
8.9 Social contract theory and intergenerational justice 
In the previous chapter, a contractualist model of distributing antibiotic effectiveness 
was proposed. It was suggested that this model offered the most convincing moral 
account of the challenge presented by AMR and could justify the restriction of 
antibiotic use for the preservation of antibiotic effectiveness.  
Nevertheless, as we have already discussed, the intergenerational sphere appears to 
create some problems for the use of social contract theories because it limits the 
scope for reciprocity. Social contract theories (of which contractualism is one 
variation) usually rely on the assumption that the concerned parties enter mutually 
into agreements. In the case of future persons, this condition cannot be met for 
obvious reasons. In deliberations about intergenerational justice, we must therefore 
deal with the challenge of ‘unidirectional dependence’.469 Today's generation does 
not depend on the action of future generations (assuming no overlap between 
generations), yet the living conditions of future generations will be shaped to a large 
extent by the choices made today.
470
 Rawls thus observes that "we can do something 
for posterity, but it can do nothing for us."
471
 However, as we have seen, many 
concerns of distributive justice in the context of AMR arise in the case of 
neighbouring generations. This leaves much greater scope for reciprocal actions and 
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further strengthens the appeal of social contract theories for the formulation of fair 
distributive principles for the use of antibiotics. We shall here consider two theories. 
First, the Rawlsian principle of just saving between generations shall be discussed 
and it will be explained, why it offers an unsatisfying account for our purposes. 
Secondly, we will examine, whether a Scanlonian model of contractualism can 
provide a more coherent principle of intergenerational justice.  
 
8.9.1  The just savings principle and AMR 
As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the discussion of intergenerational justice 
in contemporary political philosophy is often seen to have its origins in John Rawls' 
work and it will therefore make sense to consider how a Rawlsian perspective on 
intergenerational justice may inform our discussion.
472
 In sections 44 and 45 of ‘A 
Theory of Justice’, Rawls examines how his account of justice as fairness relates to 
intergenerational concerns.
473
 Rawls starts from the premise that a utilitarian 
approach fails to create fairness between generations. As we saw earlier, Rawls is 
sceptical of the practice of discounting. Interestingly, however, his critique is not so 
much directed at an insufficient consideration of future interest. Instead, Rawls 
argues that "the conclusion is all the more likely that the greater advantages of future 
generations will be sufficiently large to compensate for present sacrifices."
474
 Thus - 
from Rawls' point of view - a utilitarian account of intergenerational justice is more 
likely to overemphasise the interest of future generations at the cost of present or 
near-future generations. Of course, a utilitarian response to this might simply be that 
the sacrifices to present generations are unfortunate but morally required. Rawls does 
not engage with this kind of argument and does not provide any additional arguments 
for his view. As a result, it is important to note that Rawls' observation that the 
utilitarian calculus demands excessive sacrifices from present generations does not 
provide much in the form of an argument why it is too excessive.  
 
While he rejects a particularly high rate of savings for future generations, Rawls 
nonetheless recognises a duty to preserve some resources for future generations, 
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which he calls the just savings principle. Rawls describes this principle as "an 
understanding between generations to carry their fair share of the burden of 
realizing and preserving a just society."
475
 The principle seeks to secure "the 
conditions needed to establish and to preserve a just basic structure over time".
476
 
Rawls does not specify what precisely this share ought to be, nor does he believe that 
this question has an obvious answer.
477
 The only clear restriction that Rawls provides 
is that certain 'extremes', such as an intergenerational distribution of goods based on 
a utilitarian calculus are to be avoided.
478
  
 
The application of the just savings principle to the case of AMR is complicated for a 
number of reasons. To begin with, the principle is not designed to govern the 
preservation of specific resources. Its purpose is to preserve institutional structures, 
by saving sufficient capital for their continued existence.
479
 As Meyer has pointed 
out, this principle thus only really requires a weak form of sufficientarianism. Once 
basic structures are established, no further saving beyond what is necessary to 
preserve them is required.
480
 These basic structural requirements would most likely 
not include the preservation of a specific medical resource like antibiotics. In 
addition, Rawls' principle does not get around the unilateral dependence of 
generations, which in turn is likely to affect peoples' actions, at least in non-ideal 
theory.
481
 In order to agree on what constitutes a just rate of saving, Rawls has to 
adjust the original position to apply to an intergenerational case. He suggests that this 
can essentially be done in one of two ways. Either a) by envisioning an 
intergenerational 'assembly', in which people know that all those present are from 
different generations, but no one knows, which generation they belong to, or  b) by 
assuming that those behind the veil of ignorance all belong to the same generation, 
but have no conception of which generation exactly they are part of. Rawls refers to 
this as 'the present time of entry' model.
482
 He rejects a) because "to conceive of the 
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original position in [this way] is to stretch fantasy too far"
483
 and instead he favours 
the second scenario b). However, this original position ought to compel us not to 
save at all for future generations. This is because irrespective of which point on the 
generational continuum the people in the original position end up at, their decision 
about a fair savings rate will merely affect the next generation, and for self-interested 
individuals behind a veil of ignorance the wellbeing of future people is of no 
concern.
484
 Rawls anticipates this objection and adds that people are motivated to 
care for their family and children, and thus will not discount the future as heavily as 
pure self-interest might otherwise dictate. He therefore sees "no inconsistency in 
supposing that once the veil of ignorance is removed, the parties find that they have 
ties of sentiment and affection, and want to advance the interest of other and to see 
their ends attained."
485
 But this is of course not necessarily the case for everyone  
and we have no reason to believe that even for people with such family ties, the 
obligations felt towards family members would motivate everyone to adopt a similar 
rate of saving.  
 
However, it may still be too soon to dismiss the rationale of the just savings 
principle, especially in the case of AMR. After all, the importance of neighbouring 
generations in this context strengthens Rawls' argument, and there is even some 
statistical evidence to support his claim that people would feel compelled to protect 
resources for future persons: a recent large-scale health survey from Sweden  
reported that once people were informed of the long term effects of AMR, 80 percent 
of the more than 40.000 survey participants declared that in principle, they were 
willing to forego small benefits from antibiotic therapy in order to reduce the burden 
of AMR in the future.
486
 
 
Nevertheless, since there will also be instances of distributive justice in which there 
is no generational overlap and because the Rawlsian savings principle fails to 
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provide any guidance on what and how much should be saved for future persons, it is 
unlikely to be useful in practice when developing a workable principle of fair 
antibiotic use. We shall therefore move on to examine, if Scanlon's model of 
contractualism that was developed in the previous chapter offers a more robust 
approach to governing distributive justice between generations. 
  
8.9.2 Contractualism and future generations 
Chapter 7 presented Thomas Scanlon's model of contractualism as a feasible theory 
for engaging with many of the ethical dilemmas that arise in the fair distribution of 
antibiotic effectiveness. However, in the intergenerational context contractualism 
faces some serious challenges. Most obviously, contractualist theories are vulnerable 
to the implications of the non-identity problem. To remind ourselves, the 
contractualist argument is based on principles that could not reasonably be rejected. 
As Page has pointed out, "for a person to reasonably reject (or raise a decisive 
objection to) an act or social policy on the contractualist view, this person must (1) 
be disadvantaged or harmed by it in some way and (2) they must have a complaint 
grounded in this disadvantage which is unanswerable."
487
 As a result, contractualism 
will struggle to accommodate the conclusions of the non-identity problem, because i) 
it states that future persons cannot be harmed by current acts, and ii) we do not know 
the particular identity of future persons who would try to make such a claim in the 
first place.  
 
For Scanlon's theory, the second problem can be resolved within the theoretical 
framework of his approach. Unlike the Rawlsian account that was discussed earlier, 
Scanlon is not concerned with establishing an explicit bargain between people. As a 
result, it is not relevant whether all people affected by an action already exist.
488
 By 
merely asking if a rational agent can reasonably reject a proposed policy, Scanlon's 
thought experiment can also apply to yet unborn persons, especially where such 
fundamental interests as a healthy life expectancy are concerned. However, this does 
not resolve the first challenge of the non-identity problem - if future persons cannot 
be harmed by our actions, then on what grounds could they hypothetically reject any 
                                                          
487
  Page, E. (1999). "Intergenerational Justice and Climate Change." Political Studies 47(1): 53-
66. p. 57 
488
  Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. p. 284-293 
168 
 
policy that they disagree with? An answer to this question can appeal to three 
arguments.  
 
First, we could insist that the non-identity problem fails to apply to contractualism, 
because it does not capture the deliberative process of assessing the reasonableness 
of a principle.
489
 Rahul Kumar has proposed that the non-identity problem can be 
restated in contractualist terms, by asking the following question: “If the existence of 
the wronged is not independent of the wrongdoing, whose standing as a person was 
it exactly that the wrongdoer failed to appropriately take account of in her 
deliberations?”490 Here, Kumar points to the difficulty of conceiving of the interests 
of future persons when they do not yet exist at the time of deliberation and their 
interests will depend in part on the decisions we make. Kumar suggests that rather 
than thinking of future persons as actual persons, we should instead appeal to types 
of persons. Instead of referring to actual persons, these ‘types’ represent sets of 
characteristics and preferences which we could expect to find in future persons. 
Kumar thus suggests that in deliberating what we owe to future persons, 
contractualism does not have to take into account specific identities but merely 
consider the set of characteristics we could expect them to display. On this view, 
contractualism can sidestep the non-identity problem. It should be noted that this 
view seems to be compatible only with the ex ante view of contractualism, which we 
discussed in the previous chapter. An ex post consideration, which would evaluate 
the moral value of actions after the fact clearly would have to account for the actual 
identity of persons. However, as we already suggested that the ex ante view 
constitutes a more plausible interpretation, this does not undermine the argument 
developed here.  
  
A second argument that contractualists can refer to is that in the case of AMR the 
relevant time span is too short for the non-identity problem to fully apply. In his 
examples, Parfit considers a much greater time frame, before he is satisfied, that 
everyone's existence is dependent on earlier policy choices. Kumar calls such acts 
identity-fixing acts, where the act in question is a necessary condition for the 
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existence of a particular individual.
491
 In the case of AMR, because we are primarily 
concerned with relations between neighbouring generations, the number of identity-
fixing acts will be limited, which is to say that some people will come into existence, 
irrespective of what policies we adopt. If these people suffered the adverse 
consequences of a given policy (for example the failure to preserve antibiotic 
effectiveness) their moral claim to having been harmed could not be countered with 
reference to the non-identity problem. Since the policy which has led to the harm was 
not an identity-fixing act the non-identity problem does not apply. As a consequence, 
the specific time frame under which we consider the case of AMR allows 
contractualist theories to largely ignore the effect of the non-identity problem. 
Considerations of the far future, on the other hand, would still have to take into 
account the non-identity problem because here our policy choices would likely be 
identity-fixing for the majority of people. What has thus been suggested so far is that  
we can come to have moral obligations to persons in the near future, whereas we do 
not owe anything to persons in the far future where all particular identities depend on 
previous choices we made and consequently no one with a life worth living can 
claim to have been harmed.  
 
A third reason why we may want to endorse a contractualist model of 
intergenerational justice, despite of the challenge posed by the non-identity problem, 
is that future persons may have moral claims, even if they have not been harmed by 
our actions. In chapter 5 it was argued that persons can be seen to have been harmed, 
even if the harm is imperceptibly small. However, on a Scanlonian account of 
intergenerational justice, this claim can be extended to justify moral claims, even 
where no harm has been done.  
The claim that someone who has not been harmed can nonetheless be wronged 
should be uncontroversial to many non-consequentialists. If, for example, I trespass 
on someone else's property, without that person noticing, I have still wronged the 
owner of the property, as I have acted against his rights and/or express wish. A 
consequentialist theory cannot justify the intuition that such an act constitutes a 
wrongdoing - unless it can explain who has been made worse off as a result of it.  
But suppose the owner of the property never finds out about my trespassing. In this 
case, consequentialist theories would endorse the position that no one has been 
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wronged, since no measurable harm was done. Kumar has suggested that this 
difference between consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories can explain 
why the non-identity problem fails to properly apply to a contractualist account of 
intergenerational justice.
492
 Since Parfit's argument rests on the assumption that we 
do not owe any duties to future persons (as long as their lives are worth living) 
because they cannot be harmed by our actions, a theory, which does not presuppose 
that a moral claim necessitates the presence of some form of harm is immune to this 
kind of criticism.  
Kumar's observation is not a knock-down argument for the non-identity problem, 
since consequentialists can simply dispute that people can be wronged without 
having been harmed. However, what his argument goes to show is that non-
consequentialists do not simply have to acknowledge the non-identity problem either. 
 
8.9.3 Contractualist obligations to future persons - how far can we go? 
The discussion of Scanlonian contractualism in chapter 7 examined proposed a 
principle for antibiotic use, which could not reasonably be rejected. While it 
concluded that more extreme types of restriction of antibiotic use could be 
reasonably rejected, it was also shown that contractualism may still be able to justify 
fairly far-reaching adjustments of antibiotic use policy by invoking a rescue 
principle. However, Scanlon’s rescue principle, which permitted extensive future 
savings even at great costs to present generations required a direct link between the 
sacrifice of present people and the harm that future persons incurred. As we have 
seen throughout the previous chapters, the harm that AMR causes is not attributable 
to individual actions in a way which would justify such a principle. Moreover, as was 
already highlighted in chapter 7, the relevance that antibiotics use has not only for 
the treatment of infections, but also for the prevention of infection makes very severe 
restrictions to their use counterproductive because it would likely result in an 
increased infectious disease burden. 
  
It may therefore appear as if contractualism would ultimately only be able to justify 
limited restrictions of antibiotic use. To this, two objections can be raised. First, the 
extent to which the use of antibiotics can be restricted is clearly not an indicator for 
                                                          
492
  ibid. [Kindle p. 3306 of 6275] 
171 
 
the strength of the normative argument. If the most convincing account of 
distributive justice merely permits limited restrictions of antibiotic use, we may 
simply have to consider alternative strategies  to preserve antibiotic effectiveness. 
Secondly, the restrictions of antibiotics use, which a contractualist principle could 
reasonably justify still far exceed current practice. As a result, any discussion of 
whether the principle is sufficiently restrictive seems premature, as long as 
significant reductions of antibiotic use can still be realised. 
 
8.10 Contractualism or consequentialism? Some concluding remarks 
This chapter has shown that some of the weaknesses, which the consequentialist 
argument displayed in the intragenerational case work in its favour for the 
consideration of intergenerational justice. In particular, its ability to aggregate 
interpersonal benefits allow for the trade-off of interests over time. It has been 
argued in this chapter that the discounting of future benefits cannot be justified, 
where this concerns the wellbeing of individuals. As a result, consequentialism may 
place very substantial demands on our current use of resources. This is due to the fact 
that any utility-maximising principle would likely dictate that most resources are 
preserved for the large number of future persons who can be expected to attain a 
higher level of aggregate utility. This problem is of particular relevance when we 
consider not just the immediate but also the far future. In the case of AMR, however, 
we have seen that the positive externalities, which the careful use of antibiotics 
create for infection control may also extend into the future by creating a world with a 
lower overall disease burden. As a result, the restrictions that a utility maximising 
principle could suggest for the use of antibiotics may be lower than for other scarce 
resources. This should in principle lead to a pattern of antibiotic use that is not too 
dissimilar from that which a contractualist account proposes, albeit for very different 
reasons. The contractualist account of intergenerational justice permitted a level of 
restrictions, which eliminated the use of antibiotics in cases where there is no 
substantial risk of irretrievable harm. Such a principle, it was argued, could not 
reasonably be rejected. As we saw in the previous chapter, this still leaves us with the 
question how exactly an acceptable level of risk could be defined. However, in spite 
of this incompleteness, the contractualist argument seems to be able to offer a 
coherent account of intergenerational justice. It’s ability to sidestep some of the 
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challenges to intergenerational justice, in particular the non-identity problem, 
underline its capacity to take into account both the intra- and intergenerational 
dimension. This separates it from the consequentialist account, which – as was 
argued in chapter 4 – is less convincing in the intragenerational sphere. 
 
What this leaves us with at this stage is an account of distributive justice in the 
context of AMR, which can help us to resolve some of the key moral problems of 
drug resistance. However, its principles do not appear to be reflected in current AMR 
policies. Furthermore, we have seen that that a morally defensible restrictions of 
antibiotic use will have to operate within certain boundaries and will by itself be 
insufficient to preserve antibiotic effectiveness. The following chapter therefore 
proposes a way in which AMR can be reframed as a particular type of policy 
challenge, which requires a much broader response than merely a restriction of 
current use.  
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Chapter 9:  Policy implications: AMR as a super-wicked 
problem 
 
So far, we have focused on the ethical implications of current policies that seek to 
deal with AMR and it has been argued that the trade-offs between persons and 
generations, which necessarily occur as part of these policies, are not sufficiently 
defined and explicitly taken into consideration. The analysis to this point has shown 
that for the coherence and fairness of a policy, it matters a great deal that we get its 
underlying moral justifications right. In the case of AMR, both ensuring and 
restricting access to antibiotics is an essential part of developing a workable 
sustainable policies. However, developing such a policy will inevitably require that 
we go beyond the simplified examples of our discussion of AMR, which were 
designed to test fundamental arguments about the fair distribution of resources. This 
chapter therefore combines the lessons of the ethical analysis with a broader 
understanding of the policy landscape for AMR, in order to make a suggestion about 
what the future of AMR policy should look like.  
It will be suggested that a pragmatic first step towards a better incorporation of the 
moral concerns raised by AMR will be to frame it as a specific kind of policy 
challenge, namely as a so-called super-wicked problem. Super-wicked problems 
display a number of characteristics that prevent the implementation of a single policy 
solution, and highlight the need for long-term policy responses under conditions of 
uncertainty. The strength of the super-wicked problem approach is that it offers an 
explanation why many of the current policies have fallen short of their intended goal 
and how they could be improved in the future. Moreover, it will be suggested that 
framing AMR as a super-wicked problem can help to explain why some suggested 
solutions to the challenge will inevitably fail. The chapter will begin by outlining the 
concept of super-wicked problems, before applying this theory to the case of AMR. 
  
9.1  Wicked problems 
In their article ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning’, Horst Rittel and Melvin 
Webber, who first introduced the term in 1973, describe wicked problems as  
complex challenges to policy makers, which display ten characteristic features, that 
make them unsuitable to a mode of problem solving akin to methods commonly used 
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in natural sciences.
493
 These include the suggestion that solutions to wicked problems 
are neither right nor wrong but will at best be 'better' or 'good enough'
494
, and the 
proposition that wicked problems do not allow for a trial-and-error approach to 
policy-making.
495
 Instead, Rittel and Webber argue, wicked problems only allow 
policy-makers a single shot at solving the problem - if this fails, the unsuccessful 
policy will have changed the original problem to such an extent that originally 
suggested policy solutions are no longer viable contenders and new answers need to 
be found.
496
  
 
Rittel and Webber suggest that the success of social policy in the 19th and early 20th 
century was essentially the picking of low-hanging fruits and that the policy 
challenges that societies are now facing are much more difficult to address. Part of 
the reason for this, they argue, is  "[t]he seeming consensus, that might once have 
allowed distributional problems to be dealt with, is being eroded by the growing 
awareness of the nation's pluralism and of the differentiation of values that 
accompanies differentiation of publics."
497
 Because of their inherent complexity, 
their interrelatedness with other policy fields, and the fact that in many policy areas 
there are several  conflicting goals that might each be reasonably pursued, Rittel and 
Webber argue that policy makers are today faced with problems that are "wicked". 
On their account, these problems are not solvable by traditional instruments of 
policy-making, specifically cost-benefit analysis and system analysis, as these 
approaches fail to capture the characteristics of modern policy challenges. What 
Rittel and Webber suggest is that in the absence of a singular public welfare model, 
which meets all needs and interests equally, the definition of policy goals or targets 
has in itself become a major problem.
498
 
 
The concept of wicked problems, has been applied to a number of areas as diverse as 
coastal governance, liberal arts and design and climate change.
499
 Especially in the 
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latter case, however, the concept has undergone some adaption to better reflect the 
global scale of climate change. Levin et al have suggested that in addition to the ten 
criteria put forward by Rittel and Webber, some policy problems are characterized by 
four additional distinguishing features, making them even harder to solve, or 'super-
wicked'.
500
 In addition to Rittel's and Webber's list, these are: 
 
i) Time for finding a solution to a policy challenge is running out 
ii) Those seeking to solve the problem are part of the cause 
iii) Central authorities to address the problem are either weak or non-existent 
iv) Policy responses discount the future irrationally. 
 
While the concept of super-wicked problems was initially conceived to address 
concerns over environmental sustainability policies, it also lends itself to the analysis 
of AMR, as both problems share the characteristic that current policies focus on the 
generation of short-term improvements, which grossly underestimate the long-term 
consequences of our current actions.
501
  
 
9.2 Does AMR constitute a super-wicked problem? 
As instructive as it may appear to be for the discussion of complex policy challenges, 
Rittel's and Webber's list of criteria that define wicked problems invites at least two 
types of criticism. First, their account remains fundamentally descriptive - while they 
clearly identify and outline the problem, the authors concede that they "have neither 
a theory that can locate societal goodness, nor one that might dispel wickedness"
502
 
and as a consequence, it remains unclear what follows from identifying a policy 
problem as a 'wicked' one. The second kind of criticism levelled against the theory of 
wicked problems is the fact that the conditions of wickedness which Rittel and 
Webber define can in practice be extended to virtually all policy areas and thus may 
simply describe the difficulty of political decision-making rather than distinguish a 
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specific subset of policy problems.
503
 This is problematic because the criteria that 
Rittel and Webber suggest are so broad that to show their applicability to a given 
policy problem is only of limited help in figuring out how to address it. By contrast, 
Levin et al's account of super-wicked problem specifies a set of characteristics, 
which allow for a much more specific classification and thus constitutes a more 
helpful tool to assess the challenge which AMR presents.  
 
As a result, and due to the aforementioned limitations of Rittel's and Webber's 
account of wicked problems, the following discussion will therefore focus on the 
question, whether AMR qualifies as a super-wicked problem. Implicit in this 
discussion is the assumption that AMR does in fact meet the relevant criteria for a 
wicked problem, even though an exact match with all ten of Rittel's and Webber's 
criteria is not required for our purposes. Instead, I wish to focus on the super-wicked 
problem account, and show that while AMR meets most of Rittel's and Webber's 
broad criteria, it certainly meets all of the criteria Levin et al defined for super-
wicked problems.
504
 To be clear, the reason for choosing to focus on the super-
wicked problem criteria is by no means an attempt to side-step any inconsistencies in 
aligning AMR with the original wicked problem formulation. The more recent 
account of super-wicked problems is chosen here because it perfectly captures the 
challenges which policy-makers face in the case of AMR. We will therefore  look at 
each of the four criteria defined by Levin et al in turn, to see how they can inform our 
understanding of AMR as a policy problem. 
 
9.2.1 Criterion 1: Time is running out  
The account of super-wicked problems points to one of the key characteristics of 
AMR, namely the growing urgency with which an effective policy solution must be 
sought. Chapter 2 already discussed this aspect in detail, however the need for action 
is also neatly illustrated by the evolution of the academic discourse on AMR. While 
some papers published in the 90s, which discussed the policy response to extensive 
AMR were warning of "the dawn of a post-antibiotic age", by 2005 the discussion 
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had moved to the question, if we had already entered this era.
505
 As we saw in earlier 
chapters, this change in perception is supported by statistical evidence, with multi- 
and extensively drug-resistant infections becoming more common. And while in 
some developed countries the overall number of antibiotic prescriptions is actually 
decreasing, the proportion of second- and third-line antibiotics - drugs of last resort - 
is steadily on the rise.
506
 In a recent point prevalence study  for England, Public 
Health England reported that Meropenem, an ultra-broad spectrum antibiotic that is 
only administered intravenously, is by now one of the ten most prescribed antibiotics 
in the country.
507
 There is thus an observable trend towards more complex cases of 
AMR, which make treatment more difficult, more expensive, and - crucially - less 
likely to succeed.
508
 And as we saw in chapter 2, there is by now a serious risk of the 
emergence of completely drug resistant bacterial strains, of which a number of cases 
have already been reported.
509
  
 
9.2.2 Criterion 2: Those seeking a solution are part of the problem 
The paramount reason for AMR, the misuse of antibiotics not only by patients but 
also by healthcare providers, is accelerating the depletion of the current arsenal of 
effective antibiotics. This, in turn, does not only make the research into new drugs 
more urgent. It also acts as a disincentive for future research. Margaret Chan, 
Director-General of the World Health Organization alluded to this problem in a 
recent speech, when she asked: "[f]rom an industry perspective, why invest 
considerable sums of money to develop a new antimicrobial when irrational use will 
accelerate its ineffectiveness before the R&D investment can be recouped?" 
Arguably, irrational use is not merely a problem of prescribers. As chapter 2  
discussed, patients have frequently been found not to act in accordance with doctor's 
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recommendations in taking prescribed medication.
510
 However, the super-wicked 
problem account may lead us to view current prescribing behaviour outside of a 
simple assignment of individual responsibility. Super-wicked problems require a 
shift of policy trajectories, rather than incremental changes to existing policies.
511
 As 
was argued in chapter 3, current policies for the use of antibiotics are unsustainable. 
This means that the lack of new antibiotics, combined with their systematic and 
widespread use cannot be addressed effectively, unless fundamental changes to both 
use and procurement are being made. It is important, not to overlook the aspect of 
procurement. The reasons for a dearth of new antibiotics under development has 
been described cogently in the literature, but the discussion has often focussed on the 
lack of incentives for pharmaceutical companies.
512
 Given the scale of the problem 
that AMR presents to modern societies, the maximisation of short-term returns on 
investment as sought by major pharmaceutical companies does not only undermine 
attempts to prolong the effectiveness of antibiotics by developing new ones, it also 
runs counter to all conceivable social interests. As a result, the question if drug 
development ought to be dictated by the projected earning potential of private 
companies ought to receive a much more prominent position in societal discourse. 
 
9.2.3 Criterion 3: Central authorities to address the problem are weak  
The third criterion for the existence of a super-wicked problem is the lack of an 
institutional structure that can meet the challenge effectively and at all policy levels. 
While the development of international co-operations and sharing of information on 
AMR between countries has been greatly improved over the past decades, health 
policy remains fundamentally a national matter.
513
 Moreover, while international 
organisations can - and do - publish guidelines on good practice and prudent use of 
antibiotics, their implementation lies with the respective national governments, and 
their observance cannot be enforced. Non-observance is by no means only a matter 
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of ignorance. In many circumstances, countries may simply lack the control 
mechanisms and infrastructure to meet all requirements and recommendations of 
best-practice guidelines. Since bacteria do not respect national borders, this 
discrepancy in national health policies inevitably threatens the effectiveness of 
antibiotics even in those countries, which enforce the strictest measures to reduce and 
control the use of antibiotics. 
 
9.2.4 Criterion 4: Current policies discount the future irrationally 
As the previous chapter outlined, the appropriate consideration of future risks 
constitutes a tremendous challenge for policy-making and certainly does not only 
apply to the problem of AMR. Yet, the discrepancy between the enormous 
significance that antibiotics have in today's health care systems and the lack of a 
promising long-term plan to protect this valuable resource for future people is 
startling. Moreover, as was argued in chapter 8, the discounting of future benefits 
fails to take into account the interests and claims of persons that have not yet been 
born. Programmes that promote the prudent use of antibiotics may help to slow down 
the further spread of AMR but they are fundamentally flawed as an instrument to 
reverse the current trend. This is because they fail to produce meaningful alternatives 
to the use of antibiotics or to restrict their availability beyond what is (cost)effective. 
Ceteris paribus, a best-case scenario would thus currently consist in the preservation 
of some level of antibiotic effectiveness for the next decade or so, without a 
replacement strategy once AMR progresses further and makes currently effective 
drugs obsolete.  
 
While the lack of a long-term strategy for dealing with AMR perhaps reflects a 
general problem of incorporating the interests of future generations into today's 
decision making, a more comprehensive approach to dealing with AMR is still 
urgently needed. The previous chapter discussed the challenges that an 
intergenerational account of AMR faces but also concluded that the obligations we 
have towards current generations apply equally to future persons. Current policies on 
AMR do not sufficiently recognise these obligations. 
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9.3 How conceptualizing AMR as a super-wicked problem can inform 
policies 
In the previous section, it was outlined why AMR is a super-wicked problem. Next, I 
will provide two arguments for why this account is relevant from a policy 
perspective. Briefly summarised, these are that first, current policies do not 
sufficiently recognise the scope of the problem that AMR poses and second, that 
policy makers might  benefit from looking more closely at suggested solutions to 
super-wicked problems, which differ from current policy strategies. 
 
Currently, many of the policy responses to AMR (and a fair share of the academic 
literature) focus on the procurement of new, effective antibiotics and the cost-
effective use and 'prudent' use of currently available resources (where costs also 
include social costs incurred by higher resistance in the future).
514
 These efforts are 
primarily geared towards addressing problems on the supply side and the creation of 
new resources. In a recent article, Högberg et al illustrated this point by providing an 
overview of current policy responses to AMR, all of which either focussed on 
resource management or the promotion of research into new drugs.
515
 However, if 
AMR is understood as a super-wicked problem, it becomes apparent that these 
responses ultimately have to fall short of the goal of effectively controlling drug 
resistance in the long run. There are at least two reasons for this.  
 
First, and most importantly, framing AMR as a super-wicked problem should lead 
policy makers to place a much stronger emphasis on those policies, which - to 
paraphrase Levin et al - generate a shift in path dependencies.
516
 Path dependencies 
exist along a trajectory of policy decisions where current options are shaped (and 
limited) by previous policy decisions and reflect the thinking and inherent logic of 
planners who made decisions at an earlier point in time. A shift in path dependencies 
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becomes necessary if the trajectory of earlier policy decisions leads to unsustainable 
outcomes. In the case of climate change, for example such path-dependency is 
exemplified by the wide-spread reliance on fossil fuels that is difficult to reverse.
517
 
Because societies are built around a specific method of using a resource, any policy 
to counteract the effects of such a legacy will either only achieve marginal 
improvements by remaining within the same path dependency (e.g. by improving 
efficiency of resource exploitation) or shift the path dependency by making 
fundamental changes to the use and management of resources. In the case of global 
warming a generation of sustainable and effective changes will thus not only require 
the replacement of fossil fuels with an appropriate substitute but also require that we 
re-think the social structures in which such dependencies exist in the first place.  
In the case of AMR, the reliance on antibiotics for both, the treatment and prevention 
of bacterial infections reflects a similar level of path-dependency. Yet, current 
policies which aim at either the development of new antibiotics or the prudent use of 
available resources continue to operate along the same path and do not create 
alternatives to the use of (and need for) antimicrobial drugs. Consequently, current 
policies do not offer long-term solution to the problem of AMR, and generate at best 
what Cashore and Howlett have described as "faux paradigmatic change".
518
 Such 
"faux paradigms" occur, where large scale shifts are implemented but will only 
correct a previous policy failure temporarily.
519
 In the case of AMR, the most 
obvious example for a faux paradigmatic shift is the reliance on a future development 
of a new antibiotic, which is effective against resistant bacteria that are otherwise 
hard to treat. While such a development will provide a significant short-term 
improvement, past experience has shown that in all likeliness, bacteria will 
ultimately adapt to the new drug, and again become resistant. Describing this 
phenomenon, Spellberg recently remarked that - given current policies - "we will 
never truly defeat microbial resistance; we can only keep pace with it."
520
 Thus, in 
the absence of a realistic option for true paradigmatic change (for example the 
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development of a new 'super-antibiotic' that offers lasting effectiveness against all 
bacterial infections), policy makers should abandon the ambition to outpace the 
adaptation of microbes to new antibiotics, and instead may have greater chances of 
devising successful policies, if they focus on the creation of incremental but 
sustainable changes, which no longer follow the same policy trajectory that has been 
prevalent over the past decades.
521
 We will return to the question how such a shift in 
path dependencies could be generated in the next section. 
 
The second argument for understanding AMR as a super-wicked problem is that this 
allows us to make sense of why the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is not an 
appropriate policy response. Chapters 4 and 8 already discussed the limitations of 
cost-based approaches to AMR. AMR shares this characteristic with other super-
wicked problems which - by their nature - are not solvable with standard tools of 
CBA. This is because for most super-wicked problems the cost of inaction now will 
be very high at some point in the distant future. On the other hand, responding to the 
challenge now will often only create benefits at a much later stage, yet impose heavy 
costs on present societies. Citing again the case of climate change, Lazarus observes 
that "the time lag [between the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and any 
mitigating effects on climate change] is at the very least longer than the lifetime of 
any adult. The upshot is that no one who is asked to curtail activities to reduce 
greenhouse gas concentrations will be likely to live long enough to enjoy the benefits 
of that curtailment."
522
 As we already saw in chapter 4, the challenge for CBA in the 
case of AMR is twofold. For one, predicting expected costs and benefits significantly 
into the future is made difficult by increasing degrees of uncertainty about what will 
actually happen at a later stage.
523
 This problem is illustrated by the fact that 
incentive schemes to boost R&D into new antimicrobials have found it hard to 
decide on the size of the incentive, because the calculation of its future benefit was 
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unknown and difficult to calculate.
524
 Furthermore, even if costs and benefits could 
theoretically be assessed accurately in the long run, this still leaves policy makers 
with unanswered questions regarding the appropriate time span to consider as well as 
the rate, at which benefits that are enjoyed by present people ought to be traded off 
against the benefits that future people may enjoy.
525
 
Since super-wicked problems do not allow for a simple calculation of costs and 
benefits of different policy responses, recognising AMR as belonging to this 
category of problems would rule out any policy that relies heavily on CBA. This 
should help to move the current discussion forward and focus it on the policy 
solutions that have the potential to appropriately address super-wicked problems. We 
shall consider next, what such policy solutions may look like.  
 
9.4  Incrementally shifting the path dependency on antibiotics  
So far, it has been argued that current strategies to combat AMR replicate existing 
path dependencies and thereby fail to create sustainable policy solutions. The 
following discussion provides a brief sketch of how a shift in path dependencies may 
be generated, primarily by placing greater emphasis on some aspects of currently 
existing antibiotic usage policies. The suggestions made in this chapter do not 
amount to a comprehensive policy proposal but may help in categorising policies 
according to their expected effectiveness in the long run.  
 
Arguably, any effective response to the threat of AMR will first and foremost require 
a reduction in the dependency on antibiotics. Since there are no feasible alternative 
drugs or treatment options, which could be made widely available in the near future, 
a shift in path dependency is unlikely to be achieved by replacing antibiotics with an 
entirely different mode of treatment.
526
  
Instead, it requires health policy makers to place much greater emphasis on the 
containment of infection, effective infection control, and prophylactic measures such 
as vaccinations that offer protection against infection in the first place. None of these 
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mechanisms are silver bullets, and they may appear less heroic (and are certainly less 
profitable) than the scientific discovery of a (temporary) cure with the help of new 
drugs. However, there are already a number of examples for how a shift towards 
lower dependency on antibiotics could be achieved.  
 
A good example for the successful implementation of such a policy can be found in 
the Netherlands, where a strict screening process for newly admitted hospital patients 
has been introduced to identify individuals who are colonised with MRSA.
527
 By 
isolating these patients early on the Netherlands have managed to achieve one of the 
lowest rates of methicillin-resistance in the world.
528
 This campaign is additionally 
supported by a policy of limiting the access to antibiotics and insisting on the 
widespread use of laboratory-confirmed testing for pathogens prior to a course of 
treatment with antimicrobial drugs.
529
  
A second approach that has been discussed is to focus research on the development 
of prophylactic measures, rather than treatments of acute infections. One example is 
the development of vaccines against bacterial infections, which has shown promising 
results in some areas.
530
 These measures are only examples of how a shift in path 
dependency may be achieved and they have already been discussed in the 
literature.
531
 However, if AMR is understood as a super-wicked problem, this should 
lead us to put much more emphasis on those kinds of policy solutions that can 
generate a shift in path dependency. 
 
It should be stressed that an incremental shift in path dependency will not make 
antibiotics superfluous. Arguably, even in scenarios where prophylactic measures 
such as vaccines are more widely available, opportunistic infections would still 
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require the use of antibiotics.
532
 Consequently, a shift in path dependency does not 
constitute a one-stop remedy for all types of AMR. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that the required quantities would be much lower than those, which are 
currently being used. Moreover, by focussing on incremental changes that counteract 
current path dependencies, the super-wicked problem account of AMR promotes a 
pragmatic policy-making approach that should respect the financial limitations of 
health care systems. 
 
9.5 Summary 
Understanding AMR as a super-wicked problem is not merely a matter of 
categorisation. Instead, it should lead us to reconsider the usefulness of current 
policy approaches. If AMR does indeed present a super-wicked problem, any policy 
approach that relies primarily on large-scale medical and/or technological solutions 
fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the challenge, as well as the level at 
which it needs to be addressed.  
The super-wicked problem account does not provide a simple solution to the problem 
of AMR but it explains why most policy initiatives to date have been unable to 
address the challenge. In this chapter, I have argued that understanding AMR as a 
super-wicked problem ought to lead us to pursue a shift in path dependency, instead 
of fine-tuning existing measures. What is therefore urgently needed is a more 
integrated and internationally coordinated approach to combating AMR, for which 
the available means truly reflect the scope of the problem.  
Of equal importance is the fact that understanding AMR as a super-wicked problem 
highlights the immense importance of considering more fully the effects that a lack 
of effective antibiotics will have on future people. Incorporating the interests of 
future people into policy-making would acknowledge the shared burden, which is 
created by current generations, but (partially) borne by their successors. 
Understanding AMR as a super-wicked problem therefore offers additional reasons 
to consider distributive principles such as the contractualist account developed in 
chapters 8 and 9, which can resolve both intra- and intergenerational problems. 
Furthermore, given the inherent complexity of super-wicked problems, framing 
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AMR as one provides further arguments for the rejection of normative approaches, 
which rely heavily on the exact calculation of costs and benefits. 
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Chapter 10:Discussion and Conclusion  
 
In her recent book ‘The Drugs Don’t Work’ Sally Davies, the Chief Medical Officer 
for England, envisioned a future in which bacterial infections had become entirely 
untreatable. In such a world, she and her co-authors speculated, families might have 
to isolate members that had acquired bacterial infections and effectively leave them 
to die.
533
 The disturbing image was an attempt to shock us into action and realise the 
seriousness of the threat. However, despite increasing awareness of the size of the 
problem, we are still lacking appropriate responses to AMR. This thesis has 
highlighted the moral significance of AMR and explained what implications it has 
for distributive justice.  
 
As the previous chapter outlined, we may be unable to solve the problem of AMR 
once and for all due to its nature and complexity. However, this should not lead us to 
think that we cannot do more (and in fact have an obligation to do so). Current levels 
of antibiotic consumption are likely to produce complete AMR in the near future, 
which makes it necessary to establish how we can reduce our consumption enough to 
at least slow this process down. To date, few policy initiatives have proposed to 
reduce antibiotic use, even if this means that patients will have to forego some 
benefits. The ethical challenges and in particular concerns over distributive justice 
that a more restrictive use of antibiotics presents us with may partly help to explain 
this reluctance. By mapping more clearly, what these challenges are and how they 
could be addressed, this thesis has aimed to contribute to the development of a 
strategy to successfully address AMR. 
 
10.1 Summary of the main argument 
We started our discussion with an exploration of the origins and causes of AMR and 
examined possible solutions. It was concluded that AMR is an inevitable by-product 
of antibiotic use but that the speed at which AMR progresses depends greatly on the 
extent and conditions under which we use antibiotics. Over- and misuse of antibiotics 
were identified as the main sources of AMR, while the lack of research into new 
drugs exacerbated the problem of dwindling antibiotic effectiveness further. This 
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discussion concluded that in the near future, current policies are insufficient to halt or 
reverse the progress of AMR.  
 
In chapter 3, it was proposed that the distributive problem of AMR should be phrased 
in terms of the fair distribution of antibiotic effectiveness. The thesis then considered 
a number of distributive problems, which the existing literature described as being 
analogous. The discussion showed that while some distributive problems such as the 
‘tragedy of the commons’ or greenhouse gas emission bear a certain resemblance to 
the case of AMR, drug resistance is a policy challenge sui generis. This conclusion 
challenged the existing academic view of AMR as being analogous to other policy 
problems. It was suggested that because of the distinctive features of AMR, 
analogical reasoning would not produce workable solutions for the problem at hand. 
These features include the positive externalities that result from antibiotic use, the 
fact that overconsumption of antibiotics is irrational and the possibility of recovering 
antibiotic effectiveness in the long run by either reducing their use or developing new 
drugs.  Chapter 3 concluded that accounts of distributive justice, which consider the 
case of AMR need to answer the question how to distribute a resource that is vital for 
the protection of health but declines in  effectiveness through use.  
 
Chapter 4 constituted a first attempt of formulating a coherent account of the specific 
normative challenges of AMR by considering a consequentialist approach to 
distributive justice. While consequentialist concepts have found widespread use to 
govern the distribution of scare health care resources, our discussion showed that its 
application to the case of AMR was complicated and had to deal with a number of 
inconsistencies. Chief among them was the concern that consequentialism aggregates 
benefits across persons and cannot account for the specific claims or rights or the 
individual. The argument presented in this chapter did not amount to a refutation of 
consequentialism, nor did it entirely rule out its application to the case of AMR. 
However, it challenged the assumption that consequentialism lends itself particularly 
well to decision-making in health policy.  
 
Chapter 5 picked up on an aspect of the discussion in the previous chapter, namely 
the concept of harm. By examining if the moral relevance of AMR could be 
described in terms of either harm or risk, the thesis expanded the existing discourse 
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on the moral challenges of AMR. To this end, Feinberg’s definition of morally 
wrongful harm was adopted and applied to the case of AMR. It emerged that – on the 
assumption that it constitutes a rights violation (which was shown in chapter 6) - 
AMR can be considered morally wrongful due to the harm it causes, even when these 
harms are very small. This concept did face two problems. First, the direct causal 
relationship between individual agency and the emergence of AMR was shown to be 
weak. Secondly, it did not account for the fact that in many instances, the emergence 
of AMR does not only create harm, but also increases the risk of harm to others. 
Consequently, it was examined whether the moral wrongfulness of AMR would be 
better captured by the describing it in terms of the risk of suffering a harm. It was 
shown that such an account did not yield a satisfying result either. Two reasons for 
the rejection were provided. First, the concept of framing subjection to risk as harm 
created a number of epistemic and conceptual problems. Second, the approach 
ultimately limited the scope of morally wrongful harm to instances, in which 
wellbeing was affected by exposure to a known risk. This was rejected as too narrow 
a focus for the moral considerations of AMR. Thus, an account of AMR being 
morally wrongful because of the harm it produces seemed like a possible, albeit 
fairly limited explanation. Moreover, this view still required that we could show that 
AMR constituted a rights violation, which was examined in the following chapter. 
 
In chapter 6, it was shown that a theory of moral rights could explain the normative 
challenges of AMR. The thesis adopted Raz’s interest theory of rights and showed 
that on this account, a right to protection from adverse health outcomes was 
defensible and that a misuse of the necessary resources constituted a violation of 
such a right. This violation would then in turn produce a corresponding duty on 
others. The rights approach was shown to have a number of advantages. In particular, 
it could show that people may have moral claims, even if these claims could not be 
met appropriately. A rights based approach could therefore make sense of a 
normative claim to effective antibiotics even at a stage where no effective drugs were 
available anymore and could therefore plausibly explain why future claims to 
antibiotics have equal moral worth. At the same time, the rights-based approach 
displayed a number of drawbacks. To begin with, while the rights approach can show 
that AMR leads to the violation of individual rights, it was argued that the causal 
remoteness of the corresponding duty made it difficult to see what such a rights 
190 
 
violation could actually compel anyone to do. Another problem, which the right-
based account faced was the difficulty in formulating a right to a resource that would 
naturally diminish over time and could therefore only be provided for a decreasing 
number of the claimants. It was argued that while this did not affect the strength of 
the moral claim, it would reduce the practical relevance of such a right. 
  
Chapter 7 suggested a contractualist approach as a better way of framing the 
challenge of AMR and examined Michael Millar’s work, which has sought to apply a 
Scanlonian principle to the distribution of antibiotic effectiveness. It was argued that 
contractualism can capture and reconcile conflicting interests in the case of AMR 
and that Millar’s proposed principle for the use of antibiotics cannot be reasonably 
rejected by contractualists.  However, the discussion also showed that in some 
instances contractualist accounts would permit more restrictive policies for the 
protection of antibiotic effectiveness than the one proposed by Millar. It was 
suggested that this should not lead us to reject Millar’s principle, but that the latter 
may require more specification. In particular, the thesis showed that the conception 
of acceptable risk in Millar’s account is insufficiently specified and raises a number 
of normative challenges regarding its measurement. It was concluded that in the 
intragenerational context, a contractualist approach seems to offer the most 
comprehensive account of the distributive challenge presented by AMR. 
 
Since AMR does not only affect current generations, but also limits the availability 
of effective antibiotics in the future, chapter 8 considered intergenerational concerns 
of drug resistance. Intergenerational distributive justice raises a number of specific 
problems. The thesis discussed four of these challenges in detail, namely the problem 
of distinguishing between generations (especially if they overlap), the difficulty of 
defining obligations towards people in the far future, the practice of discounting 
future events and the non-identity problem. It was proposed that the last  of these 
presented the greatest challenge to any account of intergenerational justice The thesis 
then considered how both consequentialism and contractualism could deal with this 
challenge. It was argued that due to the fast progression of AMR, Parfit’s non-
identity problem does not fully apply, since complete drug resistance may already 
occur within the life span of the present generation. However, it was also outlined 
that a contractualist account of AMR could deal with the non-identity problem, as its 
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assessment for the reasonableness of actions was possible without knowing the exact 
identity of future persons. The contractualist account of intergenerational justice 
permitted a level of restrictions, which eliminated the use of antibiotics in cases 
where there is no substantial risk of irretrievable harm. Such a principle, it was 
argued, could not reasonably be rejected. As we saw in the previous chapter, this still 
leaves us with the question, how exactly an acceptable level of risk could be defined. 
However, in spite of its incompleteness the contractualist argument seems to be able 
to offer a coherent account of intergenerational justice. Its ability to sidestep some of 
the challenges to intergenerational justice, in particular the non-identity problem, 
underlines its capacity to take into account both the intra- and intergenerational 
dimension. This separates it from the consequentialist account, which – as was 
argued in chapter 4 – is less convincing in the intragenerational sphere. 
 
After having developed an account of both intra- and intergenerational justice in the 
case of AMR, we were left with the question what this account implied for practical 
decision-making, especially since the principles that were suggested for a fair 
restriction of antibiotic use are not reflected by current policies. Chapter 9 proposed 
that a possible first step was to start by reframing AMR as a particular kind of policy 
challenge, a so-called super-wicked problem. These problems are characterised 
among other things by their degree of complexity and their lack of an easy 
technological solution. In addition, they displayed four key components, namely a 
lack of time to respond, the entanglement of those seeking a solution in the causes of 
the problem, a lack of central authorities and a tendency to discount the future 
irrationally. This approach, it was suggested, highlighted two crucial aspects of 
AMR. First, it underlined the urgency, with which a solution must be sought, and the 
lack of any technological fixes. Secondly, the concept of AMR as a super-wicked 
problem showed that to control AMR, we will have to do more than merely restrict 
the use of antibiotics, although this is clearly a highly important first step. What the 
approach suggested was that policies would have to create a shift in path dependency 
and that a comprehensive strategy to address AMR must also seek to reduce the 
reliance on antibiotics in the future, in order to mitigate the effects of AMR. 
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10.2 What can we conclude? 
In chapter 1, it was outlined that this thesis has had two primary aims. First it sought 
to examine how and why AMR is a moral problem and raises questions of 
distributive justice. Second, it aimed to develop a framework within which these 
questions of distributive justice could be answered.  
 
Reflecting on the overall argument, how can we answer these questions now? The 
argument that was developed in this thesis suggested that AMR constitutes a very 
specific normative challenge, which is unlike other collective action problem. AMR 
creates a scarcity of antibiotic effectiveness, which is a resource that we would 
ideally like to make available to everyone who needs it. However, the rate at which 
we use it will also determine how quickly the remaining stock is depleted. 
Given that antibiotics play such a crucial role in health care, this presents us with a 
serious dilemma, namely how to preserve a resource which is of such great use to 
many but for which we have not found a sustainable way of consumption. It was 
argued that the need to find a solution to the problem of how to fairly distribute 
antibiotic effectiveness was exacerbated by the fact that suffering from a drug-
resistant infection could be legitimately described as a morally wrongful harm, which 
adversely affects the health of many and thereby violates their individual rights.  
 
The second question we initially asked was how the concerns of distributive justice, 
which are raised by AMR could be adequately addressed. We have seen that 
different moral theories prescribe different answers to this question but that a 
particularly convincing account has been put forward by contractualists. The 
contractualist argument led to the proposition and defence of a principle of antibiotic 
use, which restricted their application to instances where they could prevent a serious 
risk of irreversible harm. This principle, it was suggested, could not be reasonably 
rejected by anyone, not even by those with whose individual interests it conflicted. 
Moreover, the principle was shown to be sensitive to the interests of future persons, 
who may be the ones to bare most of the burden of AMR. It was also suggested that 
contractualism could in principle require greater sacrifices but that this seems to 
conflict with the use of antibiotics, which do not only create negative externalities in 
terms of AMR but also positive externalities in the shape of a lower disease burden 
for infectious diseases. As a result, there are limits to the restriction of antibiotic use 
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beyond which a further reduction may become counterproductive. This applies in 
particular to highly contagious diseases.  
While the contractualist argument offers a coherent account of distributive justice in 
the case of AMR, it was also shown not to be without flaws and it some leaves 
important questions unanswered. For instance, we did not establish a convincing 
account of what constitutes an acceptable level of risk, and whether this figure 
should be the same in all countries and for all people. These are important questions, 
which may be addressed in future research projects but will hopefully also become 
part of a public discourse about the principles that should govern the fair distribution 
of antibiotic effectiveness in the future. 
 
It was already emphasised in the first chapter that the proposed contractualist 
principle did not amount to a complete refutation of alternative theories. Indeed, we 
saw that consequentialist arguments and rights-based approaches have specific 
strengths but failed to account for the question at the heart of contractualism, namely 
what we owe to each other. This, I believe, is the crucial question, we should try to 
answer, when deciding about the allocation of scare resources like antibiotic 
effectiveness. The restriction of antibiotic use will be a difficult process and it will 
require that we forego small or moderate personal benefits for the sake of other 
people’s wellbeing. Similarly, our own life may at a later stage depend on the 
preservation of antibiotic effectiveness. The contractualist approach captures this 
element of reciprocity, and may also help to communicate the need for a policy that 
is unlikely to be popular.  
 
A recent example nicely exemplifies the difficulty of explaining the need for more 
restrictive antibiotic policies. In January 2014, the Danish Ethics Council released a 
statement on the normative problems of AMR.
534
 It also mentioned the possibility of 
rationing of antibiotics as one potential option to preserve antibiotic effectiveness – a 
suggestion that was immediately met with a hostile reaction from the press. On the 
following day, one of Denmark’s largest newspapers, Politiken, ran a story entitled 
‘Ethics Council: Doctors should no longer care about the individual patient’.535 Part 
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of our task, it appears, will therefore be the formulation of arguments that are not 
only philosophically plausible, but also accessible and convincing to a broader 
audience. Philosophical enquiries into AMR may therefore end up being more 
concerned with the relevance of conclusions for policy formulation and public 
communication than is common even in the field of applied ethics. However, this  
merely reflects how much is at stake for both, future generations and us. 
 
10.3 Should we base ethical decisions on worst-case scenarios?  
At this point in our discussion, the conclusion looks rather bleak and the restrictive 
principles for antibiotic use that were proposed in this thesis were all based on the 
assumption that  the problem of AMR will continue to grow. Chapter 2 showed that 
these assumptions are firmly grounded in scientific research and reflect the opinions 
and concerns of health protection agencies. However, this perspective also raises a 
question that pertains to bioethics and public health ethics more generally, namely 
how to balance the consideration of (realistic) scenarios with very bad consequences 
against a tendency to base policies on worst-case assumptions. Worst-case scenarios, 
it has been noted by numerous commentators before, rarely make for good policies.  
They overreach on the intended goal, create legal exemptions that may ultimately be 
unnecessary or assign financial and human resources to preparedness initiatives that 
could be put to better use elsewhere.
536
 Most importantly, however, they risk that 
individual rights are curtailed without proper grounds.
537
 As the discussion in 
previous chapters has shown, erring on the side of caution in the case of AMR may 
not simply be a matter of over-investing into new drugs. It may also involve that 
medication is withheld from patients or that individual liberties are curtailed. The 
opportunity cost of basing policy decisions on an overly pessimistic scenario is thus 
not only a financial one - it will affect the health and lives of a large number of 
people.  
 
However, if we take this kind of argument seriously we also must not overlook the 
fact that AMR already adversely affects the lives of thousands of people every year. 
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Thus, the formulation of policies to meet this problem should differ notably from any 
scenario in which we are merely considering the possibility of a future adverse event, 
say an act of bioterrorism or a particularly virulent and lethal strain of pandemic 
influenza. The occurrence of these events is a mere probability (albeit of varying 
magnitude); they may or may not come about. Policy-making in the case of AMR 
does not have to operate under this assumption. The catastrophe is already unfolding 
and the most recent reports on the development of AMR are similar in their tone and 
message. The problem has been variously described as an ‘apocalyptic scenario’ and 
‘catastrophic’.538 What we may, however, have to reconsider is the communication 
strategy for AMR. In particular the language of large-scale catastrophes can produce 
counterproductive results. Brigitte Nehrlich, for example, has observed that 
references to disasters and an impending apocalypse bring with them as sense of 
inevitability that does not reflect the true range of responses still at our disposal.
539
 In 
closing, we shall return to these possible responses, and discuss what the next steps 
in a response to AMR could be. 
 
10.4 Where do we go from here? 
In this thesis, it has been shown that the restriction of antibiotic use can be justified 
on grounds of distributive justice and in order to preserve higher levels of antibiotic 
effectiveness for the future. However, as things stand, this measure alone – though 
important – is unlikely to halt or even reverse the current trend of increasing AMR. 
A successful strategy to address the problem of AMR will have to go further. As we 
have seen, there are limits to the restrictions we can reasonably place on antibiotic 
use, but there are other options we can and pursue.  
These options include the strategies that were outlined in chapter 2, for example the 
investment into R&D for new antibiotics, especially against Gram-negative bacteria. 
However, some measures may be easier and quicker to implement. These include the 
development of better communication strategies that explain not only why AMR is a 
threat to health, but also what makes antibiotic effectiveness a special and important 
commodity and what everyone can do to protect it. In the past, such strategies appear 
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to have failed to create a general awareness for the mechanisms and consequences of 
AMR. We may also have to think about ways in which we can communicate the 
difficult decision of restricting the availability of antibiotics. As we saw earlier in 
this chapter, the rationing of antibiotics is unlikely to be met with widespread public 
approval.  
 
Most importantly, however, our discussion of super-wicked problems highlighted the 
importance of looking for ways in which we can reduce the path dependency of 
AMR. To reduce the future dependence on AMR will likely require extensive 
research into alternative strategies to reduce the rate of bacterial infections, for 
example by developing vaccines or improving infection control in hospitals. As a 
result, the introduction of such measures will come at a significant cost. However, a 
shift towards strategies that reduce the burden of bacterial infections, rather than 
produce more antibiotics would also mark a paradigm shift in the way we view 
infections. Michael Specter has recently made the case for a reconsideration of our 
views towards bacteria, fittingly entitled ‘Germs are us’. In it, Specter proposes that 
our traditional approach of viewing bacteria as germs to be eradicated does not only 
misunderstand their importance for our environment, but also creates a narrative 
which focuses on the complete eradication of pathogens.
540
 This war rhetoric of 
eradication is unhelpful and obscures the fact that a ‘victory’ over bacterial infections 
is unlikely to be achieved by any new drug.
541
 
Reducing our initial dependence on antibiotics and recognising that we will not win a 
pharmaceutical war against microbes, no matter how far we escalate it, may therefore 
be a step towards a more balanced view of bacteria. And it could help to move the 
policy discourse forward by offering possible alternatives to the vicious circle of new 
drug developments and increasing AMR.  
 
In summary, it therefore seems that despite the fast progression of AMR we still have 
a number of options to meet our obligations to preserve antibiotic effectiveness for 
the future. It is time that we started taking these obligations seriously. 
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